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Civil Procedure. Limoges v. Nalco Co., 157 A.3d 567 (R.I. 2017).
A Rhode Island Supreme Court justice has the authority to vacate
a trial justice’s grant of summary judgment if the hearing justice
made an improper credibility assessment, a function that should
be reserved for the factfinder at trial. The function of the trial
justice in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Plaintiff,1 Mr. Limoges, was employed by the State of
Rhode Island as an Assistant Administrator to Facilities and
Operations.2 He oversaw the heating, ventilation, and air
condition (HVAC) systems in the state’s courthouses.3 On August
8, 2008, a pipe at the Garrahy Judicial Complex in Providence
ruptured, causing the chemical bromine to leak.4 While cleaning
up the scene, Mr. Limoges inhaled the chemical, which later
caused him to suffer pulmonary injuries.5
The Plaintiffs brought suit against three different companies:
Nalco Company; Arden Engineering Constructors, LLC (Arden);
and JMB Mechanical, Incorporated (JMB), for negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty claims.6 After discovery
proceedings had begun, both JMB and Arden moved for summary
judgment.7 JMB was granted summary judgment on all three
counts; Arden was granted summary judgment on the counts of
strict liability and breach of warranty.8 At the time of the initial
hearing, the Plaintiffs were unprepared to argue against the
1. Plaintiff in the singular refers to Mr. Limoges. Ms. Limoges’ sole
claim is for loss of consortium.
2. Limoges v. Nalco Co., 157 A.3d 567, 568 (R.I. 2017).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 568–69.
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summary judgment motion on the negligence count; therefore, the
hearing justice granted the Plaintiffs an additional two weeks to
secure expert testimony that would assist in establishing a prima
facie negligence case.9
After the two weeks, the Plaintiffs filed a supplemental
memorandum and an expert affidavit.10 In response, Arden was
granted an additional two weeks to respond to the Plaintiffs’
expert affidavit.11 When it was time for the hearing justice to
consider Arden’s motion for summary judgment, Arden asserted
that it should be granted summary judgment because the
Plaintiffs’ expert’s conclusions were not supported by any facts.12
The Plaintiffs contended that their expert’s affidavit was sufficient
to establish duty and breach.13 Unconvinced by the expert’s
affidavit, the hearing justice granted Arden’s motion for summary
judgment.14 The Plaintiffs timely appealed to Rhode Island

9. Id. at 569. The hearing justice treated Plaintiffs’ argument as a
request under Rule 56(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
10. Id. The affidavit said, in relevant part:
(a) Arden, by and through its agents, employees, and assigns, had a
duty to carefully and professionally remove, replace, and/or re-align
the piping connecting the chemical feed system to the chillers when
it replaced the chillers in 2006; and (b) Arden, by and through its
agents, employees, and assigns, had a duty to carefully and
professionally inspect the piping connecting the chemical feed
system to the chillers when it replaced the chillers in 2006; and (c)
Arden either caused the crack in the piping when it replaced the
chillers in 2006, at which time it removed, replaced, and/or realigned the piping connecting the chemical feed system to the
chillers; or (d) Arden failed to inspect and discover a crack in the
piping connecting the chemical feed system to the chillers when
removed, replaced, and/or re-aligned the piping connecting the
chemical feed system to the chillers in 2006.
Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that “there [was] no paper record
here that [showed that the pipe] was cracked in 2006.” Id.
13.
Id. at 570. “Of the four elements of negligence, only duty is a
question of law.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Alston, 154 A.3d 456, 459 (R.I.
2017)). The remaining three elements of a negligence claim are fact-based,
and the hearing justice may treat the issue of negligence as a matter of law
only if the facts suggest only one reasonable inference. Id. at 570–71 (first
quoting Hall v. City of Newport, 138 A.3d 814, 820 (R.I. 2016); and then
quoting Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 2013)).
14. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 570.
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Supreme Court.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon conducting a de novo review of the hearing justice’s
grant of summary judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
sought to determine whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
[a] matter of law.”16 Here, it was uncontested that Arden replaced
the chiller units in 2006.17 According to Plaintiffs, genuine issues
of material fact remained in dispute about the standard of care
Arden was required to use while replacing the chiller units.18
The Court held that the Plaintiff’s’ expert affidavit, combined
with the other documents available to the hearing justice, raised a
material question of fact as to whether Arden was responsible for
the Plaintiff’s injury.19 In drawing all inferences in favor of the
Plaintiffs, Arden, while replacing the chiller units, should have
noticed that the piping was incorrect, and should have warned the
Plaintiff or whoever oversaw the HVAC system at the courthouse
in 2006.20
Additionally, the Court addressed Arden’s concern that the
expert affidavit was “insufficient because it is unsupported by the
record, wholly conclusory, and does not set forth any specific facts
as the basis for [its] opinion that Arden was somehow
negligent.”21 The Court reiterated that hearing justices should
not make credibility assessments during summary judgment
motions.22 The function of a summary judgment motion is issue
15. Id.
16. Id. (first quoting Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I. 2005);
and then quoting Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I. 2003)).
17. Limoges, 157 A.3d at 571.
18. Id.
19.
Id. Plaintiff swore in an interrogatory answer that Arden did install
the pipe in question. Additionally, Plaintiff testified during a deposition that
one of Arden’s employees told him that the pipe that burst was the wrong
kind of pipe. Id.
20. Id. at 572.
21. Id. at 571.
22.
Id. (first quoting DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 131 (R.I. 2013);
and then quoting Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 48 (R.I. 1999)).

2018]

SURVEY SECTION

609

finding, not issue determination.23 At trial, the Plaintiffs’ expert
would be subject to cross-examination, and it would ultimately be
left up to a factfinder to determine his credibility.24 For the
foregoing reasons, the Court vacated the Superior Court’s
judgment and remanded the record to that tribunal.25
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that
the primary role of the Court when ruling on a motion for
summary judgment is issue finding determinative, not issue
determination. The Court recently addressed a similar issue in
which they also vacated the Superior Court’s grant of summary
judgment in a negligence action.26 These rulings reiterate the
distinct functions of the Court and the factfinder regarding
summary judgment motions. It is the role of the courts to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Only
when a review of the admissible evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party reveals no genuine issues of
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, will the Supreme Court uphold the hearing justice’s
grant of summary judgment.27
Issue determination (in this case, credibility assessment), is a
function that is left to the factfinder at trial. During trial,
witnesses will be subject to three truth telling tools: the oath,
demeanor evidence, and cross-examination. It is with these tools
that a factfinder will be able to determine the credibility of a
witness. Here, Arden would have the ability during crossexamination to point out the deficiencies in the Plaintiffs’ expert
affidavit.28 Under oath, the Plaintiffs’ expert would have to
explain his findings and state the facts that supported his
conclusory statements. The jury would have the opportunity to
23.
Limoges, 157 A.3d at 571–72 (first quoting Goodkin v. DeMaio, 664
A.2d 1119, 1120 (R.I. 1995) (mem.); and then citing Hodge v. Osteopathic
Gen. Hospital of R.I., 265 A.2d 733 (1970)).
24.
Limoges, 157 A.3d at 572.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. (citing Williams v. Alston, 154 A.3d 456 (R.I. 2017)).
27.
Limoges, 157 A.3d at 570 (first quoting Nat’l Refrigeration, Inc. v.
Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I. 2008); and then quoting
Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I. 1999)).
28.
Limoges, 157 A.3d at 572.
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study the expert’s responses, both voluntary and involuntary, and
decide whether they deemed his testimony reliable. By vacating
the Superior Court’s judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reaffirmed the distinct functions of the courts and the factfinder
regarding summary judgment motions.
This decision emphasized the high bar the Rhode Island
Supreme Court requires moving parties to meet to be granted
summary judgment. A summary judgment is an
“extreme
remedy” that is only to be granted when there is no genuine issue
of material fact.29 Here, even though the expert affidavit lacked a
factual basis, the Court still decided that it was enough to deny
summary judgment. The Court determined that the conclusory
statements from the expert affidavit, paired with other documents
that were available to the hearing justice at the time, was enough
to create a genuine issue of fact. This issue of fact is all that is
needed for a summary judgement motion to be denied. The
credibility of the expert’s statements is not of concern at this point
in the proceedings. The Plaintiffs will be left to their proof at
trial.30
Here, the Court properly reversed the Superior Court’s grant
of summary judgment because: (1) plaintiffs should get their day
in court; (2) credibility determinations are made at trial; and (3) a
trial provides the forum for revealing flaws in the affidavit, not a
summary judgment hearing. Plaintiffs seek litigation with the
assumption that they will have an opportunity to be heard, to
voice one’s complaints and explain one’s actions. A grant of
summary judgment in favor of the moving party eliminates this
opportunity. Courts should continue to set high bars to shield
plaintiffs from losing their day in court. Additionally, credibility
determinations should always be made at trial. As mentioned
above, credibility determinations should be left to the trier of
facts. This responsibility requires the jury to determine what the
truth is and who is telling the truth. By allowing credibility
determinations to be made at summary judgment proceedings,
courts are robbing jurors of their primary role. By requiring a
high bar for moving parties to be granted summary judgment, the
courts are preserving the ultimate function of the jury. Lastly,
29.
30.

Id. at 570.
Id. at 572.
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trial provides a forum for each legal counsel to reveal flaws and
errors in the other sides arguments. It is important that these
faults are recognized at trial and not during a summary judgment
hearing because these faults are brought to the attention of the
jury, which impacts their decisions making abilities.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether Arden was responsible for the
Plaintiffs’ injuries. Here, the Court reiterated that a hearing
justice should not make credibility assessments, a function that
should be reserved for the factfinder at trial.
Michaela Bland

Civil Procedure. Pullar v. Cappelli, 148 A.3d 551 (R.I. 2016). A
defendant forfeits the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when
the defendant, through delay or conduct, gives a plaintiff a
reasonable expectation that it will defend the suit on the merits or
causes the court to go to some effort that would be wasted if
personal jurisdiction is later found lacking.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 2006, Plaintiff, Anthony Pullar, a Rhode Island resident,
entered into a three-year employment contract with Defendant,
Louis Cappelli, a resident of New York, to serve as the captain of
defendant’s sailboat, the S/Y Atlanta.1 Defendant retained the
right to terminate the agreement at any time for good cause.2 If
Plaintiff served the entire three-year term, he would be entitled to
a bonus of $150,000, equivalent to one year’s salary.3 Plaintiff
began performance in September of 2006.4
On August 1, 2009, one month before the contract expired,
Defendant terminated Plaintiff without cause and failed to deliver
the bonus payment.5 As a result, Plaintiff filed suit on April 22,
2011, in the Superior Court of Rhode Island, alleging breach of
contract and seeking compensatory damages for the money owed.6
Defendant, in his answer, asserted that Rhode Island did not have
personal jurisdiction over him.7 Notwithstanding Defendant’s
jurisdictional challenge, the case proceeded in the Superior Court
for more than three and a half years, during which the parties
participated in pretrial proceedings and engaged in extensive
discovery.8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Pullar v. Cappelli, 148 A.3d 551, 553 (R.I. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On December 4, 2013, the case advanced to court-annexed
arbitration. Defendant, after fully participating in the arbitration,
received an adverse result and rejected the arbitration award.9
Plaintiff then moved to assign the case to trial.10 On November
14, 2014, Defendant filed a motion requesting for the case to be
assigned to the continuous jury trial calendar.11 After a hearing
on the motion, the case was set for trial.12
On December 9, 2014, three and a half years after filing his
initial answer and faced with an impending trial, Defendant
moved for summary judgment, arguing that he lacked sufficient
contacts with Rhode Island to be within the forum’s jurisdictional
reach.13 In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant forfeited the
defense by failing to assert it for three and a half years while
actively participating in the litigation process.14 Despite
Plaintiff’s contentions, the Superior Court granted the motion,
concluding that Defendant had not waived the defense because it
was properly asserted in his answer.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg wrote for the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.16 The Court, as a matter of first
impression, was tasked with determining “whether a defendant in
a diversity action may waive or, more befittingly, forfeit the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction through delay or other
conduct that demonstrates an intent to litigate.”17 In other words,
whether Defendant forfeited the defense by actively participating
in the litigation for more than three and a half years without
asserting it.18 The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s review of a
lower court’s dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction
is de novo.19
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 554.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
See id.
Id. (citing Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836
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To challenge a forum’s jurisdictional reach, a defendant must
assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in the answer.20
However, a defense is not preserved indefinitely simply because it
was raised in the answer.21 More specifically, a defendant,
through delay or conduct, forfeits the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction by indicating an intent to litigate on the merits or
causing the court to go through some effort that would be wasted
if jurisdiction is later found lacking.22 Thus, the Court held that
Defendant forfeited the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by
participating in pretrial proceedings, discovery, and arbitration,
for more than three and a half years without asserting the defense
despite having numerous opportunities to do so.23
In so holding, the Court first looked to Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance.24 Rule 12 requires
defendants to seasonably assert affirmative defenses at the
pleading stage to eliminate unnecessary delay, avoid unfair
hardship on plaintiffs, and conserve judicial time and resources.25
Nevertheless, federal courts invoke the doctrine of forfeiture when
a defendant fails to seasonably assert a properly raised
jurisdictional defense or submits to the jurisdiction of the court
through his or her conduct.26
The Court––persuaded by the established precedent of the
federal courts––adopted the doctrine of forfeiture.27 To determine
whether a defendant forfeited jurisdictional defense, the Court
looks to: (1) the amount of time that passed between the answer
and the assertion of the defense; (2) whether the defendant
actively participated in the litigation before raising the defense;
and (3) whether the defendant had an opportunity to raise the
defense throughout the litigation process.28
A.2d 1113, 1117 (R.I. 2003)).
20. Id. at 555.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 558.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 556. See Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476–77 (R.I. 2004)
(“Rhode Island Rule 12(b) is nearly identical to Rule 12(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
25. Id.
26. Id. See Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 62 (2nd Cir.
1999).
27. Id. at 557.
28. See id.
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Turning to the facts of this case, three and a half years passed
between Defendant’s answer and motion for summary judgment
for lack of personal jurisdiction.29 Prior to Defendant’s motion on
the eve of trial, Defendant participated in extensive discovery,
appeared at pretrial hearings, submitted motions, participated in
arbitration, and even consented to a jury trial.30 Defendant had
numerous opportunities to raise the defense throughout the
litigation process and failed to do so.31 Notably, the Court opined
that it would be contradictory for a defendant to consent to the
terms of a court proceeding and at the same time remain outside
the court’s jurisdictional reach.32
Ultimately, Defendant slept on his right to challenge
jurisdiction in Rhode Island.33 Due to Defendant’s unjustified
delay and considerable pretrial activity, the notions of fair play
and justice were not offended by requiring him to accede to
jurisdiction in Rhode Island.34 Accordingly, the Court vacated the
judgment of the Superior Court, and remanded the case for
further proceedings.35
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of
forfeiture and held that a defendant forfeits the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction when the defendant demonstrates an intent
to litigate and causes the court to waste valuable time and
resources prior to finding that jurisdiction is improper.36 The
forfeiture doctrine is essential to effectuating the purpose of
requiring affirmative defenses to be promptly asserted.37 Absent
the possibility of forfeiture, litigants’ ability to raise an affirmative
defense and subsequently assert that defense later in the
litigation process creates unnecessary delay and is unfair to the
opposing party.38
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 557.
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After adopting the doctrine of forfeiture, the Court analyzed
the two ways in which a defendant may forfeit an affirmative
defense.39 Although the language employed by the Court seems to
suggest that forfeiture occurs either by indicating an intent to
litigate or causing the court to go through some effort that is
wasted if jurisdiction is later found lacking, it is evident that
defendant’s actions in this case exceeded the requirements of both
prongs.40 After three and a half years of litigation and
considerable pretrial activities, it was evident that the assertion of
the defense was nothing more than an eleventh-hour attempt to
avoid an inevitable trial.41 Thus, the “defendant’s silence in the
face of a known right” constituted forfeiture of the affirmative
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.42
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, as a matter of first
impression, adopted the doctrine of forfeiture and held that a
defendant may forfeit the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction,
through unjustified delay or conduct, that either indicates an
intent to litigate or causes the court to waste valuable time and
resources if jurisdiction is later found lacking.43 The Court
determined that the adoption of the doctrine was necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the rule, requiring defendants to raise
affirmative defenses in responsive pleadings to avoid unnecessary
delay.
Stephen D. Lapatin

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
See id. at 558.
See id.
Id.
Id.

Contract Law. Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537 (R.I. 2016). An
implied contract or claim for promissory estoppel cannot be found
when essential elements of the contract were never agreed upon
by the parties. Additionally, even where a plaintiff succeeds on an
unjust enrichment claim, he must present the proper evidence to
determine the amount of damages he is entitled to in order for the
court to render an award.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Plaintiff Mathew M. Cote began working for Defendants, John
Aiello and his wife, Anna-Maria Aiello, in 1986 at their
construction company, Aiello Construction.1 Aiello Construction
closed in 1991 and Plaintiff was transferred to a sister company,
Richmond Sand and Gravel.2 However, Plaintiff disagreed with
how the company was being managed by Jeffrey Nero (Nero),
Defendants’ son-in-law, and Plaintiff left the company later that
year.3 In May 1996, Defendants offered Plaintiff an opportunity
to return to their business at a sister company, RRM, and told
Plaintiff that he could purchase RRM in the future.4 No further
terms were discussed and Plaintiff accepted the employment
opportunity.5 Plaintiff was then named President and Vice
President of RRM and acted as its Chief Executive Officer in
1997.6 Several times over the years, Defendants indicated that
Plaintiff could purchase RRM in the future, including in 1999,
when Mr. Aiello told Plaintiff that “when he was ready to retire he
would sell RRM to [Plaintiff] at fair market value and would
structure a payment plan for him.”7 However, again, no further

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Cote v. Aiello, 148 A.3d 537, 540 (R.I. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Id.

617

618 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:617
details were ever discussed.8 Plaintiff loaned RRM approximately
$400,000 interest-free over the years, all of which was paid back to
him, in order to promote the success of the company.9 In June
2005, Defendants sold RRM to Peter Calcagni (Calcagni).10
Defendants informed Plaintiff of the sale within a few days, and
Plaintiff became “visibly distraught”; however, Plaintiff continued
to work for Calcagni.11
On August 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Mr.
Aiello, alleging: “(1) promissory estoppel; (2) breach of an oral
contract; (3) breach of an implied contract; (4) breach of a quasicontract; and (5) constructive trust.”12 On May 15, 2007, Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint bringing the same claims against
Defendant Mrs. Aiello and alleging fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.13
A bench trial commenced in Rhode Island Superior Court in
November 2011.14 In June 2013, the trial justice issued a
comprehensive bench decision that summarized the testimony of
Plaintiff, Nero, Calcagni, and Calcagni’s successor, Michael
D’Ambra.15 However, she did not include the testimony of
Defendants whom she found to be dishonest and untrustworthy.16
Although she believed that Defendants had acted “despicabl[y]”
she rejected all of Plaintiff’s claims other than that of unjust
enrichment.17 The trial justice specifically stated that the
conversations between the parties in 1996 and 1999 did not offer
sufficient evidence that all material terms of a contract were
agreed upon.18 Plaintiff’s damages were limited to reasonable
interest on the loans he had given to RRM; however, Plaintiff had
not presented evidence at trial to show what the interest rate of
this loan should have been, and thus he was not awarded any

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
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damages.19 Judgment was entered on July 29, 2013, and Plaintiff
filed a timely notice of appeal.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to analyze the
various claims Plaintiff brought, recognizing that the factual
findings in a nonjury case “are granted an extremely deferential
standard of review”; however, questions of law are reviewed de
novo.21
In his appeal, Plaintiff argued the conversations between the
parties in 1996 and 1999, in conjunction with their subsequent
conduct, was sufficient evidence of an implied contract, and the
trial justice acted erroneously in focusing only on the two
conversations when analyzing the claim.22 However, the Court
stated that although the trial justice began by summarizing
testimony and noted these instances as the only concrete
occurrences, she also referenced the “frequent conversations”
between the parties, which is proof that she did not overlook this
material evidence.23 Further, the Court agreed with the trial
justice’s analysis that there was no implied-in-fact contract,
reasoning that the 1996 conversation merely showed a “possibility
of a future ownership opportunity,” and the 1999 conversation
only added to the uncertainty.24 For example, the parties did not
discuss what the term “retirement” meant and what would
happen if Defendants died before retiring. Additionally, there
were no terms established regarding payment and financing.25
Therefore, the Court did not find that there was mutual assent
between the parties.26 For these reasons, the Court concluded
that it “fail[ed] to glean any evidence indicating that the parties
agreed on essential terms of a purchase agreement as to establish
19. Id. at 544.
20. Id.
21. Id. (first quoting State v. Gianquitti, 22 A.3d 1161, 1165 (R.I. 2011);
and then citing Lamarque v. Centreville Savings Bank, 22 A.3d 1136, 1139–
40 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 545.
24. Id. at 545–46.
25. Id. at 546.
26. Id.
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an implied contract for the purchase of RRM.”27
Plaintiff similarly argued that the trial justice overlooked
material evidence in regard to his promissory estoppel claim by
focusing solely on the 1996 and 1999 conversations, and that she
erred in concluding that Plaintiff did not reasonably rely on
Defendants’ promises.28 Again, the Court determined that the
trial justice did not overlook material evidence, and the Court
agreed that Defendants’ statements only discussed possibilities
and future opportunities and “lacked any certainty and
specificity.”29 The Court refused to expand the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and find an uncertain promise constituted
promissory estoppel merely because the statements were
repeatedly reiterated.30 Further, even if the promise was
sufficiently certain, Plaintiff needed to prove reasonable reliance
on the statements, which he failed to do.31 The Court determined
that a reasonable businessman would not rely on such vague
statements, and in the nine years since the statements were
initially made, a reasonable person would have discussed the
promise further and reduced it to writing.32 Lastly, even if there
was reliance it was beneficial to Plaintiff because he gained
“considerable experience” while also “earning an acceptable
salary.”33 Therefore, Plaintiff failed on each element of his
promissory estoppel claim.34
Plaintiff also argued that the trial court erred in dismissing
his fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims because the trial
justice found Defendants’ testimonies to be dishonest but then
concluded that Defendants had “simply changed their minds”
about the sale.35 However, the Court found that the trial justice
correctly relied on the general principle that “mere unfulfilled
promises to do a particular thing in the future do not constitute
fraud in and of themselves.”36 This principle applied equally to
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 87 at 122 (2013)).
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Plaintiff’s claim for negligent misrepresentation because the
misrepresentation must be based on fact and not some potential
future event.37
Plaintiff’s final contention on appeal was that the trial justice
erred in limiting damages to reasonable interest on the loans.38
The Court recognized that there is no prior case law that provides
a rule for the amount of damages that can be recovered in a claim
for unjust enrichment, and thus, generally a plaintiff’s damages
should not necessarily be confined to a reasonable rate of
interest.39 However, the Court held that the trial justice did not
err in limiting Plaintiff’s damages to a reasonable rate of interest
because Defendants did not “engage[] in any deceit or legal
wrongdoing,” and Plaintiff was repaid the loans in full.40 The
Court compared Plaintiff to a moneylender who “generally is not
compensated for the positive benefits derived by the loan, such as
increased profitability, unless the agreement provides for some
sort of royalty.”41 Further, the record shows only a “vague and
attenuated” connection between the loans RRM received from
Plaintiff and the success of RRM.42 Therefore, the
Court
concluded that the trial court acted appropriately in confining the
damages to the reasonable rate of interest on the loan, for which
there was no evidence of at trial.43
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, as well as the trial court,
clearly acknowledged that Defendants acted reprehensively and
that this type of behavior should be discouraged; however,
Plaintiff simply did not satisfy the elements of his claims under
established case law.44 Although the Court may have been
sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation, it relied heavily on the
established principles of law to provide reasoning for Plaintiff’s
inability to succeed on his claims.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 551.
See id. at 543, 545, 547, 548–49, 550.
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However, in evaluating Plaintiff’s claim regarding an impliedin-fact contract, the Court stated that there were “gaps in basic
contract terms, including the payment structure, financing, and
purchase price.”45 Yet, the Court had previously acknowledged
that during the parties’ conversation in 1999, Defendants told
Plaintiff that “he would sell RRM to [Plaintiff] at fair market
value and would structure a payment plan for him as well.”46
This appears to provide some evidence of payment structure, a
payment plan, and a purchase price at fair market value.
Ultimately, even if this was sufficient evidence of an agreement
about the financial aspects, other elements of the contract were
absent, making it obvious that there was a lack of mutual
assent.47
Although it was clear that the Court disagreed with
Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff,48 ruling in favor of Plaintiff on
Plaintiff’s implied-contract and promissory estoppel claims would
have set a dangerous precedent. As discussed above, certain
terms were clearly absent from the agreement between the
parties.49 If the Court had enforced this agreement as an impliedcontract or promissory estoppel, the Court would have created
uncertaintly surrounding the requirements for an enforceable
contract and as such, far more loosely agreed upon statements
could be considered a contract. For these reasons, the Court
correctly concluded that Plaintiff could not succeed on either of
these claims.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that material terms of
an oral agreement were missing and thus could not support claims
for promissory estoppel or an implied-in-fact contract. Although
the Court then found that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy
a claim for unjust enrichment, without evidence as to the
45. Id. at 546.
46. Id. at 541.
47. For example, Defendant had stated that this would occur when he
retired; however, the term “retirement” was never defined, and the parties
never discussed what would happen if Defendant died before retirement.
Further, Plaintiff “did not consider himself bound to an agreement to
purchase.” Id. at 546.
48. Id. at 543.
49. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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appropriate amount of damages, the Court refused to award
monetary damages.
Brenna P. Riley

Contract Law. Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 152 A.3d
1128 (R.I. 2017). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that an
arbitrator exceeded his authority by failing to interpret a contract
provision in a manner consistent with the essence of the parties’
agreement, and by directly contravening the contract language in
determining payments due to the contractor. Here, the arbitrator
chose to identify a wrongful termination made by the contractor as
a termination of convenience, a power specifically reserved by the
property owner in the contractual agreement, and therefore,
reached beyond the terms of the contract. There are limited
circumstances in which an arbitral award can be reviewed, but
when an arbitrator exceeds the terms and contradicts the essence
of the parties’ contract, the court cannot permit the award to
stand.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In September 2012, Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the Flynns)
entered into a contract1 with Nappa Construction Management,
LLC (Nappa) to construct an automobile repair facility in
Narragansett for $360,000 (the project).2 The contract allowed
the Flynns to terminate the contract for cause and they could
order Nappa to suspend, delay or interrupt construction for any
amount of time without cause, so long as the Flynns notified
Nappa in writing.3 Additionally, the contract provided the Flynns
with the ability to terminate the contract for convenience and
without cause provided that the Flynns give Nappa written
notice.4 Work began in December 2012, but the construction was

1. Nappa Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 152 A.3d 1128, 1129 (R.I.
2017). The parties used an American Institute of Architects form contract,
specifically A101-2007 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Contractor. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1130.
4. Id.
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erratic and Flynns complained about the pace of the project.5
On June 24, 2013, the Flynns notified Nappa, via letter, to
cease all work on the project because the construction no longer
followed the building plans and did not satisfy industry
standards.6 Specifically, the cement floor for the project was
noncompliant.7 In return, Nappa submitted a request for
payment which was then denied by the Flynns.8 Subsequently, on
July 29, 2013, Nappa informed the Flynns that they had breached
their contractual duty and sought mediation.9 Nappa then
proceeded to terminate the contract on September 4, 2013 due to
nonpayment.10 In response, the Flynns filed an action in the
Rhode Island Superior Court alleging that Nappa wrongfully
terminated the contract.11
In accordance with the terms of the contract, Nappa
demanded arbitration to resolve the issue.12 Nappa accused the
Flynns of breaching the contract, improperly stopping the work,
and failing to make a payment.13 Subsequently, the Flynns
denied all the allegations and filed a counterclaim, alleging Nappa
had breached the contract and was negligent in the performance
of its contractual duties.14
On March 13, 2015, the arbitrator issued his award after
determining there was fault on the part of both the Flynns and
Nappa.15 The arbitrator determined that problems existed with
the cement floor that Nappa constructed, but the Flynns’ order to
cease all work on the project was not a satisfactory way to resolve
the issue and had only worsened the matter between the two
parties.16 Additionally, the arbitrator found that Nappa’s request
for payment, which included the cost of the deficient cement floor,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id.
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was a poor decision.17 Consequently, Nappa’s determination that
the Flynns had breached the contract, and their subsequent
termination of the contract for the Flynns’ failure to pay, were not
justified.18 Although the arbitrator determined that Nappa was
not justified in its termination of the contract, the arbitrator
resolved to invoke the termination for convenience clause of the
contract.19 Essentially, the arbitrator decided that neither party
was in breach of the contract and that the easiest way to resolve
the tense relationship was to terminate the agreement.20 The
arbitrator then awarded Nappa $37,979.97, which represented
Nappa’s expenses, expected profit, and additional back charges,
and offset by the cost to remedy the defective cement floor.21
Nappa filed a petition in Superior Court seeking to confirm
the arbitrator’s award.22 The Flynns subsequently filed a motion
to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded
the scope of his powers and disregarded a provision of the contract
by terminating the contract for convenience.23 Nappa defended
the award by arguing the arbitrator acted within his powers and
did not disregard provisions of the contract because the contract
featured a broad arbitration provision.24 Additionally, Nappa
argued that the arbitrator can transform a termination for cause
into a termination for convenience because a court can do so when
both clauses are featured in a contract.25 On May 8, 2015, the
hearing justice denied the Flynn’s motion and granted Nappa’s
petition to confirm the award because the arbitrator had
attempted to utilize the terms of the contract in his decision,
which indicated his regard for the contract itself.26 Furthermore,
the hearing justice determined the arbitrator was within his
power to declare the termination for convenience instead of the
termination for cause.27 The hearing justice also explained that
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1131–32.
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as a matter of policy, courts traditionally favor the finality of an
arbitrator’s award.28 On May 29, 2015, final judgment was
entered, and the Flynns filed a timely notice of appeal.29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Writing for the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Suttell stated that although the Court must review an arbitrator’s
decision with deference, the Court is compelled by statute to
vacate an award “[w]here the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.”30 Additionally, the Court stated that although parties
can contract to use arbitration in order to avoid litigation,31 a
party may not circumvent an arbitral award by arguing to the
courts that an arbitrator made a mistake.32 The Court also held
that “[a]n arbitrator may exceed his or her authority by giving an
interpretation that fails to draw its essence from the parties’
agreement, is not passably plausible, reaches an irrational result,
or manifestly disregards a provision of the agreement.”33
The Court noted the arbitrator’s determination that Nappa
was not justified in declaring that the Flynns had breached the
contract, nor in terminating the contract for failure to pay.34
However, despite of the revelation that Nappa improperly
terminated the contract, the arbitrator concluded that the toxic
relationship shared by the parties must end.35 Subsequently, the
arbitrator employed the “fiction” that the Flynns had terminated
the contract for convenience and determined that neither party
was at fault.36 Although the contract provided the Flynns with
the ability to terminate the contract for convenience without
28. Id. at 1132.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9-18 (2017)).
31. Id. at 1133 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d
88, 92 (R.I. 1991)).
32. Id. (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 687 A.2d 440,
441 (R.I. 1996)).
33. Id. (quoting Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition
Co., 91 A.3d 830, 835 (R.I. 2014)).
34. Id. at 1134.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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cause, so long as they provided Nappa with written notice, the
Court found no evidence that the Flynns notified Nappa that they
were terminating the contract.37 In fact, the only letters sent
from the Flynns to Nappa were those that exercised the Flynns’
contractual right to suspend construction.38 Therefore, there was
no indication that the Flynns wanted to terminate the contract,
but rather only evidence that Nappa needed to address the
deficiency of the cement floor.39
Here, the Court held that by utilizing the termination for
convenience, a provision only to be exercised by the Flynns at
their discretion, the arbitrator disregarded the language of the
contract and ignored an explicit contract provision.40 The Court
noted that when “an arbitrator’s decision conflicts with the
express terms of the agreement, it fails to draw from the essence
of the agreement.”41 Additionally, the Court ruled that the
arbitrator’s findings were in direct contradiction to his
conclusions.42 The arbitrator did not find the “stop-work order”
issued by the Flynns to be a satisfactory way to address the
cement floor issues, but determined they did not breach the
contract.43 Similarly, the arbitrator found that Nappa was not
justified in terminating the contract, but then proceeded to award
Nappa as though they were not in breach of the contract.44
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Superior
Court, which had confirmed the award, and remanded the record
with directions to grant the Flynns’ motion to vacate with further
proceedings to be consistent with the opinion.45 Justice Indeglia,
with whom Justice Flaherty joined, dissented from the majority’s
opinion.
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court successfully navigated the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227, UFCW Union, 205 F.3d 922
(6th Cir. 2000)).
42. Id. at 1134–35.
43. Id. at 1135.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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narrow margin between the policy of giving arbitrator awards
deference in the name of finality and ensuring that the bargainedfor benefits established in a contract between two parties are
sufficiently represented.46 The fact of the matter is the parties
voluntarily entered into an agreement, and their decision to bind
themselves to the terms of the contract, even if that agreement is
a form contract,47 should be thoroughly protected when an
arbitrator misinterprets or ignores a provision.48 To uphold an
arbitrator’s award for finality’s sake when that award fails to
respect the agreement that the parties’ made would be plainly
unjust.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Indeglia agreed with much of
the majority’s analysis, but disagreed with the conclusion that the
arbitrator disregarded the law while interpreting the contract.49
While the dissenting justices acknowledged the Court must vacate
a decision in which the arbitrator exceeds their power, they
reminded the majority that the court has continuously afforded
great deference to arbitrators’ decisions.50 Here, the dissent
accepted the arbitrator’s conclusion that fault lay on both parties
and that the relationship had to be concluded.51 Accordingly, the
dissent found that the arbitrator, in an attempt to be fair and
reasonable, determined the contract was terminated through the
provision that afforded the Flynns the ability to terminate the
contract for convenience.52 In doing so, the dissent found the
arbitrator was acting within the contract and that “under no
circumstances can the arbitrator’s award be considered in excess
of the terms of the parties’ contract, a manifest disregard of the
law in its interpretation, or an irrational result.”53 Indeed, the
dissent believes that “although the arbitrator could not find a
termination for cause, a termination for convenience effectively”
occurred, and therefore the arbitrator simply resolved the dispute
on a provision that was in the contract.54
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1135–36.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The dissent desired to uphold the longstanding policy of
paying deference to the decisions of arbitrators; however, a
contractual provision providing one party the option to terminate
a contract for convenience should not permit an arbitrator to
exercise that option on behalf of, and indeed without the consent
of, the party to whom that provision empowers. The majority’s
opinion that the order to cease work on the project issued by the
Flynns represented a part of the continuing relationship is more
persuasive than the idea that a termination for convenience was
exercised by the Flynns at that moment. In spite of the
longstanding policy of the Court to pay deference to the decisions
of arbitrators, the Court should not be afraid to vacate awards
when an arbitrator has exceeded their power in the name of
protecting the essence of a contract between two parties.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that an arbitrator’s
decision should be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his
authority by failing to interpret a contract provision in a manner
consistent with the essence of the parties’ agreement. Here, the
arbitrator ended the relationship between the two parties by
exercising a termination for convenience, which was a power
specifically reserved by one of the parties. In finding that a
termination for convenience had occurred without the consent of
the party to whom that power had been vested, the Court properly
determined the arbitrator exceeded his power.
Andrew Plocica

Criminal Law. Duvere v. State, 151 A.3d 314 (R.I. 2017). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court does not require a translator for
defendants who speak English as a second language when the
defendant’s statements and demeanor during the hearing indicate
that the defendant understands proceedings. A court may use the
defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of the plea and ability
to answer the court’s questions to infer that the defendant does
not need an interpreter. Further, a court can utilize the
defendant’s long-time employment in the United States as further
evidence of understanding English.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On June 13, 1997, Rhode Island State Police stopped Jean O.
Duvere (the Defendant) for speeding.1 The Defendant worked as
a cab driver at the time and was driving back to New York after
delivering a passenger to Boston.2 The Defendant consented to a
search of the cab, and police officers found two “bricks” of
marijuana in his trunk.3 The police charged the Defendant with
possession of between one to five kilograms of marijuana with
intent to sell, and bail was set at $25,000 with surety, which the
Defendant posted.4 The Defendant attended his arraignment at
Kent County Superior Court in October, and the justice allowed
the Defendant to maintain his residence in New York.5 The
Defendant did not attend any of the following court proceedings,
and the Superior Court issued a warrant for his arrest.6
In 2009, the Defendant travelled to Haiti and was arrested
upon his return to New York.7 The police brought him to Rhode
Island, and he pled nolo contendere to possession of between one
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Duvere v. State, 151 A.3d 314, 315 (R.I. 2017).
Id.
Id.
21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.01.1 (2017); Duvere, 151 A.3d at 315.
Duvere, 151 A.3d at 315–16.
Id. at 316.
Id.
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and five kilograms of marijuana.8 The Superior Court sentenced
the Defendant to ten years, with eighteen months to serve in
person, and eight and a half years suspended with probation.9
Though the Defendant spoke English as a second language,
neither he nor his attorney requested an interpreter, and the
Defendant also stated that he could understand and speak
English.10 The Defendant’s attorney verbally explained the plea
form, and the Defendant stated that he understood that he was
forfeiting some rights by agreeing to the plea.11 After his plea, the
Defendant later appeared before the same justice several times
without his attorney, and at no point did he claim that he did not
understand the court or request an interpreter.12
On June 11, 2013, the Defendant filed an application to
vacate his nolo contendere plea, claiming that he did not know or
understand the charges against him.13 Based on the Defendant’s
thirty-year residence in the United States and the Defendant’s
ability representing himself at prior hearings, the hearing justice
denied the application.14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
Defendant’s plea was “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” and
therefore the nolo contendere plea was not a violation of Rule 11 of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.15 The Defendant
argued that the hearing justice “should have insisted that a
Haitian-Creole interpreter be available. . . .”16 The hearing justice
has discretion to appoint interpreters if necessary, and when a
defendant would have “significant language difficulty” the court
“should make such a determination of need.”17 Further, the Court
is deferential to the hearing justice and does not change the
hearing justice’s determination “[a]bsent ‘clear evidence of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.01.1 (2017); Duvere, 151 A.3d at 316.
Duvere, 151 A.3d at 316–17.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 318.
Id. (quoting State v. Ibraham, 862 A.2d 787, 798 (R.I. 2004)).
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prejudice.’”18
In determining if there was “clear evidence of prejudice,” the
Court examined the two reasons the hearing justice concluded
that the Defendant had not needed a translator.19 First, the
Court examined the hearing record and found there was no
evidence that the Defendant did not understand the
proceedings.20 When asked if he understood English, the
Defendant responded “Yes, I speak English. Yeah, I
understand.”21 Further, the Defendant answered all questions
asked of him without any signs of difficulty.22 Beyond the mere
ability to speak English, the Defendant gave the hearing justice
evidence that he understood the plea. When asked to explain why
he was taking a plea, the Defendant explained “[Counsel] told me,
but I suppose for 18—I got eight years probation. I say that’s
okay.”23 The Court reasoned that this statement showed that the
Defendant understood that he received a lesser sentence for the
nolo contendere plea.24
Second, the hearing justice relied on the fact that the
Defendant had lived and worked in the United States for thirty
years.25 In State v. Ibraham, the Court held that eight years of
employment was enough time to infer an understanding of
English.26 Applying that reasoning to this case, the Court held
that the hearing justice did not err in determining that the
Defendant did not need an interpreter based in part on the
Defendant’s thirty years of employment in the United States.27
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court examined two types of
evidence to determine the necessity for the hearing justice to use a
18. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318 (quoting State v. Reyes, 141 A.3d 647, 653
(R.I. 2016)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318–19; State v. Ibraham, 862 A.2d 787, 798
(R.I. 2004).
27. Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318.
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translator in hearings. The first type looked at the Defendant’s
statements and mannerisms during the hearings.28 This direct
evidence showed that the Defendant claimed to be proficient in
understanding and speaking English and demonstrated this
ability when questioned by the justice.29 The Defendant could
also summarize the result of the plea and even voiced approval for
the outcome.30 From this, the Court reasonably concluded that
the Defendant was able to agree to the plea in a “knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary” manner.31
However, the Court also upheld the hearing justice’s
determination that the Defendant’s length of employment in the
United States showed he understood English without considering
any other factors.32 While a defendant’s employment can be
relevant to knowledge and understanding of English, the length of
time alone is far from the only factor that should be considered
when inferring a defendant’s English proficiency from their work.
In Ibrahim, the defendant’s employment was better suited to show
his ability to speak and understand English.33 In that case, the
defendant worked for seven years as a project manager at a
technology company, which would require extensive interaction
with, comprehension of, and direction of English speaking
workers.34 The defendant in Ibrahim is easily distinguished from
the Defendant in Duvere, where it is conceivable that the
Defendant would only need to know the names of locations and
simple directions to work as a taxi driver.35 It is also conceivable
that the population the Defendant served as a cab driver may
have primarily been a Haitian-Creole speaking neighborhood of
New York.
The Court was correct to determine that the Defendant could
speak English well enough to understand the court proceedings
based on his statements during the hearings.36 However, the
Court oversimplified the analysis from Ibrahim, where the Court
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id. “I say that’s okay.” Id.
Id. at 317.
See id. at 318.
See State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 798 (R.I. 2004).
Id.
Duvere, 151 A.3d at 315.
Id. at 318.
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inferred English proficiency from the length of the defendant’s
employment, as well as the defendant’s field of work and
managerial position.37 The Court simplified the nuanced analysis
and inference from Ibrahim, and instead inferred English
proficiency from the Defendant’s length of employment alone.38
CONCLUSION

When a defendant’s statements and demeanor indicate that
the defendant understands English, the court does not need to
insist that an interpreter be present during a court proceeding.
Evidence that the defendant understands English include the
responses the defendant gives to direct questioning, as well as the
defendant’s ability to explain the consequences of his or her plea.
Further, the court can infer an understanding of English from the
length of the defendant’s employment in the United States.
Ryan M. Cummins

37.
38.

Ibrahim, 862 A.2d at 798.
Duvere, 151 A.3d at 318–19.

Criminal Law. State v. Adams, 161 A.3d 1182 (R.I. 2017). An
FBI agent’s cell phone testimony is admissible when he is
qualified as an expert, the State shows he reached his conclusion
in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable manner,
and his inability to pinpoint cell phones at a certain time went to
the weight of the evidence. Cell phone records are admissible
through employee of a cell phone provider, which merged with a
Defendant’s provider, because the employee had knowledge of the
record-keeping and used her employer’s processes.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In June and July of 2012, James Adams (Adams or
Defendant) accessed Backpage.com for escort services and had
female escorts meet him at his designated location, a first-floor
garage that he was staying in.1 On July 20, 2012, Patrolman
Jared Hardy of the Cranston Police Department responded to the
address of 391 Framington Avenue in Cranston, Rhode Island
after reports of an “oozing liquid . . . coming out of the garage”
that was described as having a “bad smell.”2 Upon entering the
garage, he found a badly decayed body that he believed to be an
African-American female.3 Detective William John Palmer from
the Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) unit of the Cranston
Police Department was called to the scene and discovered a cell
phone, a Massachusetts identification card, and multiple debit
cards belonging to one Mary Grier (Grier).4 On July 22, Detective
Gates from the Cranston Police Department met with Jesse
Adams, brother of the Defendant, who confirmed that James
Adams had been living in the garage.5 Following this meeting,
1. State v. Adams, 161 A.3d 1182, 1187 (R.I. 2017). Backpage is a
classified advertising website where individuals can list a variety of products
and services, including escorts and strippers. Id. at n.1
2. Id. at 1187–89.
3. Id. at 1188.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Detective Gates began to prepare a photo array containing the
Defendant’s image and contacted the Defendant’s parole officer to
ascertain the Defendant’s location.6 It was at this time that
detectives confirmed that the decedent found in the garage was
Grier.7 Detective Gates was able to obtain Grier’s cell phone
number and obtain search warrants for certain cell phone records
and simultaneously secured an arrest warrant for James Adams.8
On July 23, 2012, Detective Gates interviewed Jessica Dyer
(Dyer) after receiving information that there may have been a
second female present the night Grier was murdered.9 Dyer
claimed she had been assaulted by a man in the same garage on
June 30, 2012.10 Detective Gates then conducted a photo array
containing six males with similar characteristics, and Dyer
identified the Defendant as her assailant.11 On July 24, 2012, the
detectives learned that the Defendant was at the Charlesgate
Manor apartment complex in Providence.12 Detective Jaime
Cahill of the Cranston Police Department was inside the building
when he observed the Defendant “running through the parking
lot.”13 After the police apprehended the Defendant, Detective
Souza collected a “red and black backpack, a couple of bottles of
beer, a bottle of water, and an Airsoft pistol.”14 Detective Souza
test-fired the Airsoft pistol from the backpack to confirm that this
“pistol [was] an operable firearm.”15 On July 26, 2012, Evonna
Malave, who previously reported to the police that, on June 24,
2012, she had been robbed and sexually assaulted by a man on
School Street in Johnston, went to the Johnston Police
Department, where she gave a statement and identified the
Defendant as her assailant.16
On December 6, 2013, Defendant was charged by criminal
indictment with the murder of Grier, two counts of felony assault
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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upon Dyer, two counts of committing a crime of violence while in
possession of a firearm, two counts of first-degree sexual assault
upon Malave, first-degree robbery of Malave, and unlawful
possession of a firearm.17 These charges resulted in a ten-day
jury trial, which had a total of twenty-eight witnesses.18 Doctor
Carolyn Revercomb (Revercomb), a former assistant medical
examiner at the Office of State Medical Examiners for Rhode
Island, testified that her conclusion was that Grier’s cause of
death was homicidal violence.19 Doctor Revercomb reached this
conclusion based on several factors including “the positioning of
the body in a concealed location where it was found, the presence
of the ligature around the neck in an irregular knot,” the body
being found nude, and the bruising on decedent’s right leg and on
her right-hand index finger which was “potentially” a defensive
wound.”20 She also testified that the time of death was difficult to
pinpoint because of decomposition, but estimated that based on
maggot activity she observed on July 24, 2012, the death of Grier
could have occurred “a week or more” prior to that date.21
Tamara Wong (Wong), a forensic scientist for the Rhode Island
Department of Health Laboratories, testified that she analyzed a
pair of Joe Boxer underwear found in the garage and that the
DNA on the underwear was a match to the Defendant.22 Wong
stated that there was a “1 in 82 trillion chance that” the DNA
profile indicated someone other than the Defendant.23 Kevin
Horan, a Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Cellular Analysis Certificate Survey Team, testified regarding his
conclusions after analyzing certain cell phone data from the
Defendant’s and Grier’s cell phones.24 Agent Horan concluded
that the Defendant’s and Grier’s cell phones were in the same
approximate vicinity on the morning of July 15, 2012.25
Vanyik Proeun (Proeun) testified that, in July 2012, he was
living on second-floor apartment on the property and that he
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1190–91.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id.
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became friends with the Defendant.26 Proeun testified that he
would give the Defendant rides and on one occasion, the
Defendant informed him that he was attracted to strippers.27
Sarivutha Pich, who also lived in the second-floor apartment,
testified that, on July 15, 2012, after returning home between 3:30
and 4:30 a.m., she noticed the garage light was on and saw the
Defendant in the garage alone.28 Dayo Oduntan (Oduntan), a
friend of the Defendant for over fifteen years, testified that the
two were “close friends.”29 Oduntan testified that in 2002 or 2003,
the two shared an apartment on Federal Hill in Providence, and,
at that time, he observed the Defendant use the Backpage website
to “look[] for girls.”30 Oduntan testified that he was incarcerated
at the Adult Correctional Institutions during July of 2012 when he
saw the Defendant in prison.31 Oduntan testified that he wrote a
letter to the Special Investigations Unit “looking for a deal” to help
reduce his own sentence in exchange for information he could
obtain from the Defendant, which led to him eventually being
assigned to same cellblock as the Defendant.32 Oduntan testified
that, while he and the Defendant were in the recreational yard, he
asked the Defendant about Grier and the Defendant “let it be
known, yes, he did it.”33 Oduntan testified that the Defendant
made other references to the murder including a reference to a
television show where a female was murdered and rolled up in a
carpet and stated that was what he had done.34
On July 13, 2015, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the
second-degree murder of Grier (count 1), felony assault on Dyer
with a dangerous weapon (firearm) (count 2), felony assault on
Dyer with a dangerous weapon (metal object) (count 3), firstdegree robbery of Malave (count 10), and unlawful possession of a
firearm (count 12).35 The Defendant moved for a new trial, which

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 1191–92.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1193.
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was heard and denied on September 2, 2015.36 On appeal, the
Defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the
weight of the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and the
trial justice erred in deciding otherwise.37 The Defendant also
appealed the admission of certain evidence relating to cell phone
data and analysis that was introduced at trial, which he argued
should have been excluded by the trial justice.38
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the Defendant’s arguments, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court initially sought to determine whether the trial
justice abused his discretion, in violation of Rule 72 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence,39 when he allowed in the testimony of
Agent Horan.40 The Court focused on the statutory language
which provides that, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of fact or opinion.”41 The Court then identified
four nonexclusive factors that trial courts look to when
considering expert testimony involving novel or technical
theories.42 These factors include: “(1) whether the proffered
knowledge can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3)
the known or potential rate of error; (4) whether the theory or
technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
field.”43 The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. R.I. R. Evid. 702.
40. Adams, 161 A.3d at 1194.
41. Id. at 1195 (citing R.I. R. Evid. 702).
42. Id. at 1196.
43.
Id. (quoting DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729, A.2d 677, 689 (R.I.
1999)). The Court provided that “when the proffered knowledge is neither
novel nor highly technical, satisfaction of one or more of these factors is not a
necessary condition precedent to allowing the expert to testify” and “[t]he
proponent of the evidence need only show that the expert arrived at his or her
conclusion in what appears to be a scientifically sound and methodologically
reliable manner.” Id. (quoting Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881, 892 (R.I.
2003)).
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discretion by allowing Agent Horan to testify about the cell phone
technology, as this was a field in which he was an expert and his
knowledge was not novel.44 The Court then addressed the
Defendant’s claim that the trial justice abused his discretion when
he did “not fashion an effective remedy” after the State disclosed
Agent Horan’s expert testimony one month before trial and
therefore, the one-month time period was insufficient to prepare
for trial.45 The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his
discretion because, at the evidentiary hearing on May 28, 2015,
the trial justice informed defense counsel that if he needed
additional time to prepare, he would receive an extension.46
Because the Defendant’s counsel failed to request a continuance,
this claim failed on appeal.47
The Court then turned to the Defendant’s contention that the
trial justice abused his discretion in admitting his MetroPCS cell
phone records (MetroPCS records) through Susan Johnson
(Johnson), an employee of T-Mobile.48 The Defendant’s claim
rested on the fact that that evidence did not satisfy the businessrecords exception49 to the hearsay rule because the relevant
“records were kept in the ordinary business of MetroPCS, not TMobile.”50 At trial, Johnson testified that, in 2013, after T-Mobile
and MetroPCS merged, Johnson became responsible for
maintaining MetroPCS records.51 The trial justice held that the
cell phone records met the business-record rule exception and
satisfied Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence
because Johnson was “entirely familiar with how Metro[PCS] kept
its records” and T-Mobile and MetroPCS records “were kept in
precisely the same way.”52 Additionally, the Court held that the
records were properly authenticated in accordance with Rule
90153 because it was “reasonably probable that the evidence is

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1198.
R.I. R. Evid. 803(6).
Adams, 161 A.3d at 1198.
Id.
Id.
R.I. R. Evid. 901.
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what [Johnson] [pro]claim[ed] it to be.”54
Finally, the Court addressed the Defendant’s claim that the
trial justice erroneously denied his motion for new trial given that
the weight of the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions.55 The Defendant specifically contended that Dyer
and Malave were not credible witnesses and that his seconddegree murder charge should be vacated because there was “no
evidence of any type of malice necessary to sustain a second[]degree murder conviction.”56 The trial justice found that Dyer
was a credible witness and her failure to disclose a head injury at
the hospital did not mean “that Defendant didn’t hit her in the
head.”57 For Malave, the trial justice found her to be a credible
witness and noted that a handgun found in the Defendant’s
backpack when he was arrested provided further proof that her
allegations were true.58 When assessing the malice necessary for
a second-degree murder conviction, the trial justice highlighted
Oduntan’s ability to recount details “that could have only come
from [the Defendant],” specifically the style of clothes Grier was
wearing when she was killed.59 Additionally,
Oduntan’s
testimony provided that the Defendant made statements that
Grier was just a prostitute and that he had left her body behind a
sofa, which further supported a finding of malice.60 After a
careful review of the trial transcript in its entirety, the Court was
satisfied that the trial justice “articulated adequate grounds for
denying the motion.”61 The Court declined to disturb the trial
justice’s decision as the trial justice specifically noted the
shortcomings of certain witnesses, but ultimately concluded that
the weight of the evidence supported convictions on counts one,
two, three, and ten of the indictment.62
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly found that using the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Adams, 161 A.3d at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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four nonexclusive factors to assist in expert testimony was
unnecessary to this case as Agent Horan’s expert testimony
involving cell phone towers was not novel.63 Considering how
widely accepted cell phone evidence has been in courts for some
time now, the Court was correct to conclude that this type of
expert testimony was certainly not novel. The Court articulated
that the responsibility to question the shortcomings of cell phone
tower science fell on the Defendant through cross-examination of
Agent Horan.64 Also, the Court determined there was
no
discovery violation because the trial justice specifically told the
Defendant he would be given additional time if he needed it.65
This seems to be a fair assessment because if the Defendant is
truly claiming he did not receive adequate time, the trial justice
allowed him the opportunity to be granted more.
Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of whether the
business records exception to hearsay applies when an employee
of one company is testifying about another company’s records that
her employer also owns.66 The Court allowed this to fit into the
business records exception because Johnson had knowledge of the
record-keeping of MetroPCS, she spoke to the record keeper of
data for MetroPCS, and MetroPCS followed the same processes for
storing data as T-Mobile.67 However, it is fair to ask just how far
this should extend when it comes to employees of one company
testifying about the records of another company. The Court
concluded that this met the burden to fit the business records
exception to hearsay, but it could be argued that the testimony
would have been more adequate if it came from the record keeper
of the MetroPCS data, rather than just a T-Mobile representative.
While the records were kept in the same way at both companies,
Johnson was not an employee of MetroPCS; therefore, she can
only assume that it followed the same processes without firm
knowledge of the day-to-day activities at MetroPCS.
Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court outlined the
high standard required before it will disturb a trial justice’s ruling
on denial of a new trial. On the counts of felony assault, the trial
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
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justice found that Dyer was a credible witness.68 It is interesting
to note that Dyer testified to a head injury, but did not report this
to the doctor when she was treated.69 However, this discrepancy
alone should not be enough to make someone not a credible
witness, and the Court seemed to reach the right conclusion in
allowing that verdict to stand. On the count of robbery, the
witness Malave initially gave a written statement that her
assailant had blonde hair and tattoos on both arms, which the
Defendant does not have.70 However, the trial justice noted that
the jury simply ignored this discrepancy to which he did not fault
them because it was clear this was not a mistaken identification.71
While the discrepancies in the description are noteworthy, the
Court drew the proper conclusion, as Malave was able to describe
the gun and backpack which the Defendant himself had in his
possession when police apprehended him.72 Finally, on the count
of second-degree murder, the Court gave enhanced consideration
to Oduntan’s testimony to reach its finding of malice.73 The trial
justice noted that Oduntan’s description of the events “could only
have come from [the Defendant].”74 The Court made the proper
judgment here as it was clear that Oduntan’s knowledge of the
events came from listening to the Defendant essentially bragging
about the crime he committed.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an agent’s cell
phone testimony is admissible when he is qualified as an expert,
the State shows he reached his conclusion in a scientifically sound
and methodologically reliable manner, and his inability to
pinpoint cell phones at a certain time went to the weight of the
evidence. The Court determined cell phone records are admissible
through employee of a cell phone provider, which merged with a
Defendant’s provider, because the employee had knowledge of the
record-keeping and used her employer’s processes.
Sean Rock

Criminal Law. State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2017). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that comprehensive jury
instructions on eyewitness identification are preferred, but not
required, so long as the trial justice gives a reasonable jury
instruction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Early on November 6, 2009, Henry Vargas (Vargas) was shot
and killed outside of a nightclub on Broad Street in Providence.1
At around 1:00 a.m., Vargas left the nightclub, Club Platinum,
with his girlfriend, Carmelina Bueno (Bueno).2 Upon leaving,
Bueno and Vargas crossed Aldrich Street which intersects Broad
Street.3 Two people followed them, one man (the Defendant) and
one woman.4 When Bueno and Vargas arrived at their car, the
man following them shouted and asked Vargas if he wanted to
fight.5 Vargas ran at the man.6 The man then pulled a gun from
his jacket and shot Vargas repeatedly.7 Bueno testified at trial
that she saw the shooter’s face and more specifically, his smile,
during this encounter.8 After Vargas, mortally wounded, fell to
the ground, Bueno saw the man get into the passenger side of a
dark-colored SUV parked on Aldrich Street.9 Bueno described the
shooter as five foot, nine or ten inches tall, about thirty-six or
thirty-seven years old, about one hundred seventy pounds, having
short black hair and a clean face, and wearing jeans and a black
jacket.10 On December 1, 2009, Detective Emilio Matos presented
1. State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638, 640 (R.I. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The Defendant allegedly shouted, “Your fat one, didn’t you want
to fight me? Come now.” Id. at 641.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 642.
10. Id.
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Bueno with a photo array to identify the shooter.11 After a
minute, Bueno identified the Defendant as the shooter because of
his face.12
Bueno testified at trial as the sole testifying eyewitness to the
shooting of Vargas.13 On cross-examination, Bueno testified that
the shooter “looked and sounded Dominican”; but in front of the
grand jury, Bueno testified that the shooter had “light skin, like
an Indian.”14 Bueno explained that “[f]or us, an Indian is a
person [who is] not dark nor white,” and that she was referring to
a “Hispanic.”15 Bueno also testified that she met with Detective
Kenny Court where she saw a photograph of DJ Nelson who had
been in the club the night of the shooting.16 Bueno stated that DJ
Nelson looked like the shooter, but that DJ Nelson was darker
than the shooter.17 On cross examination, Bueno testified that
she had told an investigator, Robert Gemma, and his paralegal
that she “believed [DJ Nelson] was involved in the shooting.”18
Bueno also testified that one week after the shooting, at a housing
complex referred to as “Chad Brown,” that she had seen DJ
Nelson coming out of a SUV.19 She further testified that she was
afraid of DJ Nelson because of a prior occasion at Club
Platinum.20 This prior occasion was when Vargas told Bueno that
“somebody had [told him] that they wanted to kill him.”21 When
Bueno tried to ask Vargas about who had told him that someone
wanted to kill him, Vargas stated that DJ Nelson had taken this
man away.22
Bueno also testified that three security guards worked at
Club Platinum at the night in question: one of whom argued with

11. Id. at 643.
12.
Id. Bueno also identified the defendant at trial as the man she saw
shoot Vargas. Id.
13.
Id. at 640. Twenty-two other witnesses testified at trial, however,
none of them witnessed the murder. Id.
14. Id. at 642.
15. Id. (alteration in original).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 642–43.
19. Id. at 643.
20. Id.
21. Id. (alteration in original).
22. Id.
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Vargas and who Bueno testified shot Vargas.23 When the other
two security guards ran to Bueno after Vargas had been shot,
Bueno told the security guard who asked what happened that “he
knew who had done it.”24
In January 2010, a grand jury indicted the Defendant on two
counts: first-degree murder of Vargas and discharging a firearm
while committing a crime of violence, resulting in the death of
Vargas.25 At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found the
Defendant guilty on both counts and the trial justice sentenced
the Defendant to two consecutive life sentences.26 The Defendant
filed a timely appeal and argued that the trial justice failed to
provide the State v. Werner jury instruction that cautioned jurors
about the fallibility of eyewitness
identifications.27
The
Defendant argued that the trial justice’s refusal to provide this
jury instruction was a reversible error that “gravely prejudiced the
defense.”28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court sought to address the issue of whether the trial
justice properly instructed the jury on witness identification.29
The Defendant argued that the trial justice should have used the
eyewitness jury instruction approved by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in Werner.30 The State argued that the trial
justice did not err because in State v. Davis,31 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the trial justice’s failure to give a specific
jury instruction about eyewitness identification was not a
reversible error.32
The Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the
23. Id. The Court did not indicate whether the defendant was a security
guard at Club Platinum. Id. at 641.
24. Id. at 642.
25. Id. at 640.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 1102 (R.I. 2004)).
28. Id. at 645.
29. Id. at 640.
30. Id. at 645; see also Werner, 851 A.2d at 1102.
31. 131 A.3d 679, 697 (R.I. 2016). The court held that “[t]he better
practice would be for courts to provide the jury with more comprehensive
instructions when eyewitness testimony is an issue.” Id.
32. Fuentes, 162 A.3d at 645.

2018]

SURVEY SECTION

649

Defendant’s request for a jury instruction on eyewitness
identification.33 The trial justice instructed the jury to consider
the following factors about witness credibility: age, intelligence,
candor, prejudice, motive, appearance, conduct, and demeanor of
each testifying witness.34 The trial justice instructed the jurors to
bring their own experiences from their everyday lives to evaluate
witness credibility.35 Further, the trial justice instructed the jury
to consider any consistencies or inconsistencies between what a
witness testified at trial and what the witness may have said
earlier.36 Both of these instructions were proper, especially with
respect to the undulating nature of Bueno’s eyewitness
testimony.37
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed their holding in
State v. Davis.38 The Court prefers more comprehensive jury
instructions with respect to eyewitness testimony, but the Court
does not require comprehensive jury instructions.39 The trial
justice did consider the undulating nature of Bueno’s eyewitness
testimony and acted accordingly.40 Bueno’s total testimony shows
potential inconsistencies between her trial and prior testimony.41
However, the trial justice’s instructions took into account these
inconsistencies by instructing the jury to take into account such
inconsistencies.42 Therefore, the court found no reversible error in
the trial justice’s refusal to instruct the jury with more
comprehensive jury instructions.43
The problem with this opinion is that the Court was very
unhelpful on the issue of proper jury instructions on eyewitness
identifications. Should trial judges give the more comprehensive
jury instructions found in Werner or try to consider specific issues
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 646.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 645–46.
See id. at 646.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 642–43.
Id. at 646.
Id.
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with the eyewitness’s testimony? The former ensures that the
jury is properly instructed on the issue of the unreliability of
eyewitness identification and on the weight such testimony should
be given. The latter can fail to clearly instruct the jury on the
unreliability and proper weight that should be given to this kind
of testimony. Further this method lacks uniformity. The risk of
wrongful conviction of innocent people based upon mistaken
eyewitness identification is real. In this case, the Court should
have given clearer guidance on this issue. Instead, the Court
simply agreed that the trial judge gave proper jury instructions.
No rules were given on why these instructions were proper.
Begging the question, has the Court endorsed the lower court’s
jury instructions and, therefore, told lower courts to use these jury
instructions? Or does the court want more comprehensive jury
instructions, but in this case found no errors that merited
reversal? The answer to either question remains unclear.
The solution to this problem is to either formally require the
Werner jury instructions, or to adopt a rule or test to evaluate jury
instructions on eyewitness identification? Either scenario will
provide helpful guidance on this issue. The Werner instructions
will provide uniformity. This bright line rule will ensure that all
juries will be instructed about the weight and reliability of such
evidence. However, this approach may not fit every case. The
other approach will require a test or rule to require that jury
instructions appropriately instruct juries on reliability issues and
weight of eyewitness identifications. This rule or test will allow
for both a minimum level of uniformity and proper discretion at
the trial court level to respond to circumstances.
The adoption of a rule or test to evaluate jury instructions
about eyewitness identifications is the better solution to this
problem. This solution provides first and foremost uniformity in
jury instructions on this issue that ensure that juries are properly
instructed on the risks of eyewitness identifications. Second, this
solution will provide meaningful guidance for trial judges when
deciding how to instruct the jury. This guidance will ensure that
a trial judge can be confident that his or her jury instructions are
proper and will be upheld as such.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that comprehensive
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jury instructions on eyewitness testimony is preferred, but not
required.44 In this case, the trial justice did not abuse his or her
discretion by not giving such comprehensive instructions because
the trial justice provided other jury instructions that were
sufficient to guard against a jury placing too much weight on the
conflicting eyewitness testimony.45
Tyler Pare

44.
45.

See id. at 645.
Id.

Criminal Law. State v. Pacheco, 161 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2017).
Dismissal of a preliminary breath test refusal in the Traffic
Tribunal does not collaterally estop the State from bringing a
chemical breath test refusal charge against the same defendant at
a criminal trial. Preliminary breath test refusals and chemical
breath test refusals are two distinct issues; the preliminary breath
test refusal was actually litigated in the Traffic Tribunal so that
the State is not estopped from raising the chemical breath test
refusal charge in a criminal trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

At approximately two o’clock in the morning in December
2011, Francisco Pacheco (Pacheco) ran a stop sign, nearly hitting
Warren Patrolman Patrick Sarasin’s (Officer Sarasin) police
cruiser.1 Officer Sarasin, accompanied by Patrolman Christopher
Perreault (Officer Perreault), began following Pacheco in his
vehicle as he turned onto Child Street in Warren.2 Pacheco
quickly turned into a parking lot and sped away in the opposite
direction, where he again failed to stop at another stop sign.3
Pacheco eventually pulled off into a parking lot and got out of his
car, at which point the officers began chasing him on foot.4 While
apprehending Pacheco, who struggled, Officer Sarasin smelled “a
strong odor of alcohol” and noticed that Pacheco was slurring his
speech.5 Pacheco refused to take a field sobriety test and a
preliminary breath test.6 At the Warren Police Department,
Pacheco was placed in a breathalyzer room and advised of his
rights to undergo a chemical breath test.7 He remained
uncooperative and refused to take a chemical breath test and to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Pacheco, 161 A.3d 1166, 1168 (R.I. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sign any related paperwork.8 Among other charges, Pacheco was
charged with a second offense of refusing a chemical breath test.9
He was also cited for several infractions, including refusal to
submit to a preliminary breath test.10
On July 15, 2013, Pacheco appeared pro se before the Rhode
Island Traffic Tribunal where Officer Sarasin reported that he
chased Pacheco on foot and apprehended him after a struggle.11
The magistrate dismissed the preliminary refusal infraction for
lack of evidentiary foundation.12
Before trial, Pacheco sought to dismiss the chemical refusal
charge on the basis of collateral estoppel.13 The trial justice
denied the motion.14 At the end of trial, Pacheco renewed his
motion to dismiss, which was denied again.15 The jury convicted
Pacheco of unlawful possession of marijuana and a chemical
refusal and, in May 2014, he was sentenced to five months to
serve on the chemical refusal count.16
In November 2015, by order of the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, the case was remanded to the Superior Court with
directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
Pacheco’s motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel was
timely.17 The Superior Court found the motion was untimely
8. Id. at 1168–69.
9. Id. at 1169. Pacheco was also charged with possession of marijuana,
second offense; driving under the influence of alcohol; simple assault; and
resisting arrest; see also 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(b)(2) (2012).
10.
Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1169. Pacheco was also cited for failure to stop
at a stop sign and operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance;
see also 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.3 (2012).
11.
Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1169.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. Pacheco argued that “because the government failed in its first
attempt to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant refused to
submit to a chemical test at the time of the alleged incident, it is collaterally
estopped from trying [Pacheco] again on same issue.” Id. He also argued
that “the state failed to establish the requisite reasonable belief necessary to
prove the preliminary refusal by failing to present evidence that Officer
Sarasin detected alcohol odor on defendant, observed blood shot or watery
eyes, or exhibited a staggered walk.” Id.
14.
Id. The trial justice found that the motion was untimely filed and
lacked merit. Id.
15.
Id.
16. Id. at 1169–70.
17. Id. at 1170; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2); SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
12(b)(3).
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filed, but there was good cause for delay.18
Before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Pacheco argued
that the State was collaterally estopped from prosecuting the
chemical refusal in Superior Court because those facts were
already decided in the Traffic Tribunal, and although the charges
arose under different statutes, the State must still prove Officer
Sarasin reasonably believed Pacheco was operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence for both the chemical refusal
and preliminary refusal.19 The State contended that the issue of
Officer Sarasin’s reasonable belief was not “actually litigated and
determined” in the Traffic Tribunal because the charge was
dismissed and that observations relevant to the second charge
made after the first preliminary refusal were unrelated to the first
charge.20 Further, the State argued that there are procedural
differences between the Traffic Tribunal and the Superior Court
that made collateral estoppel an improper avenue to travel.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Conducting a de novo review, the Court rejected Pacheco’s
assertion that the State was collaterally estopped from
prosecuting him for the chemical refusal after the Traffic Tribunal
magistrate dismissed the preliminary refusal infraction.22
Addressing in depth two of the three identified elements of
collateral estoppel, the Court determined that there was no
identity of the issues and no final judgment on the merits so as to
invoke collateral estoppel.23
The Court identified the issue before it as having two
separate statutes governing two different offenses so that there is
18. Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1170. Pacheco’s first attorney suffered a
medical emergency and a new attorney had been assigned. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1171–72.
23.
Id. at 1172. The Court identified three elements that must be
present for collateral estoppel to apply: “(1) an identity of issues, (2) the
previous proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits,
and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the
same or in privity with a party in the previous proceeding.” Id. (quoting
State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 358 (R.I. 2005)). The Court did not address
the third element in the present case because it was clearly met. Id.
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no identity of issues:24 chemical refusals governed by Rhode
Island General Laws section 31-27-2.1(a) and preliminary refusals
governed by section 31-27-2.3(a).25 While both statutes “require
that the officer have a reasonable belief or reasonable grounds to
believe that the operator was operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence” before requesting the driver submit to a test,
this only provides “the grounds upon which the officer based a
request that operator submit to each test.”26 The issue at stake in
the present case was unrelated to whether there was a lawful stop
or probable cause to arrest so as to invoke the reasonable belief
standard.27 Instead, the Court reasoned that the reasonable
belief for a preliminary breath test may be established up until
the officer requests the breath test, whereas reasonable belief for a
chemical breath test may continue beyond the time of the arrest.28
Thus, the operator’s behavior following an arrest is irrelevant for
preliminary refusal infractions, but highly relevant to chemical
refusal charges.29 In the present case, the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest provided Officer Sarasin
with reasonable grounds to request the chemical breath test.30
Further, after the preliminary refusal, Officer Sarasin found
two unopened beer bottles in Pacheco’s vehicle, and Pacheco was
“belligerent and uncooperative” at the police station, thus
continuing to establish reasonable grounds for the chemical
breath test request that were no longer relevant for the
preliminary breath test.31 The Court also reasoned that because
24.
Id. at 1173. “An identity of issues requires ‘first, [that] the issue
sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue decided in the prior
proceeding’ second, the issue must actually [have been] litigated; and third,
the issue must necessarily have been decided.’” Id. (quoting State v Godette,
751 A.2d 742, 746 (R.I. 2000)).
25. Id. at 1170–71.
26. Id. at 1174.
27. Id. at 1175.
28. Id. at 1174; see also 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-27-2.1(b)(2), -2.3 (2012).
29. Pacheco, 161 A.3d at 1174.
30. Id. The Court considered that this was a “chaotic, 2 a.m. nearcollision with a police cruiser, a motorist driving through two stop signs,
followed by a foot chase, a pepper spray takedown, preliminary refusal,
struggle, and uncooperative behavior at the police department.” Id.
31. Id. at 1174–75. The Court determined that evidence relevant to
second offense was irrelevant to first refusal, bolstering the conclusion that
identity of issues is lacking. Id.
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the results of a preliminary breath test are not admissible at trial
to prove a chemical refusal charge, it seems counterintuitive to
decide that a determination on the preliminary refusal infraction
could collaterally estop the State from pursuing the more serious
charge at trial where the preliminary breath test analysis would
not be admissible.32
The Court next examined whether the issue was actually
litigated using the Chase standard, which in part states that “only
a specific finding on a material matter of fact fully litigated at [a]
hearing will collaterally estop the state from attempting to prove
the same fact at trial. A general finding will not suffice.”33 The
Court determined that the magistrate in the Traffic Tribunal did
not make “a specific finding on a material matter of fact” because
he only found that the evidentiary requirements necessary to
prove a preliminary refusal had not been met.34
The Court declined to address the State’s contention that
procedural differences between the Traffic Tribunal and criminal
trials bar the use of collateral estoppel because this analysis was
unnecessary as all the other elements of collateral estoppel were
addressed.35 However, the Court did note that there are
differences between the two forums and other jurisdictions have
held “that traffic infractions may not serve as a basis for collateral
estoppel in a subsequent criminal proceeding.”36
COMMENTARY

In this case, the majority and dissent characterized the
identity of issues and final judgment requirements of collateral
estoppel differently, thus resulting in contradicting conclusions.
The majority opinion took the more restrictive approach of
concluding that the issues of a preliminary breath test and
chemical breath test must be exactly identical and that both
issues must have been actually litigated in at least a similar
forum in order for collateral estoppel to apply.37 On the other
hand, the dissent approached these requirements in a more liberal
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1175 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
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manner, concluding that the issues are identical when looking at
the statutes and were actually litigated in the Tribunal.38
The majority views the application of collateral estoppel, in
most instances, as threatening to equitable decisions.39 In looking
at Rhode Island case law, the Court referenced a history of cases
that consistently limited the use of collateral estoppel to very
specific, narrow instances. For example, the Chase doctrine
established that only a “specific finding” on a matter “fully
litigated” would collaterally estop the State from pursuing the
same fact at trial and a “general finding” would not suffice.40
While this doctrine was eventually replaced in Gautier, that Court
still maintained a restrictive collateral estoppel view in finding
that an issue heard in a probation-revocation hearing is not
collaterally estopped in a criminal trial because the two forums
are so distinct.41 The Court emphasized that probation-revocation
hearings, similar to the Traffic Tribunal hearing in the present
case, were considerably less formal than criminal trials so to apply
collateral estoppel here would “undesirably alter the criminal trial
process.”42
In applying this same restrictive rationale to the current case,
the Court emphasized that the issues were not exactly identical.43
The majority followed State v. Godette in determining that the
issues had to be “identical.”44 Thus, even though the issues here
were extremely similar with nearly identical evidentiary
foundations, because the two separate statutory mandates were
not facially identical, the majority concluded that collateral
estoppel did not apply to this case.45 The majority continues in its
opinion to discourage cross-forum collateral estoppel. The
Tribunal initially dismissed the case because the charge was
lacking an evidentiary basis, but the majority stated that, because
this evidence was not a statutory mandate for preliminary
refusals nor was it the exclusive way to show reasonable belief,
38.
39.
2005)).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1178–82.
See id. at 1172 (quoting State v. Werner, 871 A.2d 347, 1055 (R.I.
Id.
Id. at 1173.
Id.
See id. at 1175.
Id. at 1173 (citing State v. Godette, 751 A.2d 742, 746 (R.I. 2000)).
Id. at 1174; see 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-27-2.1(b)(2), -2.3 (2012).
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the Tribunal misconstrued the statute and, in fact, separate
evidence was needed to prove each issue in the two forums.46
The Court supports its final conclusion with the rationale that
the “doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘is capable of producing
extraordinarily harsh and unfair results,’” so much so that the
Court will “not apply the doctrine ‘mechanically’ in situations
which would lead to inequitable results.”47 In essence, the Court
here was admittedly following the United States Supreme Court’s
suggestion that collateral estoppel in criminal cases is to be
applied with “realism and rationality.”48 Through its prior views
and applications of collateral estoppel, the Court entered this case
with the understanding that to apply collateral estoppel with
“realism and rationality” meant to apply it sparingly, as its
application threatens to undermine the equitable system of justice
established today.49
In contrast, the dissenting opinion does not feel as though
applying collateral estoppel would threaten or undermine the
justice system. Rather, the dissenting opinion points out that
both statutes require the officer to meet the same level of
suspicion before requesting the breath test and it was this
threshold issue that the State failed to prove at the Tribunal,
causing it to dismiss the preliminary refusal.50 While the dissent
admits that if post-arrest evidence were introduced at the criminal
trial it would agree with the majority that the issues to be decided
were different, the State failed to provide any post-arrest evidence
at trial supporting its reasonable grounds.51 Therefore, because
the same evidence was admitted to support the reasonable
suspicion standard required in both statutes and that evidence
was heard by the Tribunal, the same issue was actually litigated
and decided when the Tribunal dismissed the preliminary refusal
for lack of an evidentiary basis.52
Here, the dissent makes the most compelling argument in
finding that the issues are identical and were actually litigated in
46. Id. at 1174.
47. Id. at 1176 (quoting Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee,
854 A.2d 1008, 1017 (R.I. 2004)).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1172, 1176.
50. Id. at 1178.
51. Id. at 1178–79.
52. Id. at 1169, 1182.
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the Tribunal in stating that, because the statutes require the
officer to meet the same level of suspicion before requesting the
breath test and only evidence of what occurred prior to both tests
was introduced, the same issues were tried.53 Even though postarrest evidence can be admitted for chemical refusals and not
preliminary refusals, because the State did not rely on post-arrest
evidence and therefore did not utilize this difference, the issues
that were actually heard in the Tribunal and criminal trial were
the same, despite this technical, statutory difference.54 The
evidentiary difference was the only distinguishing factor in the
statutes relied on by the majority to reach its conclusion that the
issues were not identical, yet this difference was not utilized
here.55 Further, to support its conclusion in finding that the issue
was actually litigated, the majority opinion relied on Chase even
though Gautier replaced the Chase doctrine and the majority
recognized that the doctrine was no longer applicable.56 This
contradiction seems to show that the majority was working
towards the overarching view that collateral estoppel threatens to
undermine the justice system rather than looking at how the
elements of collateral estoppel actually applied to the facts of this
case.57
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the Traffic
Tribunal’s dismissal of a refusal to submit to a preliminary breath
test infraction does not collaterally estop the State from pursuing
the charge of refusing a chemical breath test in a criminal trial.
The Court determined that the two issues, governed by two
separate statutes with distinct requirements, does not satisfy the
identity of issues requirement of collateral estoppel, and a
dismissal for lack of evidentiary support is not a final judgment on
the merits so as to make the issue actually litigated.
Kaelyn Phelps
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1178.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
See id. at 1176.

Criminal Law. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283 (R.I. 2017). Rhode
Island General Laws section 12-19-2, reducing a punishment of
imprisonment for time already served, and section 42-56-24,
reducing punishment of imprisonment for good behavior, apply
only to the incarceration period, not the overall sentence imposed.
As such, although the Defendant had been notified by the
Department of Corrections that his probation had ended, the
Defendant was still on probation, and the State could charge him
as a probation violator.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On January 21, 1986, Anthony Parrillo (Parrillo) pled guilty
to two counts of second-degree murder.1 Parrillo received a
sentence of thirty years, twenty years to serve with ten years
suspended.2 Ten years of probation were to follow upon release
from the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI).3 While serving his
sentence, Parrillo received credit for both time served, pursuant to
Rhode Island General Laws section 12-19-2,4 and for good
behavior pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 42-5624.5 As a result, Parrillo was given an early release on December
22, 1993, and started parole.6 Parrillo stated in an affidavit that
on or about October 25, 1999, his parole officer notified him that
his parole was terminated and his ten-year probation term had
1. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283, 285 (R.I. 2017). Parrillo was charged
with one count of murder in the first degree and one count of murder in the
second degree in March of 1982. Id. Parrillo was found guilty on both counts
by a Rhode Island Superior Court jury; however, he appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in 1984, and the conviction was vacated. Id. The case
was remanded to the Superior Court where Parrillo pled guilty. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 285 & n.3 (citing relevant part of 12 R.I. GEN LAWS § 12-19-2
(2017) that credits a term of imprisonment for time already served).
5. Id. at 285–86 & n.4 (citing relevant part of 42 R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-5624 (2017) which credits a term of imprisonment for good behavior).
6. Id. at 285–86.
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begun.7 After ten years without an incident, Parrillo received
written notice from the Department of Corrections (DOC) Adult
Probation and Parole Unit, stating “that his ‘file ha[d] expired on
[October 24, 2009,]’ and that ‘[a]ccording to available records as of
[that] date, [his] probation ha[d] been terminated.’”8 After
receiving the letter, Parrillo had no further contact from the
probation department.9
On December 17, 2011, Parrillo was involved in a physical
altercation at a nightclub in Providence and was charged with two
counts of felony assault, conspiracy to commit felony assault, and
simple assault.10 The following month, on January 9, 2012, the
state of Rhode Island (the State) filed a probation violation report
pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure.11 The State claimed Parrillo “had failed to ‘keep the
peace and be of good behavior’” and charged him as a probation
violator.12 Parrillo claimed he was no longer on probation at the
time of the incident, and had not been on probation at any time
after October 24, 2009, hence, he sought a dismissal of the
violation report.13 Parrillo also asserted that the State should be
barred from charging him as a probation violator “because to hold
otherwise would constitute a violation of his due-process rights.”14
On November 2, 2012, a violation hearing was held where
Parrillo argued that he was not a violator because his probation
Further, he claimed it was
had terminated in 2009.15
“inconceivable” for the State to inform him his probation had

7. Id. at 286.
8. Id. (alterations in original).
9. Id.
10. Id. Parrillo was convicted at a bench trial in the Superior Court of
aiding and abetting one felony assault and of misdemeanor assault; the other
counts were dismissed. Id. at 286 n.5.
11. Id. at 286 & n.6 (citing relevant part of Rule 32(f) of the Superior
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning probation violation).
12. Id. at 287.
13.
Id. Parrillo claimed his probation ended on December 20, 2003,
relying on the sentencing justice’s language that stated his probation term
would “commence upon his release from the ACI.” Id. He further claimed
that at the very latest his probation ended on October 24, 2009, relying on the
DOC letter. Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
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terminated and “years later” charge him as a probation violator.16
As such, Parrillo argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
barred the state from charging him as a probation violator.17 The
State maintained Parrillo was on probation in 2011, claiming that
a thirty-year sentence in 1986 “meant that he would ‘finish
serving the full term of his sentence on January 22, 2016.’”18
Disagreeing with the State, the hearing justice quashed the
32(f) violation report.19 The hearing justice rejected Parrillo’s
equitable estoppel argument because there was no detrimental
reliance in the circumstances of this case.20 Further, he found
that section 12-19-8 of the Rhode Island General Laws clearly
granted the sentencing justice authority to set the period of
probation, and that the sentencing justice specified that it would
commence when Parrillo was released from the ACI.21 The State
filed a motion to reconsider that was heard on April 5, 2013.22
The hearing justice explained that he denied the violation report
because the “clear language of the judgment of conviction that
articulated that the probationary term would ‘commence upon
[Parrillo’s] release from the ACI.’”23 The hearing justice denied
the motion to reconsider and the State filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
on May 27, 2014.24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The first question for the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
whether Parrillo was on probation at the time of the 2011
altercation.25 If so, then the Court would determine whether the
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. The hearing justice found that regardless of whether the
probationary period commenced on the date Parrillo was released from the
ACI or the date he completed parole, he was not on probation at the time of
the 2011 altercation. Id. at 287 n.7.
22.
Id. at 287–88. The Supreme Court noted that “no avenue for such a
motion” exists in the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the
hearing justice heard the motion regardless. Id. at 288 n.8.
23.
Id. at 288 (alteration in original).
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
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hearing justice erred in rejecting Parrillo’s equitable estoppel
defense.26 The Court noted it would affirm unless one or more
errors of law had “so infected the validity of the proceedings as to
warrant reversal.”27 To determine whether Parrillo was on
probation the Court looked at the “interplay and application of
several statutory provisions”—the first being section 12-19-8 of
the Rhode Island General Laws, which governs sentencing.28 The
Court interpreted that section as granting a wide range of
discretion to the sentencing justice with the only limitation being
that it does not conflict with another statute.29
Next, the Court determined the application between Rhode
Island General Laws sections 42-56-24,30 governing good behavior
credits, and section 12-19-2(a),31 governing time already served
credits.32 The Court relied on the holding in Rose v. State, which
dealt with the interplay of these two statutory provisions with the
existence of a mandatory minimum sentence.33 In Rose, the Court
found that the language of section 42-56-24 was clear, and the
only reduction contemplated by the provision was for the amount
of time spent incarcerated, not the overall sentence imposed.34
Also in Rose, the Court, relying on State v. Bergevine,35 held
section 12-19-2 also did not apply to the overall sentence.36 As
such, the Court held in Rose that neither the good-behavior credits
nor the time-served credits entitled the defendant to “an
acceleration of the end date of his probationary term” as they only
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 288. (“Section 12-19-8(a) provides, in relevant part, that the
sentencing court may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of the
sentence, in whole or in part, or place the defendant on probation without the
imposition of a suspended sentence[,] and that such suspension shall place
the defendant on probation for the time and on any terms and conditions that
the court may fix.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)).
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 289. The Court found that section 42-56-24 authorized the
DOC to credit a prisoner for good behavior and “industriousness.” Id.
31.
Id. The Court found that section 12-19-2(a) requires that a sentence
of imprisonment be reduced for the amount of time confined while awaiting
trial or awaiting sentencing. Id.
32. Id. at 288–89.
33. Id. (citing Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 907–13 (R.I. 2014)).
34. Id.
35. See 883 A.2d 1158, 1158–59 (R.I. 2005).
36. Parrillo, 158 A.3d at 290 (citing Rose, 92 A.3d at 912).
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applied to the time spent incarcerated.37
The State argued that despite Rose dealing with a mandatory
minimum, the holding in Rose still applied to Parrillo, and the
Court should reverse the hearing justice’s finding that Parrillo
was not on probation in 2011.38 Conversely, Parrillo argued that
Rose did not apply because Rose relied heavily on two cases that
were decided after Parrillo was sentenced in 1986.39 Further,
Parrillo argued Rose was distinguishable because it dealt with
good-time and time-served credits lowering a sentence to less than
a mandatory minimum, and in his case there was no mandatory
minimum.40 Finally, Parrillo argued “principles of estoppel
appl[ied] as a matter of due process, barring the state from
seeking to adjudge him a probation violator.”41
The Court found Rose central to their analysis of the State’s
petition and to the three statutory provisions at issue because
Parrillo made the same claim as the defendant in Rose—that the
“clock on his probationary term should have started ticking when
he either was released on parole or had successfully completed
parole.”42 Moreover, regarding Parrillo’s first argument that Rose
relied on two cases decided after Parrillo was sentenced, the Court
stated “[i]t is well established that a judicial interpretation of a
statute ‘relates back’ to the date the statute was enacted and,
unlike legislative action, does not implicate ex post facto
considerations.”43 Furthermore, the Court noted Parrillo’s
argument that there was no mandatory minimum in issue, but
found that the distinction did not require the Court to “stray away
from [its] clearly articulated interpretation of the good-time and

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The two cases relied on in Rose were State v. Jacques,
announcing that a “probationary period began at imposition of a sentence,
even if that meant at the commencement of incarceration” and State v.
Dantzler, holding that a “trial court could revoke a probationary term on the
basis of criminal acts committed after imposition of sentence but before the
actual probationary portion of sentence commenced.” Id. at 290 & n.11–12
(quoting State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338 (R.I. 1997) and State v. Jacques, 554
A.2d 193, 196 (R.I. 1989)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 291 (citing State v. Barber, 767 A.2d 78, 78–80 (R.I. 2001)).
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time-served credit statutes enunciated in Rose . . . .”44 As such,
the Court found Parrillo’s credits did not entitle him to “an
acceleration of the end of his probationary term,” especially
because the sentencing justice specified that the sentence was
thirty years.45 The Court held that Parrillo was on probation at
the time of the 2011 altercation because Parrillo was sentenced to
a thirty-year term on January 21, 1986, and his good-time and
time-served credits only reduced his incarceration period, but not
the overall sentence.46 Therefore, the thirty-year sentence did not
end until January 21, 2016.47
Next, the Court addressed whether the hearing justice
committed an error of law when he held that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel did not bar the state from charging Parrillo as a
probation violator.48 Parrillo claimed that the 2009 letter sent by
the DOC informing him his probation was completed caused him
to “conduct [himself] at all times as though [he] was not on
probation.”49 As such, Parrillo argued that as a result he
detrimentally relied on the letter, while the State argued that
Parrillo could not meet the elements of equitable estoppel.50
The Court stated that in order to invoke the equitable
estoppel doctrine there are two necessary elements: “[f]irst, an
affirmative representation . . . directed to another for the purpose
of inducing the other to act or fail to act in reliance thereon; and
secondly, that such representation or conduct in fact did induce
the other to act or fail to act to his injury.”51 The Court held that
this was not the proper instance for equitable estoppel and that
the hearing justice had not committed an error of law.52 The
Court reasoned that the DOC employee that sent the letter did not
have the “authority to decrease a judicially imposed sentence,”
and that any statement about Parrillo’s probation term ending in
2009 directly contradicted the “judicially-imposed” sentence as
well as “[sections] 42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a), including the effect
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291–92.
Id. at 292 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. (quoting Faella v. Chiodo, 111 A.3d 351, 357 (R.I. 2015)).
Id.
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these credits had on the length of Parrillo’s
sentence.”53
Moreover, the Court found that Parrillo provided no evidence that
the DOC employee “intended to induce any specific behavior” or
that his conduct in the 2011 incident was “induced by the 2009
DOC letter.”54 Finally, the Court emphatically stated it was
“preposterous” for Parrillo to claim the 2009 letter induced him to
commit an alleged crime.55
Finally, Parrillo argued the State violated due process given
he had no “fair warning” that his conduct subjected him to the
penalty of a probation violator.56 However, because the lower
court had decided Parrillo’s case on other grounds, the Court
remanded for the hearing justice to consider the due process
argument.57
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court relied heavily on Rose when
holding that sections 42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a), dealing with goodtime and time-served credits, only reduce the time spent
incarcerated, and not the overall sentence, regardless of whether
or not there is a mandatory minimum sentence.58 It seems as
though the majority of the Court found that the distinction in
Rose, the mandatory minimum, was not enough to require the
Court to revisit the relationship between these statutes when it
addressed the interplay of the same two statutes in Parrillo.59
Conversely, the dissent used the definitions of the words
“sentence” and “imprisonment” while interpreting the two statutes
in question, sections 42-56-24 and 12-19-2, and would have
affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that Parrillo was not on
probation at the time of the 2011 altercation.60 The dissent noted
that Rose had a key distinction, the mandatory minimum, and
Rose did not decide the interpretation of the two statutes when
there was no mandatory minimum.61 The dissent focused on the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293 (citing Faella, 111 A.3d at 357).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 291.
Id.
See id. at 294 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Rose, 92 A.3d at 913).
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word “sentence,” and faulted the majority with equating “sentence
with imprisonment” when interpreting section 42-56-24.62
Moreover, the dissent claimed the majority interpretation of
section 12-19-2 was faulty on the same grounds, especially
because section 12-19-2 mandates that a “sentence or sentences
imposed shall be reduced by the number of days spent in
confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting
sentencing.”63 The plain language of the statutes
clearly
mandates that good-time and time-served credits reduce the
sentence imposed.64 Additionally, the dissent noted that sentence
and imprisonment have a clear distinction as sentence is defined
as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding
a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a
criminal wrongdoer.”65 Therefore, the dissent found that the
General Assembly used the word “sentence” to “refer[] to the
entirety of the judgment imposed against the defendant.”66
The dissent, by citing to the actual definitions of the terms in
question, took the clearer approach and deferred to what the
General Assembly likely intended by using those terms.67 As the
dissent pointed out, if the General Assembly wanted the credits
applied only to the period of incarceration, then it could have
chosen that word when drafting the statutes.68 The Court’s
reasoning behind the Rose holding is logical; if there is a
mandatory minimum sentence then it should not be reduced below
that minimum. However, when no mandatory minimum is at
issue, the plain language of the terms used by the General
Assembly should be used to interpret the statutes enacted. This
seemingly led to the dissent’s conclusion—a sentence means just
“the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.”69
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly held that sections
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. (citing Rose, 92 A.3d at 914).
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 295.
Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (10th ed. 2014)).
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id.
See id.

668 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:660
42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a), dealing with good-time and time-served
credits, only reduce the time spent incarcerated and not the
overall sentence regardless of whether or not there is a mandatory
minimum sentence. The Court extended the Rose holding because
it found the distinction between Rose and the case at bar, that no
mandatory minimum existed, was not sufficient for the Court to
stray from the interpretation they gave to the two statutes in
Rose.
David R. Fitzpatrick

Criminal Law. State v. Terzian, 162 A.3d 1230 (R.I. 2017). To
comply with the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entries and
searches must conform to particular and narrow exceptions, such
as exigent circumstances that supersede the warrant requirement.
Police must also base their belief that a person has the authority
to consent to a search of a home on demonstrable factors, not on
assumption.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On the night of July 31, 2007, Providence police received a 91-1 call of gunshots fired in the area of Pumgansett Street.1 Soon
after, officers responded to a nearby location.2 There, a man
approached police and told them that the “Defendant, who ‘lived
on Pumgansett Street,’ had ‘shot his back window out and beat up
his girlfriend.’”3 Officers responded to the Defendant’s home on
Pumgansett Street, where, according to police, gunpowder could
be smelled in the air and broken glass laid in the street.4 After
police knocked on the front door, the Defendant, Boghos Terzian,
emerged from the house, appearing “to the officers to be ‘highly
intoxicated.’”5 Police did not ask the Defendant if he lived in the
home.6 The Defendant began to converse with police, but soon
“became ‘uncooperative’ and ‘belligerent,’” causing officers to place
him in a police cruiser.7 After removing him from the cruiser to
be identified,8 police handcuffed the Defendant and placed him
back in the cruiser, where he remained for the duration of the
1. State v. Terzian, 162 A.3d 1230, 1234 (R.I. 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id. at n.2. The man who spoke with police was Vito A. Cocci. Id.
4. Id. at 1234–35.
5. Id. at 1235.
6. Id. at 1240. “The officers failed to ask who, if anyone, lived in the
house, and they did not ask anyone for identification.” Id.
7. Id. at 1235.
8. Id. The defendant “was identified by Vito as the person with the
firearm.” Id.
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events.9
Police then spoke with the Defendant’s fiancée, Stephanie
Kruwell, and her daughter, Samantha Kruwell, both of whom
were at the Pumgansett Street home.10 The two women were
caring for “a young child who was ‘running around the house.’”11
Police did not ask Stephanie or Samantha who lived in the house
and assumed the two women did.12 Police asked Stephanie if the
house contained any guns.13 Stephanie told officers it did, and,
though police did not request her permission, she voluntarily
consented to a search of the home.14 Police entered the house and
Stephanie directed them to the location of the gun.15 Police
discovered a holstered handgun “beneath clothing stacked on top
of a bureau,” along with ammunition adjacent to the gun.16 After
detectives from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation arrived and
photographed the gun, police seized it.17
The Defendant moved to suppress the seized gun, which the
Rhode Island Superior Court justice denied.18 At the conclusion of
a trial, a jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of assault
with a dangerous weapon and one count of carrying a pistol
without a license.19 The Defendant appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, arguing that “the Superior Court justice erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence seized by police during a
warrantless search of his home.”20

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1236.
12.
Id. at 1235. “Significantly, when the Superior Court justice
pointedly asked Patrolman Zambarano to state the factors that led him to
conclude that Stephanie lived in the house, before he entered, he responded,
‘Just assumption, I guess, your Honor.’” Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17. Id. at 1236.
18.
Id. at 1237. The Superior Court justice stated, “‘[T]here were
circumstances present in the case before me that certainly were exigent to
the point where the cops had to find that gun, and knew there was a firearm.”
Specifically, the justice pointed to the young child and the recent skirmish
and gunfire. Id.
19.
Id.
20. Id. at 1234.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Because this case concerned an alleged violation of the
Defendant’s constitutional rights, the Court conducted a de novo
review.21 In doing so, the Court examined the “totality of the
circumstances” to determine whether the firearm was seized from
the Defendant’s home in violation of the Fourth Amendment.22
The Court reaffirmed that warrantless entries by police into a
home violate the Fourth Amendment, absent “one of the specific
and
carefully
delineated
exceptions
to
the
warrant
requirement.”23 Such exceptions are “‘narrowly defined and
jealously guarded,’”24 and serve as the basis for the Court’s Fourth
Amendment analysis.25
The Court first examined the voluntary consent exception to
the warrant requirement.26 The State argued Stephanie Kurwell
had the “apparent authority” to voluntarily consent to police
entering and searching the Defendant’s home.27 In apparent
authority cases, “the [S]tate must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence the factors that were actually relied
upon by the police,” a demonstration that hinges on an officer’s
reasonable belief.28 In affirming the Superior Court’s holding, the
21. Id. at 1238.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1239 (quoting State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I.
1984)).
25. Id. at 1238. “The starting point for analyzing whether the evidence
seized during the warrantless search of defendant’s home is admissible under
the Fourth Amendment must begin with a determination of whether the
entry by the responding officers was justified as falling within an exception to
the warrant requirement.” Id.
26. Id. at 1239. “Voluntary consent by a person authorized to grant
consent is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. (citing State
v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1125 (R.I. 2005)).
27. Id. at 1238. Additionally, in apparent authority cases, “the state
bears the burden of proving that the officer reasonably believed that the
person who invited the officer into the dwelling, or permitted a search, was
authorized to do so, and it is discovered later that the consenting party lacked
the authority to consent.” Id. at 1239–40.
28. Id. at 1240. “Crucial to an examination of apparent authority, “‘is
whether, based on the information in the officers’ possession, they reasonably
believed’ that the consenting individual had the authority to consent to a[n]
[entry or] search.” Id. (citing State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 1000 (R.I.
2008)) (emphasis added and emphasis omitted).
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Court held that the State failed to meet this burden and that
Stephanie did not possess the apparent authority to voluntarily
consent to police entering and searching the Defendant’s home.29
The Court noted that police did not rely on any factors to satisfy
the conclusion that Stephanie lived in the house they sought to
enter;30 rather, the Court reaffirmed police assumed Stephanie
lived in the house and did not direct any questions to the parties
involved to confirm their assumption.31 The Court found police’s
assumption that Stephanie lived in the house, “in the absence of
factors that would lead an experienced police officer to reach such
a conclusion, [to be] woefully inadequate and [did] not lead to a
reasonable judgment.”32 Because Stephanie did not have the
apparent authority to authorize police to enter and search the
Defendant’s home, the Court reaffirmed the Superior Court’s
holding that the voluntary consent exception did not justify the
failure to obtain a warrant in the Defendant’s case.33
Next, the Court examined the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement, which applies when “there
is such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not
brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.”34 “[T]he police [must]
have an objective, reasonable belief that a crisis can only be
avoided by swift and immediate action.”35 The Court illustrated
29. Id.
30. Id. “Although the state points out that Stephanie was the
defendant’s fiancée and that she was familiar with defendant’s dogs as
factors that support the officers’ conclusions, there was no evidence produced
to suggest that the officers relied on these factors.” Id.
31. Id. The Court again stated that both responding officers testified at
the suppression hearing they assumed Stephanie lived in the house. Id.
32. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that police should not be held to a
standard of perfection. “This Court recognizes that, in the context of
apparent authority, ‘room must be allowed for some mistakes on [the officer’s]
part.’” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
However, the Court here found police’s mistakes unreasonable. “[T]he
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability.” Id. (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176)
(emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1241 (citing State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1151 (R.I.
2016)).
35. Id. (citing Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1151). Additionally, the Court
noted that its focus in analyzing the exigent circumstances exception is
limited “to the facts known to the police at the time they enter the dwelling.”
Id.
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previous examples where it deemed such action overcame the
warrant requirement, including: the need to render “emergency
assistance,” “hot pursuit” scenarios, and preventing “the imminent
destruction of evidence.”36 The Court also noted that an exigent
circumstances analysis hinges on “whether the police reasonably
believed, relying upon facts known by them at the time[,] that the
warrantless intrusion was necessary to preserve life or avoid
serious injury.”37
Overturning the Superior Court’s finding, the Court held
exigent circumstances were not sufficiently present so as to justify
the warrantless entry into the Defendant’s home. In doing so, the
Court first examined the responding officers’ testimonies provided
at the suppression hearing.38 The Court found that “neither
officer testified that he was concerned about the unsecured
firearm or that he was faced with an emergency,” and neither
officer testified they believed the “underlying dispute” for which
police were initially summoned would “reignite.”39 Because the
officers did not “‘point to some real immediate and serious
consequences if [they] postponed action to get a warrant” through
their testimony, the Court held exigent circumstances justifying
the absence of a warrant did not exist.40 Additionally, the Court
turned to the facts of the incident in finding exigent circumstances
lacking. These included the fact that police secured the defendant
in a cruiser during the search, and that there were “no other
suspects, intruders, or victims on the premises.”41 The Court also
dismissed the potential concern that the child Stephanie and
Samantha cared for could have accessed and fired the weapon,
noting that police only discovered the child running around the
36. Id. at 1241. “Those circumstances include: ‘law enforcement’s need
to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home, engage in “hot
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, enter a burning building to put out a fire and
investigate its cause, [and] prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.’”
Id. (citing Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1164).
37. Id. at 1242.
38.
Id. “The testimony of the intruding officer provides the court with
insight into the officer’s motivation for the entry and, therefore, provides the
basis for the court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances support the
intrusion.” Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
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house after they entered it.42 Moreover, that a firearm was
merely present in the Defendant’s house did not persuade the
Court an emergency existed justifying warrantless entry by
police.43 The Court emphasized the general circumstances at the
time of the search and found that they presented no hazard that
rightly afforded police the authority to conduct a warrantless
entry.44 The Court stated, “When the area is secure and the
danger is no longer present, the emergency is over, and the search
must cease.”45
Lastly, the Court briefly addressed the issue of harmless
error.46 The inquiry under which harmless error is analyzed asks
“whether it is reasonably possible that the error contributed to the
conviction.”47 The State argued it was harmless error that the
Superior Court Justice admitted the firearm seized from the
Defendant’s home into evidence.48 The Court, noting that the
Defendant’s charges “require the [S]tate to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the] [D]efendant had control over a
firearm,” disagreed, and further illustrated conflicting testimony
as to the Defendant’s possession and use of a firearm during the
incident that elicited police response.49 In considering this, the
Court held that admitting the unlawfully seized gun was not
harmless error.50
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court analyzed a fluid and
42.
Id. at 1243. The Court also noted police “paid scant attention to the
child in any event. A passing observation that there may have been a child
‘running around the house’ will not support a warrantless search based on an
emergency.” Id.
43.
Id. “The fact that there may have been a firearm somewhere in the
residence does not, by itself, rise to the level of exigency necessary to surpass
the warrant requirement.” Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 1244. “Harmless error is recognized to be an error that ‘in the
setting of a particular case [is] so unimportant and insignificant that [it] may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction.’” Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
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undoubtedly complex set of facts. It is clear that Stephanie lacked
the apparent authority to consent to a search of the Defendant’s
home because police admittedly relied on nothing more than
assumption in determining to the contrary.51 However, it is less
clear that exigent circumstances were absent. The dissent
considered the circumstances to be sufficiently exigent so as to
justify a warrantless entry into and search of the Defendant’s
home,52 and emphasized that the actual circumstances should
remain the exclusive basis for the Court’s inquiry in cases
involving warrantless entry and the exigent circumstances
exception.
The dissent illustrated a scene that had yet to fully cool,
stating the “[D]efendant’s arrest did very little to address the
underlying domestic dispute that served as the catalyst to the
fight and ultimate shooting.”53 Because the events were prone to
being dangerously revived, the dissent noted the potential for
harm to police or others, which was certainly exacerbated by the
presence of an unsecured firearm; indeed, the dissent stated that
“exigent circumstances are found when an officer anticipates that
someone in the home, whether a child or an adult, will be harmed
by a firearm.”54 Additionally, that the gun remained hidden and
the shooting ceased is immaterial. The dissent stated that “[a]n
officer is not required to wait until the anticipated danger—
whether to himself or herself or to the public—comes to
fruition.”55
The dissent contested the majority’s reliance on “the
testimony of the intruding officer [which] provides the [C]ourt
with insight into the officer’s motivation for the entry and,
therefore, provides the basis for the court’s conclusion that exigent
circumstances support the intrusion.”56 The dissent stated that
“[b]y shifting the focus to ‘the officer[s’] motivation for the entry,’
the majority has erroneously applied a subjective analysis to
51. Id. at 1240.
52. Id. at 1245.
53. Id. at 1246.
54. Id. “Here, the officers could reasonably have believed that it was
necessary to secure the gun before either the heated domestic dispute
reignited or, perhaps worse, the young child located the unsecured firearm.”
Id.
55. Id. at 1246.
56. Id. at 1247.
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determine whether an exigency existed.”57 Instead, the dissent
retained focus on the “actual circumstances that confronted”
police.58 Those circumstances involved “shots [that] had recently
been fired; there had been a street fight between Samantha and
her ex-boyfriend; someone had been pepper-sprayed; and the
officers had been told that there was a firearm in the house where,
as the majority noted, a young child ‘was running around.’”59
Notwithstanding the officers’ testimonies that they were
unconcerned for the loose gun,60 the dissent found the dangerous
circumstances alone gave rise to exigency sufficient to overcome
the warrant requirement.61
The dissent is more persuasive because it addressed the
danger police actually encountered, not what the officers may
have believed. In determining whether the exigent circumstances
exception applies, confining the analysis to the actual
circumstances, viewed objectively, seems more appropriate than
expanding the inquiry to consider an officer’s subjective
motivation.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that police violated the
Fourth Amendment by entering and searching the Defendant’s
home without first obtaining a warrant. The Court determined
the entry and search to be unconstitutional because it satisfied
neither the voluntary consent nor the exigent circumstances
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
Adam J. Fague

57. Id.
58. Id. at 1248.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1242.
61. Id. at 1247. “When the circumstances are examined objectively,
however, the officers’ entry was clearly justified under the exigentcircumstances exception.” Id.

Employment Law. Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159
(R.I. 2017). Rhode Island General Laws section 28-5-7(6), the
Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), does not
provide for individual liability of an employee of a defendant
employer. Enforcing individual liability against an individual
employee under FEPA would be against the intent of the statute
and would have a chilling effect on management employees.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Sergeant Mark Mancini (Mancini) of the Providence Police
Department brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island, alleging unlawful employment and
disability discrimination against his employer, the City of
Providence, and the Chief of Police of the Providence Police
Department, Hugh Clements, Jr. (Clements).1 Mancini alleged
that he was illegally denied a promotional opportunity within the
Providence Police Department.2 Additionally, Mancini alleged
Clements was liable in his individual capacity for Mancini’s
failure to be promoted.3 Section 28-5-7(6) of FEPA provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice [f]or any
person, whether or not an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or employee, to aid, abet, incite,
compel or coerce the doing of any act declared by this
section to be an unlawful employment practice, or to
obstruct or prevent any person from complying with the
provisions of this chapter or any order pursuant to this
chapter, or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any
act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment
practice[.]4

1.
2.
3.
4.

Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 161 (R.I. 2017).
Id.
Id.
28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(6) (1956).
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Mancini argued that Clements violated section 28-5-6-7(6) of
FEPA when he failed to promote Mancini.5 Chief Clements
moved to dismiss the complaint against him, arguing section 28-56-7(6) does not provide for individual liability.6 The United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island posed a certified
question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court requesting that the
Court determine if individual liability exists under FEPA section
28-5-6-7(6).7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In answering the certified question posed by the district
court,8 the Supreme Court sought to determine if FEPA could be
reasonably interpreted to provide for individual liability of
employees. Conducting a de novo review of the statutory
language, the Court focused on the parties’ conflicting views on
the language of the “aiding and abetting” statute.9 Mancini
argued that the statutory language was unambiguous and urged
the Court to follow the decisions of New York, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut, which have held individual liability exists.10
Clements urged the Court to read the FEPA as a whole and to
follow the reasoning of Alaska, California, and Minnesota, which
have held that individual liability does not exist under similar
statutory schemes.11
In interpreting the statutory language, the Court sought to
“give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.”12 The Court stated
that if the language of the statue was unambiguous it “must
interpret the statute literally and give the words . . . their plain
5. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 161.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 161–62.
8. Id. at 161. The United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island asked the Rhode Island Supreme Court to answer the following
certified question: “Does Section 28–5–7(6) of the Rhode Island Fair
Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28–5–1 et seq. (‘FEPA’), provide
for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer and, if so,
under what circumstances?” Id.
9. Id. at 161–62.
10.
Id. at 162. New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts all have
similar statutory schemes for employment discrimination and have held
multiple times that individual employees may be held liable. Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
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. . . meanings.”13 However, because the language of the statute
states liability should be attributed to “any person, whether or not
an employee,” the Court determined that section 28-5-6-7(6) was
ambiguous with regards to whether or not it imposed individual
liability.14 In light of the ambiguous wording of the statute, the
Court stated it must attempt to give effect to the legislative intent
by evaluating the “entire statutory scheme.”15 The
Court
reasoned that in order to impose individual liability it would have
to determine that Sergeant Clements aided and abetted himself.16
In order to impose liability on Clements, it would have to be
determined that as an employee he was aiding in the unlawful
employment practice.17 However, because Clements was both the
employee and the sole individual responsible for the alleged
unlawful employment practice, the Court determined that he
could not aid and abet himself.18 The Court found that
interpreting the statute in such a manner would be illogical and
circular.19
The Court noted that the General Assembly intended for
FEPA to be construed liberally; however, a liberal interpretation
of the statute should not go against logical reasoning.20 The
section of FEPA at issue here was ambiguously worded, and the
Court reasoned that if the General Assembly intended for
individual liability, it would have expressly stated so in
unequivocal language.21 Persuaded by precedent from Alaska, the
Court held that the statute did not impose individual liability.22
While the Court based its holding entirely on the principles of
statutory interpretation, the Court also reasoned that holding
13.
Id.
14. Id. at 163; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(6).
15. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 163.
16. Id. at 164.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Court reasoned that holding Clements individually liable
“would create a strange and confusing circularity where the person who has
directly perpetrated the harassment only becomes liable through the
employer whose liability in turn hinges on the conduct of the direct
perpetrator.” Id. (quoting Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d
790 (Minn. 2013)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 165.
22. Id. at 165; see also Mills v. Hankla, 297 P.3d 158, 172 (Alaska 2013).
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individuals liable would have a “chilling effect” on management
decision making.23 If individual liability was imposed, the Court
predicted that supervisors might make employment decisions
based on fear of litigation instead of the best interest of the
business.24 For public policy reasons, an individual should not
have to be concerned with losing all of his possessions when
deciding which employee to promote.25 Additionally, the remedies
provided by FEPA, such as cease-and-desist orders, hiring
reinstatements, and upgrading of employees, are traditionally
statutory remedies imposed on employers.26 In line with the
reasoning of the California Court, this Court stated that imposing
individual liability may encourage individuals to make decisions
based on what actions were least likely to result in litigation
versus making the best decision for the furtherance of their
employer’s business.27
Finally, the Court briefly discussed the issue of deference to
agency interpretation. The Rhode Island Commission for Human
Rights stated in an amicus curiae brief that as the agency
responsible for administering the FEPA, it has long held
individual employees liable.28 The agency urged the Court to give
deference to their interpretation of the statute.29 However, the
Court reasoned that while it is often the practice to defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, the Court is the
final authority in statutory interpretation.30 Ultimately, the
Court determined that any deference due to the agency did not
overcome the General Assembly’s intent to not impose individual
liability.31
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly stays true to the
23.
24.
25.
liability
Id.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165–66.
Id.
Id. at 166. The Court also noted the potential difficulty of assigning
when multiple individuals are part of the decision-making process.
Id.
Id. at 166; see also Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1339 (Cal. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
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spirit of section 28-5-7(6) by providing wronged employees an
appropriate avenue to bring action against their employer for
discrimination. In balancing the interests of the industry against
those of wrongly discriminating employers, the Court ensured that
employees who are wronged still have recourse against their
employer and, further, that individual supervisors are free to
make important business decisions without fear of legal
repercussions. By ensuring that employees are still able to seek
redress from their employer, the Court maintained the spirit of
the statute, discouraged discrimination, and protected employees
from wrongful discriminatory conduct by their employer.
As such, by clarifying that individuals cannot be held liable
under the FEPA, the Court broadened the decision-making
capabilities of individual supervisors. In eliminating the risk of
individual liability for discriminatory action, the Court gave
supervisors and managers the confidence to make the right
management decision for their organizations. In return,
individual employees no longer need to fear losing their personal
assets as a result of a lawsuit from an aggrieved employee.
Finally, the Court protects the rights of injured employees
seeking recourse for discriminatory acts. The Court maintained
the overall purpose of the FEPA by ensuring that employees
alleging discrimination still have effective means of redressability
against their employer. In clarifying the ambiguous statutory
language, the Court protected the interests of wronged employees
while insulating individual employees from liability under section
28-5-7(6) of the FEPA.
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in answering a certified
question from the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, held that under section 28-5-7(6) of the Rhode
Island Fair Employment Practices Act individual employees are
not liable for employment or disability discrimination.32 In the
absence of clear language, the Court determined the General
Assembly did not intend to hold individual employees liable under
section 28-5-6-7(6) of the FEPA.33
Kathrine M. Morin

32.
33.

Id. at 168; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(6).
Mancini, 155 A.3d at 164.

Injunctive Relief. Paolino v. Ferreira, 153 A.3d 505 (R.I. 2017).
Despite mandatory injunctive relief for cases of continuing
trespass, certain exceptional circumstances warrant a balancing of
equities between parties before ordering injunctive relief. Upon a
finding of exceptional circumstance warranting a balancing of
equities, injunctive relief may still be ordered upon a finding of
excessive activity corresponding to a de minimis encroachment.
Evidence. Id. Expert testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule
703 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence where an expert
perceives facts or data prior to the testimony and relies upon those
facts or data, which have been established as being reasonably
and customarily relied upon by experts in the field. During
testimony, upon an objection to the foundation of expert
testimony, appeal is preserved upon a sufficient offer of proof.1
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In October 1983, Joseph Ferreira (Ferreira or Defendant)
purchased approximately thirty acres of property, which included
a stream and two large ponds, for use as an auto salvage yard.2
Ferreira constructed two separate buildings on his property: the
first was located two hundred feet away from the stream and used
for dismantling cars, and the second was seven to ten feet from
the border of an abutting property.3 There was no survey
conducted before any construction, and when an addition to the
second building was constructed, it exceeded the property line by
1. Attorney sanctions were also discussed in the opinion, but will not be
a focus in this survey.
2. Paolino v. Ferreira, 153 A.3d 505, 509–10 (R.I. 2017).
Upon
ownership, Ferreira cleaned up the lot without any environmental inspection
and began filling the wetlands, which caused a pond to rapidly fill. Id. This
caused Ferreira to widen the stream, which led the Department of
Environmental Management to require erosion controls to address the
environmental violations. Id.
3. Id. at 510.
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eighty-six hundredths (0.86) of a foot.4 Ferreira also installed
drainage controls to trap contaminants pursuant to an agreement
with the Department of Environmental Management (DEM).5
Ferreira testified that, in spite of the precautions taken to trap
containments, he had noticed turbid water running off the site.6
In December 1985, a company owned by Louis Paolino
(Paolino or Plaintiff) purchased six acres abutting Ferreira’s lots.7
In 1987, Paolino received a letter from DEM notifying him that his
land was on the CERCLIS list because of the potential release of
contaminants in the area.8 In response, Paolino had tests
conducted on his land which subsequently cleared the property
from the CERCLIS list.9 Through the 1990s, Paolino had no
further problems with contamination on his property.10
Contaminants were not again found until a potential buyer had
the property evaluated.11 In response to the contamination, DEM
sent a letter of responsibility, and then a letter of noncompliance,
which indicated Paolino, as the owner of the property, was
financially responsible for the investigation and remediation of the
hazardous materials on site.12
Subsequently, in November 2006, Paolino filed an action in
the Rhode Island Superior Court alleging continuing trespass,
public and private nuisance, as well as federal and state
environmental violations on the basis that Ferreira caused the
contaminants to flow onto his property.13
4. Id. at 510, 513.
5. Id. at 510. The storm water pollution prevention plan was installed
by 2008. Id.
6. Id. at 511.
7. Id. LM Nursing Services Inc. Id.
8. Id.
CERCLIS
(Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Information System) is a database maintained
by the EPA as part of the Superfund program. Id. at 511 & n.3 (internal
citation omitted).
9. Id. at 511. Paolino hired Environmental Resource Associates,
Incorporated (ERA) to conduct the test and, subsequently, clear the property
from the CERCLIS list after the test revealed the contamination had
subsided. Id.
10. Id. The Division of Air and Hazardous Materials of DEM sent a
letter confirming that the stream had been sampled twice and neither sample
was found to be contaminated. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 511–12. Amended complaints added, in total, thirty-five
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At trial, Paolino called Alvin Snyder (Snyder), a consulting
environmental and chemical engineer, to testify as an expert
witness concerning the contaminants and the properties at
issue.14 In preparation for testimony, Snyder reviewed all
available information including thousands of pages of documents
that are customarily and reasonably relied upon by site
assessment professionals when performing site assessments.15
Snyder relied upon these documents to formulate his expert
opinion.16 Snyder testified that storm water runs from Ferreira’s
property and into the stream on Paolino’s property.17 Further,
Snyder testified that the Environmental Resource Associates
(ERA) conducted tests in 1987, which revealed no contamination
on Paolino’s property, but “soil borings from Paolino’s property in
2007 showed the presence of oil contamination.”18 Snyder then
offered testimony of his visits to the property in which he
determined the presence of turbidity in the stream water.19
Snyder also took independent samples from the storm water
running off of the property and testified that the oil from the
storm water was “fingerprinted” and identified as lube oil or
counts as well as two new defendants: Joseph Ferreira Trust and J.F. Realty,
LLC. Id.
14. Id. at 516. Snyder offered that he had a Bachelor of Science degree
in chemical engineering from Clarkson College of Technology and that he was
a registered engineer in four states. Id.
15. Id. at 516–17.
16.
Id. at 517. An expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical
question, facts or data perceived by the expert at or before the hearing, or
facts or data in evidence of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon by
experts in the particular field. In forming opinions upon the subject, the
underlying facts or data shall be admissible without testimony from the
primary source. R.I. R. Evid. 703.
17.
Paolino, 153 A.3d at 517. Snyder offered testimony on aerial
photographs of the property which had been taken in 1981, 1988, 1996, and
2005. The photographs revealed that Ferreira did not comply with a twentyfoot buffer zone requirement between activity and the stream. Id.
18.
Id. The soil borings found solvents, metals, lead, and light, nonaqueous phase liquids like oil or gasoline. Id. at 517 & n.7. Snyder also
noted an analysis done by the Pawtucket Water Supply Board that indicated
a presence of other components of gasoline and testified to a hydrology report
indicating oil sheen at the entry point of the storm water from Ferreira’s
property to Paolino’s property. Id. at 517.
19.
Id. at 517–18. “Turbid” is defined by the American Heritage
Dictionary as “having sediment or foreign particles stirred up or suspended.”
Id. at 518 & n.9 (internal citation omitted).
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compressor oils.20
On direct examination, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Snyder if he
had an opinion as to what caused the contamination on Paolino’s
property, upon which Ferreira’s counsel objected based on lack of
foundation.21 The trial justice sustained the objection providing
that the Court was going to need more foundation, grounded in
science, for the opinion testimony.22 Thereafter, Paolino’s counsel
attempted to build a foundation for this opinion testimony which
was repeatedly objected to by Defendant’s counsel and repeatedly
sustained by the trial justice.23
The sustained objections to this line of questioning continued
until Paolino’s counsel asked:
Based upon the reports you reviewed, your testing, and
your personal observations at the site in 2009, did you
have an opinion as to whether or not the water that was
coming out of the storm water discharge system at the
headwall was causing oil to come onto Mr. Paolino’s
property?24
Only then did the trial justice permit a limited opinion testimony
that the storm water discharged from Ferreira’s salvage yard by
the headwall was polluting Paolino’s property.25 Accordingly, the
jury found that there was a continuing trespass and awarded
Paolino nominal damages of $1,400.26
Two years after this jury verdict, Paolino moved for an entry
of final judgment, and, at the hearing, Paolino claimed he was

20.
Id. at 518. The storm water samples were carefully taken from
Ferreira’s property to be sure the samples did not include any additional
runoff from other properties. Id.
21.
Id.
22. Id. at 519.
23. Id. Paolino’s counsel made numerous offers of proof to establish the
foundation for which Snyder would testify through questions concerning the
documents Snyder reviewed, the analysis Snyder performed, and the review
of DEM and GZA tests and analysis. Id. at 518–20.
24. Id. at 521.
25.
Id. However, testimony as to the discharge of oil from Ferreira’s
property into the stream was precluded. Id.
26.
Id. at 512. The continuing trespasses identified were: a corner of
Ferreira’s metal building, the headwall and riprap for Ferreira’s storm water
remediation system, and the discharge flowing from Ferreira’s property onto
Paolino’s property. Id.
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entitled to injunctive relief to remove the continuing trespass.27
At the hearing, the trial justice noted that the general remedy for
continuing trespass is injunctive relief, but she stated that there
are exceptions to mandatory injunctive relief where the impact to
a defendant is disproportionate to the benefit of a plaintiff.28 The
trial justice found that the Ferreira’s did not act recklessly or in
bad faith and had no reason to know of the encroachment.29
However, because encroachment of the metal building invites
more human activity onto Paolino’s property, the injunctive relief
was issued only in part to remove the portion of the metal
building.30
On appeal, Paolino challenged the trial justice’s preclusion of
his expert witness’s opinion testimony, as well as the failure to
order full injunctive relief on the issue of continuing trespass.31
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Preclusion of Expert Opinion Testimony
On appeal, Paolino first argued that the trial justice erred
when she precluded his expert witness from testifying as to the
cause of the oil running onto Paolino’s property.32 Paolino argued
that Snyder established a reasonable basis for the opinion
testimony under Rule 703 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence,
contrary to the finding of the trial justice.33 It is clear that the
determination of whether to qualify an expert witness to proffer
an expert opinion is left to the discretion of the trial justice, and
the Court will not disturb that determination absent clear error or
abuse of discretion.34 Accordingly, a litigant must make an offer
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 513 (citing Santilli v. Morelli, 230 A.2d 860 (1967)). The court
is entitled to balance the equities between parties unless the encroachment is
intentional. Id. (citing Renaissance Development Corp. v. Universal
Properties Group, Inc., 821 A.2d 233 (R.I. 2003)).
29.
Paolino, 153 A.3d at 513.
30.
Id. at 514. The trial justice reasoned that there would be an increase
in human activity of Paolino’s property because people would be retrieving
automobile parts that were stored in the structure. Id.
31. Id. at 514, 521.
32. Id. at 521.
33. Id. at 521; see R.I. R. Evid. 703.
34. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 521 (quoting Foley v. St. Joseph’s Health
Services of Rhode Island, 899 A.2d 1271, 1280 (R.I. 2006)).
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of proof after a sustained objection to preserve the issue for
appeal.35 The Court determined, from the record of a sidebar
exchange, that Paolino’s counsel made a sufficient offer of proof.36
Because the issue had been preserved for appeal, the Court then
sought to determine if, under Rule 705 of the Rhode Island Rules
of Evidence, the testimony was permissible.37 Under Rule 705,
“an expert’s opinion must be predicate upon facts legally sufficient
to from a basis for his [or her] conclusion.”38
In determining admissibility, the Court recognized that
Snyder reviewed numerous documents pertaining to the property
that were made available through governmental and professional
agencies; the documents were typical of those customarily relied
upon by site assessment professionals; and Snyder had taken
visits to the property and independently analyzed various water
samples.39 Subsequently, the trial justice only allowed testimony
on the results of his independent tests and precluded opinion
testimony as to the Ferreira property being the source of the
contaminants.40
As noted, the Court will not interfere with the trial justice’s
decision unless a clear abuse of discretion is apparent.41 The
Court elaborated that “if the expert has testified with ‘some
degree of positiveness,’ his or her testimony is admissible[,] and
issues relative to the weight of the evidence are left to the factfinder.”42 Finding such, the Court determined that Snyder, as an
expert witness, reviewed the reports of others and conducted his
own analysis to render his expert opinion in a manner common to
35. Id. at 521 (quoting Mead v. Papa Razzi, 899 A.2d 437, 445 (R.I.
2006)).
36. Id. at 522. The record of such exchange is quoted in full in the
opinion. Id.
37. Id. “Unless the court directs otherwise, before testifying in terms of
opinion, an expert witness shall be first examined concerning the facts or
data upon which the opinion is based.” Id. at 522; see R.I. R. Evid. 705.
38. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 522 (quoting Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d
1059, 1063 (R.I. 1998)); R.I. R. Evid. 705.
39. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 523. None of the information discussed or relied
upon was challenged by Defendant’s counsel. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The standard is applicable to a trial justice’s determinations
with respect to both the relevancy of proffered evidence and the adequacy of
the foundation laid for its admission. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. (quoting Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 477 (R.I. 2002)).
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expert witnesses.43 Subsequently, the Court found the exclusion of
Snyder’s expert testimony an unsustainable exercise of discretion
and awarded a new trial on the admissibility of the testimony.44
B. Failure to Order Injunctive Relief
Secondly, on appeal, Paolino argued that he was entitled to an
order of full injunctive relief.45 Injunctive relief is discretionary in
nature, and a decision will not be disturbed absent a showing of
an abuse of discretion or error of law.46 The Court recognized a
fundamental principle of property law that “land is not fungible;
and, accordingly, equitable remedies are normally used when it
comes to injuries and intrusions to it.”47 The trial justice, in
opposition to the fundamental principle, may, in its discretion,
decline to weigh the equities where enforcement will
disproportionately harm the defendant with little benefit to the
plaintiff.48 Paolino argued the trial justice should have found that
Ferreira acted in bad faith and/or recklessly in encroaching upon
Paolino’s property and, as such, it was inappropriate to balance
the equities.49
The Court addressed Paolino’s argument that the balancing of
equities was not appropriate because the hardship to the
Defendant was self-inflicted where he encroached on Paolino’s
property knowingly or recklessly.50 However, the opinion makes
clear the trial justice did not abuse her discretion because she
found Ferreira did not knowingly and deliberately encroach upon
43.
Id. at 525. “An expert’s opinion may be based on a hypothetical
question, facts or data perceived by the expert at or before the hearing, or
facts or data in evidence. If of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject, the
underlying facts or data shall be admissible without testimony from the
primary source.” R.I. R. Evid. 703.
44.
Paolino, 153 A.3d at 525.
45. Id. at 514.
46. Id. (citing North End Realty, LLC v. Mattos, 25 A.3d 527, 530 (R.I.
2011)).
47. Id. at 515. (quoting Rose Nulman Park Foundation ex rel. Nulman
v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 29 (R.I. 2014)).
48. Id. at 515. “[T]hese exceptional circumstances include, but are not
limited to, acquiescence, laches, or a de minimis trespass.” Rose Nulman, 93
A.3d at 29.
49. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 515.
50. Id.
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Paolino’s property, but actually respected what he genuinely
believed to be the property line.51 Thus, the Court opined that,
where the encroachments do not substantially interfere with a
plaintiff’s use of his or her land and it would cause such an
inconvenience and pecuniary obligations to a defendant, the trial
justice should use his or her discretion in denying the mandatory
injunctive relief.52 Therefore, the Court affirmed the findings of
the trial justice and made clear that the encroachment of the
metal building was subjected to enforcement of injunctive relief
because it invited continuous human activity where the building
was used in connection with the business.53 However, the twelveinch encroachment of the headwall and riprap in this case was de
minimis and warranted a balancing of the equities which fell in
favor of Ferreira.54 Thus, the Court found that the trial justice
did not stray beyond her broad discretion in ordering injunctive
relief in part.55
COMMENTARY

Upon review of Snyder’s expert opinion testimony, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court immediately noted the impressive
credentials of Snyder’s schooling and career.56 It was further
established that Snyder was more than prepared for his testimony
after reviewing thousands of pages of documents and performing
his own tests on the property.57 Concededly, under Rule 703 of
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, Snyder relied upon these
documents and tests to formulate his expert testimony.58 In
response to repeated objections for lack of foundation during
testimony, Paolino’s counsel made an offer of proof as to how
51. Id. The trial justice noted that the defendant’s testimony was
believable where the survey did not reveal any encroachments and because it
was easy to make a mistake as to the property boundaries. Id.
52. Id. at 516. Because the cost to remove the riprap was $18,000 and
the cost to redirect the discharge was $60,000, this case involves the
exceptional circumstances warranting the balancing of equities. Id. at 514,
516.
53. Id. at 516.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 516–17.
58. Id. at 517; see R.I. R. Evid. 703.
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Snyder would testify.59 What the Court has failed to do, is
recognize any rational basis for why the expert testimony was
initially precluded. The Court expressly referred to the record of
the trial justice during an interaction at sidebar.60 According to
the record, the trial justice stated that “[Snyder] needs to give us
the facts upon which he has concluded something. . . .[t]hat’s a
little bit more than ‘I looked at a bunch of records.’”61 To the
contrary, and under the express language of Rule 703 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence, where the expert opinion is of a type
reasonably and customarily relied upon by experts in a particular
field, as established here, an expert’s opinion testimony may be
based on facts or data perceived by the expert at or before the
hearing.62 By expressly including the record from Snyder’s
testimony, the Rhode Island Supreme Court implied that this was
an obvious abuse of discretion in precluding expert testimony
which was facially and procedurally sound practice under the
Rules.63 It is sufficiently noted that the customary and suitable
means for attacking credibility is through cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof, and it is not for the trial justice to interfere with
the jury’s role as the trier of fact.64 As evidenced here, a narrow
application of the Rules of Evidence hinders the juries
opportunity to hear relevant testimony and relieves the jury of its
duty to weigh the credibility of an expert witness on direct
examination and on cross-examination.
The trial justice’s partial order of injunctive relief was a
proper use of discretion upon weighing the equities of the
parties.65 Here, the Court placed great weight on the balancing of
equities and noted that there is a lack of a bright line rule in its
application.66 The balancing act, as applied to the metal building,
weighed both the physical intrusion as well as expected future
intrusion. Accordingly, this Court, upon the findings of the trial
59. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 518–19.
60. Id. at 522.
61. Id. at 519.
62. R.I. R. Evid. 703.
63. See id.
64. Paolino, 153 A.3d at 525 (citing Owens v. Silva, 838 A.2d 881, 883
(R.I. 2003)).
65. Id. at 516.
66. Id.
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justice, identified the purpose of the encroaching metal building as
being for business purposes.67 Therefore, the foreseeability of
future, continuous human intrusion onto Paolino’s property for
business purposes was a substantial factor in the ordering of
injunctive relief.68 By allowing the equitable balancing act to
include probable future intrusions and not rely strictly on the
imminent, and readily ascertainable intrusion, the Supreme Court
offers an additional tool to plaintiffs in search of injunctive relief
who may be subjected to future continuing trespasses.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that expert testimony
is admissible where the expert witness relies on documents
reasonably and customarily relied upon by experts in the field
where the facts and data are perceived by the expert prior to
testimony. Further, the Court determined that, upon a balancing
of equities, injunctive relief is to be ordered upon continuing
trespass in the face of exceptional circumstances, such as price of
removal, where the continuing trespass invites continuous, future
business activity.
Maxwell L. Beermann

67.
68.

Id.
Id.

Insurance Law. Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 161 A.3d
1150 (R.I. 2017). A passenger who is injured while rendering
roadside assistance as a Good Samaritan is “occupying” the
vehicle she just exited under the terms of an insurance policy and
is entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits because: (1)
there was a showing of some nexus between her injury and use of
the insured vehicle; (2) she remained vehicle oriented as her
departure from the insured vehicle was a temporary interruption
in an unfinished excursion; and (3) in light of long-standing public
policy to encourage rescue of others from perilous situations, at
the time of injury she was engaged in a transaction essential to
the use of the insured vehicle.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In February 2012, Amberleigh Hudson (Hudson or Plaintiff)
was a passenger in a car driven by her then boyfriend, Gregory
Hurst (Hurst).1 The car Hudson was traveling in was insured by
GEICO Insurance Agency, Inc., d/b/a GEICO General Insurance
Company (GEICO or Defendant), under which the named insured
was Hurst.2 In the early morning hours the couple pulled into the
Amazing Superstore parking lot on Allens Avenue with the
intention to exit the vehicle and enter the store.3 While parked in
the lot, but still in the car talking, they heard an automobile
collision.4 The couple exited the vehicle, crossed two lanes of
traffic, and reached the scene of the nearby collision.5 While
Hudson was at the rear of the vehicles looking down to obtain the
license plate numbers, someone yelled, “Car!”6 A third vehicle
then struck the disabled vehicles.7 Hudson was injured as a
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 161 A.3d 1150, 1152 (R.I. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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result of the impact.8 Hudson brought a claim against GEICO
seeking relief as a passenger through the insurance policy Hurst
maintained.9 GEICO denied Hudson’s claim, asserting that she
was not “occupying” the insured vehicle at the time of her
injuries.10
In a bench trial upon a set of stipulated facts before the Rhode
Island Superior Court, the trial justice analyzed the term
“occupying” using the four prong Olivier test,11 and concluded that
Hudson could not satisfy the first or third prongs of the Olivier
criteria because no causal connection was established between
Hurst’s insured vehicle and the Plaintiff’s injuries, nor was the
Plaintiff vehicle oriented at the time of the injury.12 Thus, the
trial justice held that Hudson “could not recover [underinsured
motorist] (UM) benefits under the terms of the GEICO policy
because she was not ‘occupying’ the insured vehicle at the time of
the incident giving rise to her injuries.”13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Justice Goldberg wrote the opinion for the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.14 In a matter of first impression, the Court was
called upon to address how, if at all, section 11-56-1 of the Rhode
Island General Laws15 interacts with the term “occupying” in an
insurance policy.16 Upon review of the Superior Court judgment,
the Court sought to decide “[w]hether, in light of [section] 11-56-1,
a Good Samaritan who was injured while rendering roadside aid
may be considered to be ‘occupying’ an insured motor vehicle for
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. “The policy defined ‘occupying’ as ‘in, upon entering into or
alighting from [the vehicle].’” Id.
11. The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted four criteria under which
a motorist would be considered “occupying” a vehicle within the meaning of
an insurance policy in General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Olivier,
574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990). See Hudson, 161 A.3d at 1153 n.1.
12. Id. at 1153.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1152.
15.
Referred to by the Court as the “Good Samaritan Act.” Id. at 1154.
But see id. at 1163 n.2 (Indeglia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
mischaracterizes the statute as a Good Samaritan Act, when it is really
entitled “Duty to assist”).
16.
Id. at 1154 (majority opinion).
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purposes of UM coverage under that vehicle’s insurance policy.”17
Conducting a de novo review,18 the Court—using a broad and
liberal view of the policy language19 and guided by the four prong
Olivier criteria—analyzed whether Hudson was “occupying” the
insured vehicle as defined in the GEICO policy.20
A. First Prong
The first prong of the Olivier criteria requires “a causal
relation or connection between the injury and the use of the
insured vehicle.”21 To satisfy this criteria there must be some
nexus between the insured motor vehicle and the claimant’s
injuries, which can fall short of amounting to proximate cause: the
automobile does not have to be the instrumentality of the injury
nor does the type of conduct that causes the injury need be
foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle.22 The
Court concluded that there was a sufficient nexus between the
insured car and Hudson’s injuries because Hudson was occupying
the insured motor vehicle when she heard and became aware of a
collision.23 At that point, Hudson exited the vehicle because she
was compelled to offer and render assistance at the nearby
accident scene, which led to her injuries.24

17. Id. at 1155.
18.
Because the trial court played no fact-finding role, questions of law
and statutory interpretation, and the decision on motion for judgment as a
matter of law were all reviewed de novo. Id. at 1153.
19.
Relying on Jackson v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the Court
determined whether the interpretation was classified as inclusive (includes a
person other than the named insured) or exclusive (excludes the named
insured from the coverage). Id. at 1155 (citing Jackson, 159 A.3d at 610).
Because Hudson was a passenger other than the named insured who sought
to be included within the protection of Hurst’s GEICO policy, the Court read
the terms of the GEICO policy broadly. Id.
20. Id. at 1155–56.
21.
Id. at 1156 (quoting Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier, 574
A.2d 1240, 1241 (R.I. 1990)).
22.
Id.
23.
Id. The Court was quick to distinguish a scenario where Hudson had
departed the car and did not become aware of the accident until she was
already proceeding into the Amazing Store because a causal connection under
those circumstances would be less certain. Id. at 1156–57.
24. Id. at 1156.
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B. Second Prong
The second prong of the Olivier criteria requires that a
plaintiff “be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the
insured vehicle.”25 The Court did not address this prong because
the parties did not dispute the trial justice’s finding that this
prong had been satisfied.26
C. Third Prong
The third prong of the Olivier criteria requires that a plaintiff
“be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at
the time [of the injury].”27 Looking to other courts who have
considered the phrase “vehicle oriented,” the Court concluded that
under Rhode Island law “where a departure from an insured
vehicle is incident to a temporary interruption in an otherwise
continuing excursion, and upon completion of the occasion causing
the brief interruption the individual intends to continue on with
his venture, he remains ‘vehicle oriented.’”28 In the case at bar,
Hudson remained “vehicle oriented” because her exit of the
insured motor vehicle was a temporary interruption in an
unfinished excursion to the Amazing Superstore, and upon
completion of the interruption (i.e., rendering aid at the accident
site), Hudson intended to resume her journey.29
D. Fourth Prong
The fourth and final prong of the Olivier criteria is “that the
individual be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the
vehicle at the time of his or her injuries.”30 To satisfy this prong,
the Court accepted Hudson’s argument “that, in light of [section]
11-56-1, a willingness to render aid at the scene of a motor vehicle
collision as a Good Samaritan, is inherently part of the use of the
motor vehicle in this state.”31 Under Rhode Island law, a Good
Samaritan is statutorily required to render reasonable assistance
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1157 (quoting Olivier, 547 A.2d at 1241).
Id.
Id. (quoting Olivier, 547 A.2d at 1241).
Id.
Id. at 1157–58.
Id.
Id.
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and thus cannot ignore the call of distress at the scene of an
accident.32 Prior decisions of the Court and legislative intent
made it clear that Rhode Island public policy recognizes the value
of encouraging the efforts of Good Samaritans and seeks to spur
rescue.33 Thus, the Court answered the question of how section 1156-1 interacts with term “occupying” in an insurance policy by the
following: “[A] motorist who exits his or her vehicle in order to
provide reasonable assistance to victims at the scene of an
accident is engaged in a transaction essential to the use of that
vehicle.”34
Armed with this holding, Hudson was able to satisfy the
fourth and final criteria of Olivier, which led to the Court’s
ultimate conclusion that she was “occupying” the insured vehicle
and could recover under the GEICO policy.35
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly affirmed that
“Olivier remains the governing standard for according a broad
interpretation to the terms of an insurance policy” and should be
used “in assessing whether an insured is ‘occupying’ a vehicle
when an accident occurs.”36 While the Olivier criteria were
affirmed in this case, their continued survival as good law seems
uncertain, either in part or in whole. The Court declined to
abandon the third prong of the Olivier test (vehicle oriented), but
indicated that abandonment may be the road of the future.37
Echoing the uncertainty of the Olivier criteria, Justice Flaherty, in
his concurring opinion, advocated for abandonment of the criteria
entirely.38 He described them as “unwieldy and difficult to
understand,” and proposed a simpler approach wherein the
32. Id. at 1159; see also 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 480 of the Jan. 2017 Sess.).
33. Hudson, 161 A.3d at 1159; see also Ouelette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687,
689–90 (R.I. 1992).
34. Hudson, 161 A.3d at 1159.
35. Id. at 1160.
36. Id. at 1156.
37.
Id. at 1158. Washington is the only state that has abandoned the
third prong, finding it unhelpful and creating internal inconsistency in the
four-prong test. Id. at 1158 (citing Cherry v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 892
P.2d 768, 772 (Wash. 1995)).
38.
Id. at 1160 (Flaherty, J., concurring).

698 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:693
guiding inquiry is: “under the totality of the circumstances, was
the plaintiff sufficiently connected to the motor vehicle to be
considered occupying it?”39 The concurring opinion recognizes one
issue the dissenters also take issue with—that public policy, not
the Olivier prongs—is actually what drives the analysis in cases
such as these.40
There are two issues of first impression in this case which
should be accorded particular attention: first, what the phrase
“vehicle oriented” means,41 and second, whether in light of section
11-56-1, rendering aid at the scene of an accident is inherently
part of the use of a motor vehicle in Rhode Island.42 The
conclusions the Court reached on both of these issues are
supported by case law and Rhode Island General Law, as they
accurately reflect the legislative intent of the General Assembly.
First, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Jackson v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Co., makes it clear that
when the Court is examining a policy provision seeking to include
somebody other than the named insured within the protection of
the policy, the Court must take a broad and liberal view of the
extent of coverage.43 The dissent argues that the majority started
with too broad of an interpretation, and as such the analysis of the
subsequent Olivier criteria was flawed.44 However, the goal of the
Olivier criteria is to determine whether, under the terms of an
insurance policy, someone is “occupying” the vehicle and thus falls
within the extent of coverage.45 Therefore, the Court
is
attempting to deduce whether Hudson, the unnamed insured, is
included within the protection of the policy by determining her
occupancy status. Because of this, a broad and liberal view of the
coverage afforded remains in line with the Court’s precedent.
As to the second issue, the Court undertook determining
whether rendering aid at the scene of an accident is inherently
part of the use of a motor vehicle in Rhode Island.46 To do so, the
39. Id. at 1160–61.
40. Id. at 1160 (Flaherty, J., concurring); id. at 1161 (Suttell, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 1162 (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1157 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 1158.
43. Id. at 1155 (citing Jackson, 159 A.3d at 614) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 1163 (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1153 n.1 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 1158.
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majority looked to the Good Samaritan statute.47 Despite the
dissent’s disagreement,48 this was an appropriate reliance
because Good Samaritans cannot ignore the call of distress at the
scene of an accident, and they are actually “statutorily required to
render reasonable assistance.”49 In light of this, the majority
rested their conclusion of this issue on the public policy goal of
protecting Good Samaritans, which, in turn, will encourage public
safety and honor the legislative intent of the General Assembly to
spur rescues.50 From his dissent, it seems as though Chief Justice
Suttell would not have held so broadly that rendering aid as a
Good Samaritan is always inherently part of the use of a motor
vehicle in Rhode Island, but rather whether the Good Samaritan
“was required to interrupt his or her travel in order to render
assistance at the scene of an emergency.”51 Had the majority
applied this more restrictive test, it is unclear whether they would
have found that Hudson was able to recover under the GEICO
policy because they determined a passenger can remain vehicle
oriented even where there is “a temporary interruption in an
otherwise unfinished excursion.”52 Therefore, under Chief Justice
Suttell’s test for the relationship between a Good Samaritan and
the term “occupying” in an insurance policy, it is unclear whether
the majority would have held that a temporary interruption
amounts to the kind of interruption the Chief Justice was
referencing.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in light of section
11-56-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws, an essential
transaction of the use of a motor vehicle is exiting the vehicle to
47. Id. at 1159.
48.
In his dissent, Justice Indeglia disagreed that section 11-56-1 was a
declaration of public policy to encourage the rescue of others from perilous
situations. Rather, the statute is vague and fails to even mention motor
vehicles. Id. at 1165 (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
49.
Id. at 1159 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
50.
See id.
51.
Id. at 1158. Because Hudson had reached her interim destination
and was sitting in a parked car when she heard the accident, she would not
satisfy this test and would not be able to recover. Id. at 1162 (Suttell, C.J.,
dissenting).
52.
Id. at 1157 (majority opinion).
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provide reasonable assistance at the scene of an accident. As
such, a passenger is entitled to recover underinsured motorist
benefits under the policy of the car she was traveling in prior to
exiting the vehicle to render roadside assistance at an accident
scene.
Mackenzie C. McBurney

Insurance Law. Jackson v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 159 A.3d
610 (R.I. 2017). The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews a grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Quincy Mutual Fire
Insurance Company. The question as to whether summary
judgment was proper hinges upon the interpretation of the term
“occupying” a motorcycle in order to determine whether a plaintiff
is barred from recovery under the exclusionary policy in their
insurance policy.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On September 9, 2011, Anthony J. Esposito (Esposito)
suffered a tragic fate. Esposito was riding his motorcycle down
Route 6, a well-traveled and busy thoroughfare that winds its way
through the heart of downtown Providence.1 As a truck
approached Esposito in the opposite lane, a green trash barrel fell
from the truck and skipped into Esposito’s lane.2 The barrel
became wedged between the front tire and the frame of the
motorcycle, causing Esposito to be launched from his vehicle and
into the lane of oncoming automobiles.3 As Esposito struck the
ground, he slid into a high-speed lane of traffic where he was
struck by an automobile traveling in that lane.4 Esposito died at
the scene.5
Esposito’s motorcycle insurance policy did not have uninsured
motorist coverage.6 However, Esposito did have an insurance
policy through the Defendant, Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance
Company (Quincy), for his automobile.7 This policy contained
uninsured motorist coverage.8 The Quincy policy contained an
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Jackson v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 159 A.3d 610, 611 (R.I. 2017).
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
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exception to uninsured motorist coverage, which states:
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for
“bodily injury” sustained: By an “insured” while
“occupying”, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned
by that “insured” which is not insured for this coverage
under this policy.9
The Plaintiff, the Executrix of the Estate of Anthony J.
Esposito, Jr., brought an action for declaratory judgment in
Superior Court seeking recovery under the Quincy policy.10
Subsequently, Quincy (the Defendant) filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the exclusion clause precluded the
Plaintiff from recovery.11
A hearing for the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
was held on September 29, 2015.12 The Plaintiff argued that
there existed an issue of material fact regarding which impact
caused the decedent’s death (i.e. the impact with the trash barrel
or the impact with the oncoming vehicle).13 The motion justice
granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that the “decedent was ‘occupying’ his owned-but-not-insured
motorcycle at the time of the fatal injury.”14 The motion justice
was not persuaded by the Plaintiff’s argument that stressed the
importance of the temporal separation of the two impacts and the
question of which impact caused Esposito’s death.15 After hearing
the arguments, the motion justice concluded that Esposito was
“occupying” his motorcycle at the time of his death and granted
partial summary judgment on October 16, 2015.16 The Plaintiff
filed a timely notice of appeal.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In its de novo review of the motion justice’s grant of summary
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (relying heavily on the Court’s holding in Gen. Accident Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990)).
15. Id. at 612.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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judgment, the Court was charged with determining whether the
motion justice erred in disregarding the importance of the
interpretation of the term “occupying” as it relates to the Quincy
policy exclusion clause.18 The Plaintiff argued that there were
two distinct impacts leading up to the moment of Esposito’s death:
the first being the impact with the trash barrel, and the second
being the impact with the oncoming car.19 The Plaintiff argued
that determining which impact caused Esposito’s death was an
issue of fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The
plaintiff contended that Esposito was lying in the opposing lane of
traffic when he was fatally struck by the oncoming vehicle, and
therefore should not be considered to have been occupying his
motorcycle at the time of his death.20
In response, Quincy argued that the two impacts were nearly
instantaneous and that the motion justice properly applied the
Olivier test.21 Quincy further argued that Esposito died as a
result of his impact with the ground rather than the subsequent
impact with the oncoming vehicle and that he still “occupied” his
motorcycle under the Quincy policy definition of the word.22
Although the Court typically reviews insurance policies using the
literal definition of the language, the Court had never before been
called upon to define “occupying” as it relates to a multi-collision
accident, nor had it examined an insurance policy clause designed
to exclude the policyholder from the protections under his policy.23
Therefore, the Court determined that a more concrete definition of
18. Id. at 613. “Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as [a]
matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Sola v. Leighton, 45 A.3d 502, 506 (R.I. 2012)
and Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I. 2005)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The court in Olivier employed a four-pronged test to determine
occupancy: there must be a causal connection between the injury and the use
of the insured vehicle; the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably
close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle; the person must be “vehicle
oriented” rather than “highway or sidewalk oriented” at the time of injury;
and the person must be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the
vehicle at the time of injury. Id. (citing Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane,
473 A.2d 1005, 1009 (Pa. 1984)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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“occupying” was required.24
The Quincy policy defines “occupying” as “in, upon, getting in,
on out or off.”25 In previous cases, the Court has held that the
coverage afforded to someone occupying a vehicle hinges upon
whether the clause is inclusionary or exclusionary.26 When a
clause in a policy “relates to the inclusion of persons other than
the named insured within the protection afforded, a broad and
liberal view is taken of the coverage extended. But, if the clause
in question is one of exclusion or exception, designed to limit the
protection, a strict interpretation is applied.”27 The pivotal issue,
therefore, was whether Esposito was “occupying” the motorcycle at
the time of his death and therefore barred from recovery, or
whether he was not “occupying” his motorcycle at the time of his
death and therefore able to recover uninsured motorist insurance
under the Quincy policy.28
The Court looked for guidance in other jurisdictions’
definitions of occupancy in the context of two-impact collisions.29
In Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, the Washington Supreme
Court concluded that “when the second impact occurred, [the
insured], who had been lying in the roadway. . . clearly was not
‘in, on, getting into, or getting out of’ her motorcycle and therefore
she was not ‘occupying’ it.”30 Likewise, the Court cited Miller v.
Amica Mutual Insurance Co., where the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held a decedent was not precluded from recovery under an
exclusionary clause when “a reasonable person . . . would not view
someone lying in the middle of the highway forty feet from his
motorcycle for a period of time between thirty seconds [and] one
half minutes as ‘in, upon, getting in, on, out or off’ that
motorcycle.”31
24. Id.
25. Id. (quotations in original).
26. Id. at 614 (relying on the “general principle favoring broad coverage”
as the controlling standard) (quoting Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577
A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1980)).
27. Id. (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co of Winterhur,
Switzerland, 170 A.2d 800, 804 (1961)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 615.
30. Id. (quoting Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 905 P.2d 379, 381
(1995)).
31. Id. at 615–16 (quoting Miller v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 931 A.2d 1180
(N.H. 2007)); see also Swarner v. Mut. Benefit Grp., 72 A.3d 641, 650–51 (Pa.
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In its holding, the Court rejected Quincy’s argument that a
lack of distance in space and time constitutes occupancy, and
instead adopted the sister jurisdictions’ definitions and
reasoning.32 In defining occupancy through the lens of other
jurisdictions’ decisions, the Court found that it is entirely possible
that Esposito could have died while he no longer occupied his
motorcycle, thus rendering it possible for his estate to recover
under the Quincy policy.33 The question of whether Esposito died
as a result of the impact with the trash barrel or as a consequence
of his impact with the oncoming vehicle, as well as the time or
distance between them, are genuine issues of material fact for the
jury to evaluate.34 Accordingly, the court sustained the plaintiff’s
appeal and vacated the motion justice’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Quincy.35
COMMENTARY

This case is the first instance in which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was faced with interpreting an exclusionary clause
in the context of a multi-impact motorcycle accident.36 Although
certain previous cases define “occupying” in a more broad sense,
the Court determined that, at least in terms of multi-impact
accidents, there is no need to depart from the literal definition of
terms in an exclusionary clause.37 With this newly-solidified
interpretation, Rhode Island joins her sister states of Washington,
New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania with respect to a plaintiff’s
ability to survive summary judgment in this context.38
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in this case considered
whether a jury could conclude that the decedent no longer
occupied his motorcycle when he sustained bodily injury. While it
is evident that the Court sought to narrow its definition of key
words in the exclusionary clause by consulting other jurisdictions,
Super. Ct. 2013) (holding that decedent was not “occupying” motorcycle when
she was struck by a passing truck).
32. Jackson, 159 A.3d at 616.
33. Id. at 617.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 613.
37. Contra Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington v. Clure, 702 P.2d 1247
(1985).
38. Jackson, 159 A.3d at 614–16.
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much weight was given to the hypothetical interpretation that the
decedent was “occupying” his motorcycle as he was launched into
an opposing lane of traffic. In Justice Robinson’s partial dissent,
he contends that the issue of whether or not the decedent occupied
his motorcycle at the time of death should not be in dispute, as the
decedent could not have occupied his motorcycle as a matter of
common English.39 “If I stand up from the chair in my office in
order to go to lunch, one can rightly describe me as ‘getting off’
that chair.”40 A man lying in an opposing lane of traffic cannot be
described as to having any sort of occupancy of his motorcycle.
Although the Court may have approached the genuine issue in a
semi-circuitous manner, it ultimately came to a conclusion that is
both fair to the plaintiff and instructive to drafters of exclusionary
clauses.
CONCLUSION

In this matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the motorcyclist no longer occupied his motorcycle
when he sustained his injury and issues of fact exist as to when
the cause of his death occurred, and therefore does not fall into the
exclusionary clause of an insurance policy. Because a jury could
determine that the motorcyclist’s injury could have occurred
during an accident when he did not occupy his motorcycle,
summary judgment for the insurance company was improper.
Brody Karn

39.
40.

Id. at 618.
Id.

Labor and Employment Law. Beagan v. R.I. Dept. of Labor &
Training, Bd. of Review, 162 A.3d 619 (R.I. 2017). Under Rhode
Island General Laws section 28-44-18(a) of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act, only an employee’s misconduct that is
connected to the employee’s work, such that it creates a workplace
nexus, can be considered misconduct that can disqualify an
employee from receiving unemployment benefits. An employee
“baiting” his employer to visit his Facebook page, which contained
derogatory comments towards his employer, is not enough to
establish the requisite connection without more legally competent
evidence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Michael Beagan (Beagan) was formerly employed by
Kemperle, Incorporated (Kemperle) as a full-time delivery driver
until his termination on March 7, 2013.1 Prior to Beagan’s
termination, Kemperle issued new Standard Operations &
Procedures policies that its employees needed to sign.2 According
to Beagan’s manager, Henry Morancey (Morancey), Beagan made
a “ruckus” over the new policies and initially refused to sign
them.3 On March 6, 2013, Beagan spoke with Morancey and
agreed to sign the policy, but complained he was being underpaid
overtime.4 Following his meeting with Beagan, Morancey emailed
Ronald Kemper (Kemper), the owner of Kemperle, and relayed
Beagan’s complaints and issues he caused.5
1.
Beagan v. R.I. DOL & Training, Bd. of Review, 162 A.3d 619, 621
(R.I. 2017).
2.
Id. Kemperle’s new policy was called the “accident policy.” Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. Beagan complained that he was not being paid two and a half
hours for overtime each week. Id.
5.
Id. at 621–22. The letter stated that Beagan complained about the
unfairness of the policies and that his wife, who was a Workers’
Compensation attorney, thought Beagan should be paid for the overtime
every week and should not have to comply with the standard operation
procedures. Id. Additionally, Morancey wrote that Beagan initially refused
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On March 7, 2013, Morancey intended to fire Beagan for
personal, derogatory comments Beagan made to Morancey the day
prior and because “[he] felt it was in everyone’s best interest.”6
Morancey instead took pity on Beagan, and Beagan apologized,
signed the written notice and the email Morancey sent to Kemper
regarding his comments, and acknowledged his insubordinate
behavior.7 Morancey told Beagan that his next violation would
result in termination.8 Before the end of the meeting, Beagan
commented that “[Morancey] couldn’t see what [Beagan] writes on
his Facebook because he has [Morancey] blocked.”9
This
statement peaked Morancey’s curiosity, and, after the meeting,
Morancey sent Beagan on his deliveries and asked a third-party to
log onto Facebook and look at Beagan’s post.10 Morancey found
that Beagan’s post criticized Beagan’s boss, who was left
unnamed.11 When Beagan returned from his deliveries, Morancey
fired him.12
On March 18, 2013, Beagan filed an unemployment benefits
claim with Department of Labor and Training (DLT).13 The DLT
form Kemperle completed stated the reason for Beagan’s
termination was “misconduct” and did not mention the Facebook
post.14 On April 22, 2013, the DLT director denied Beagan’s
application because it found that Beagan was discharged due to
to sign and had complained to drivers in both Rhode Island and Connecticut,
which created a lot of “ill-will.” Id. at 621–22.
6.
Id. at 622.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. Moracey noted that Beagan said this in a “smug manner.” Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. Beagan’s post read: “It’s a good thing my boss doesn’t take
things personal and wanna [sic], like, know if I wrote shit about him. I
sometimes forget that despite that [sic] fact he walks and talk [sic] like a real
person, he isn’t a real boy, Geppeto [sic].” Id.
12.
Id. at 623.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. Kemperle also gave an “employer statement” that described the
cause of Beagan’s termination and did not mention the Facebook post. Id. In
addition to including the language of the written warning, the statement
“described that Beagan was angry about the new policy and that, after
signing the written policy, ‘[Beagan] went out of the office ranting and raging
to other employees about management and the new policy. He wanted
overtime. He was given [two] 15 minute breaks and 1/2 hour lunch[es]. [H]e
was saying he wanted overtime and causing a commotion with other
employees.’” Id.
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“unprofessional behavior in the workplace,” and Beagan could not
receive benefits because his actions went against Kemperle’s best
interests pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 28-4418.15 Beagan appealed, and on May 29, 2013, Morancey and
Beagan testified at a hearing before the appeal tribunal.16
Morancey testified that the Facebook post was ultimately the
reason why he fired Beagan.17 Additionally, Morancey stated that
according to the time of Beagan’s Facebook post, Beagan used his
phone while driving, which was prohibited by company policy, and
was an additional reason for his termination.18 At the close of the
hearing, the appeal tribunal referee affirmed the director’s denial
of Beagan’s unemployment benefits, concluding that Beagan’s
actions were not in the employer’s best interests, and Beagan was
discharged for disqualifying reasons under section 28-44-18.19
Among the disqualifying reasons, the referee mentioned the
derogatory comments Beagan posted on Facebook.20
Beagan appealed to the full board of review (Board), and on
August 2, 2013, the Board affirmed the referee’s decisions.21
Beagan appealed the Board’s decision to the Rhode Island District
Court.22 On June 4, 2014, the District Court affirmed the Board’s
finding of ineligibility based on qualifying misconduct and held
that Beagan “baited” Morancey to search his Facebook page, and
Beagan’s Facebook post constituted misconduct or insubordination
and the connection of the post to Beagan’s work was sufficiently
established, although “barely so.”23 Thereafter, Beagan filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme
15.
Id.; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a) (1956) (stating that an
employee discharged for misconduct connected to his work is ineligible for
unemployment benefits).
16.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 623; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-43 (1956)
(stating that a claimant may appeal the judgment of the director to the
referee).
17.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 623.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 624; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a).
20.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 624.
21.
Id.; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-47 (1956) (stating that a claimant
may appeal the judgement of the appeal tribunal to the board of review).
22.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 624; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-52 (1956)
(stating that a claimant may appeal the judgement of the board of review to
the District Court).
23.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 624–25.
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Court.24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the District Court order, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court initially sought to determine whether there was
legally competent evidence in the record to support the finding
that Beagan was discharged for disqualifying reasons.25 Based on
the language in section 28-44-18(a), the Court found that two
things must be considered to determine whether an employee is
ineligible for benefits based on disqualifying reasons: “(1) whether
there was an act of proven misconduct; and (2) whether the
misconduct was connected to the employee’s work.”26 The Court
assumed Beagan’s actions in posting the Facebook message
constituted misconduct and instead focused on whether there was
legally competent evidence that Beagan’s misconduct was
connected to his work because the District Court’s judgment
rested on this fact.27 The Court noted, pursuant to section 28-4418(a), that misconduct must be connected to an employee’s work to
be considered disqualifying misconduct.28 The Court looked at
case law for precedent but found the connection between an
employee’s alleged misconduct and the workplace as it related to
social media and online activity had not yet been considered.29
Although the District Court found that the requisite
connection was established when Beagan “baited” Morancey into
searching for his Facebook page, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
disagreed.30 The Court instead held that Beagan’s alleged
misconduct lacked the connection to the workplace required by
section 22-44-18 and reasoned that Beagan’s statement to
Morancey alone did not support a finding that the Facebook post
was connected to Beagan’s work.31 The Court supported their
24.
Id. at 625.
25.
Id. at 626.
26.
Id. at 627; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a) (stating that an
employee discharged for misconduct connected to his work is ineligible for
unemployment benefits).
27.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 627.
28.
Id.; see also 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a).
29.
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 627 (citing Bunch v. Bd. of Review, Rhode
Island Dep’t of Emp’t and Training, 690 A.2d 335 (R.I. 1997)).
30.
Id. at 628.
31.
Id.; 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a).
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reasoning by pointing out that Morancey was blocked from
Beagan’s Facebook page; that there was no evidence the post
related to Beagan’s job performance or that it was authored on
any employer’s device; that the employer did not have a social
media policy in evidence; and that Beagan specifically denied
making the post on the road.32
Lastly, the Court noted its task was to search the record for
any legally competent evidence they could use to determine
whether Beagan was ineligible for unemployment.33 The Court
did this in light of legislative intent that recognized the
Employment Security Act’s declared purpose is to lighten the
burden on the unemployed worker and his family.34 In doing so,
the Court declined to extend the exclusionary effect of restrictions
on unemployment eligibility under the pretext of interpreting the
Employment Security Act.35
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that the
legislative purpose of the Employment Security Act was to lighten
the burden of unemployment on the employee and his family.36 In
doing so, the Court narrowly focused on the issue of whether there
was any legally competent evidence that could support the District
Court’s finding that the employee’s misconduct was sufficiently
connected to his work.37 To establish the sufficient connection
between the misconduct and the employee’s work, the Court
specifically focused on Beagan’s Facebook post. Through their
focus, the Court failed to give weight to a multitude of legally
competent evidence that highlighted Beagan’s other actions that
Morancey considered in Beagan’s termination, most of which
arguably constituted misconduct that established a connection to
the workplace.
The Court looked to section 28-44-18, which details that
misconduct must be connected to the employee’s work to be

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Beagan, 162 A.3d at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.
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considered disqualifying misconduct.38 On March 6, 2013, when
Morancey first asked his employees to sign Kemperle’s new
Standard Operations & Procedures, Beagan willfully refused,
stating that his wife said he should not have to comply with the
new procedures.39 Additionally, Beagan later acknowledged that
he had exhibited insubordinate behavior.40 Morancey initially
found that this was cause for Beagan’s termination but gave him
another chance out of pity.41 The referee and the Board took this
into consideration in establishing the requisite connection but
here, the Court mistakenly treated Beagan’s Facebook post as the
main thrust of Morancey’s reasoning for terminating him and did
not look at the other factors. In reviewing the legally competent
evidence available to the District Court, the Supreme Court had
evidence of both the referee’s and the Board’s findings.42 In
addition to finding evidence of Beagan’s Facebook post, the referee
found that Beagan violated the company policy on insubordination
and acted inappropriately when he voiced his opinions to
coworkers in both the Rhode Island and Connecticut office which
created ill-will towards the new policies.43 Based on these
findings alone, the Court could have considered Beagan’s
misconduct to establish a connection to the workplace. It is clear
Morancey terminated Beagan based on his prior insubordinate
behavior, and Beagan’s Facebook post merely confirmed
Morancey’s initial concerns, which led to the warning.
Similarly, although the Court ultimately found that there was
no legally competent evidence to establish that the employee’s
conduct was related to his work, the dissent points out that the
majority exceeded their scope of review in re-evaluating and
weighing the evidence and drawing inferences in doing so.44
Although the District Court cautiously determined that the
connection was sufficiently established by Beagan “baiting”
Morancey, the District Court concluded that a jury could find that
“posting of such materials was utterly corrosive of the supervisor38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.; see 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-18(a).
Beagan, 162 A.3d at 621–22.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 629.

2018]

SURVEY SECTION

713

employee relationship.”45 In considering what Beagan’s post
related to and how much weight to give the fact of Beagan
“baiting” Morancey, the majority effectively substituted their
judgement by re-evaluating and weighing the evidence from the
District Court.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to
section 22-44-18(a), misconduct must be connected to the
employee’s work to be considered misconduct that disqualifies an
employee from receiving unemployment benefits. An employee
who “baited” the employer to access his Facebook page that
contained comments regarding the employer’s manager creates no
workplace nexus without more legally competent evidence. The
Court determined this in light of the Employment Security Act’s
legislative purpose to lessen the burden of unemployment on the
worker and his family.
John Souza

45.

Id. at 625.

Legal Malpractice. DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell,
Ltd.,152 A.3d 413 (R.I. 2017). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that a Rhode Island Superior Court justice did not commit
error of law by allowing the Plaintiff to obtain, through discovery,
antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that his former attorney
drafted for other clients to show that the attorney took subsequent
remedial measures. The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument
that the agreements were protected by the attorney-client
privilege because the Defendants lacked standing to assert the
privilege, and concluded that the agreements did not qualify for
protection under the marital privilege or work product doctrine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In the year 2000, Sergio A. DeCurtis (Plaintiff) hired Visconti,
Boren & Campbell, LTD., and one of its attorneys (collectively,
Defendants) to draft an antenuptial agreement that would protect
his income in the event his ensuing marriage dissolved.1 Soon
thereafter, the Plaintiff and his fiancée executed the agreement
and married on March 28, 2000.2 In 2005, the marriage faltered,
and the Plaintiff’s wife filed for divorce.3 In a turn of events, the
divorce petition was dismissed, the couple participated in a courtmandated settlement, and entered into a postnuptial agreement.4
Unfortunately, harmony in the marriage was short-lived and in
June 2010, the Plaintiff’s wife again filed for divorce.5 On June
21, 2011, the Family Court justice determined, after reviewing the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act,6 that the antenuptial and
postnuptial agreements drafted by the Plaintiff’s attorney “did not
1. DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell, LTD., 152 A.3d 413, 418
(R.I. 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The Defendants drafted the postnuptial agreement on the
Plaintiff’s behalf. Id.
5. Id.
6. See 15 R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6 (2017).
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exclude any income or appreciation of assets derived by [the
Plaintiff] during the marriage from the marital estate.”7 The
Plaintiff’s pecuniary exposure was not insignificant; the marital
estate was valued at “several million” and the vast majority of its
assets were accumulated during the period of coverture.8 The
Plaintiff, after learning his financial fate, entered into a property
settlement agreement with his former wife.9 Pursuant to the
agreement, the Plaintiff’s former wife would receive $2,750,000
based on equitable distribution of the marital assets and
$1,500,000 in spousal support over the course of fifteen years.10
On August 8, 2012, the Plaintiff brought an action for legal
malpractice against the Defendants, alleging that the antenuptial
and postnuptial agreements were negligently drafted, and that
the Defendants failed to advise him against commingling his
premarital and marital assets.11 During discovery, the Plaintiff
propounded document requests upon the Defendants, requesting,
inter alia, antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that the
Defendants drafted for other clients from the year 1999 through
the date of the requests.12 The Defendants objected to the
requests and asserted the attorney-client privilege, marital
privilege, and work product doctrine to protect the agreements
from disclosure.13 The Defendants further maintained that,
because the agreements were privileged, the requests were beyond
the scope of Rule 26 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure.14 The Plaintiff countered the Defendants’
objections and argued that the agreements were relevant and
constituted subsequent remedial measures in accordance with
Rule 407 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.15 Moreover, the
7. Id. The Plaintiff explained to the Family Court that according to his
understanding of the antenuptial and postnuptial agreements the
instruments would, “allow[] [the Plaintiff] to take [his] income, and whatever
portion of it was going to be kept separate could be kept in a separate account
so that it was protected.” DeCurtis, 152 A.3d at 419.
8. Id. at 418.
9. Id. at 419.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. “When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
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Plaintiff argued that the agreements would demonstrate that the
Defendants took remedial measures after they learned that the
language used in the Plaintiff’s antenuptial and postnuptial
agreements failed to protect his interests.16
Ultimately, the Superior Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion
to compel, but limited the scope of discovery to the years 2010
through 2012.17 The Superior Court determined that the Plaintiff
was entitled to agreements that the attorney drafted for his other
clients after the June 2011 Family Court hearing because at that
time he learned about the ineffective language used in the
agreements, and therefore the hearing was the “triggering event”
for subsequent remedial measure purposes.18 Subsequently, the
Defendants filed a writ of certiorari petitioning the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for interlocutory review of the discovery order.19
The Supreme Court granted the Defendant’s writ on June 15,
2015,20 and, following review, it quashed the writ, affirmed the
Superior Court justice’s discovery order, and advised the lower
court to permit disclosure, so long as the agreements were subject
to a protective order and reviewed in camera prior to production.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior
Court justice’s discovery order and held that it was without error.
First, the Court considered the scope of Rule 26 and concluded
that disclosing the agreements would advance the Rule’s policy
favoring broad discovery.22 Next, the Court analyzed
the
Plaintiff’s request for the agreements under Rule 407 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence—which permits evidence of subsequent
remedial measures to prove negligence—and held that the
Plaintiff was entitled to those agreements that the Defendants
subsequent measures is admissible.” R.I. R. EV. 407.
16. DeCurtis, 152 A.3d at 419.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 420.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 429.
22. See id. at 421. “The philosophy underlying modern discovery is that
prior to trial, all data relevant to the pending controversy should be disclosed
unless the data is privileged.” Id. (quoting Cabral v. Arruda, 556 A.2d 47, 48
(R.I. 1989)).
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drafted for other clients after the year 2005.23 Lastly, the Court
held that the agreements, although laden with confidential client
information, were not protected by the attorney-client privilege,
marital privilege, or work product doctrine because the
Defendants lacked standing to assert those privileges, and the
Plaintiffs presented a substantial need for the agreements.24
Although the Defendants did not object to the entirety of the
Plaintiff’s requests, they argued that disclosure should be limited
to those agreements that were drafted after the June 2011 Family
Court hearing.25 The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument
and reasoned that the “triggering event” for purposes of
subsequent remedial measures is the “liability causing conduct,”
not the “eventual litigation,” because concluding otherwise would
render Rule 407 superfluous in most cases.26 Therefore, the
liability causing event that triggered the subsequent remedial
measures analysis was the attorney’s drafting of the 2005
postnuptial agreement, not the June 2011 Family Court
hearing.27 Moreover, the Court highlighted that the “triggering
event” for Rule 407 purposes is not predicated on the tortfeasor’s
knowledge of the injury.28
The Defendants further argued that the agreements were not
subject to disclosure because they were protected by the attorneyclient privilege, marital privilege, and work product doctrine.29
First, the Court held that the Defendants could not protect the
agreements from disclosure by turning to the attorney-client
privilege because they lacked standing—the clients, not the
Defendants—were the “true privilege holders.”30 Next, the Court
rejected Defendants’ argument that the agreements were
protected by the marital privilege.31 The Court reasoned that the
martial privilege exists only to protect spouses from having to
testify against one another regarding communications exchanged
during the marriage, and in the instant case, the agreements were
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 422.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
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not testimonial and the parties to the antenuptial agreements
were not married at the time they were executed.32 Lastly, the
Court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the agreements
were factual work products and therefore protected by the work
product doctrine.33 The Defendants posited that the agreements
were prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” e.g. divorce
proceedings, and that the Plaintiff did not have a “substantial
need” for the agreements to prove the merits of his case.34 On the
contrary, the Court held that the agreements were prepared to
“avoid” litigation, rather than “in anticipation of litigation,” and
the Plaintiff would not have access to the agreements through
alternative channels.35 The Court concluded that precautionary
steps, such as redacting confidential information and producing
the agreements under a protective order, would allay the
Defendants’ confidentiality concerns.36
COMMENTARY

This decision is a clear victory for plaintiffs pursuing
malpractice actions because it dismantles evidentiary barriers.
The Court reiterated its position that parties should be given wide
latitude during discovery and that evidence should not be
excluded, unless a narrow privilege fits the facts of the case,
because excluding evidence “limits the full disclosure of the
truth.”37 In addition, this decision keeps Rhode Island within the
minority of jurisdictions that permit parties to use evidence of
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence.38 Moreover,
the Court’s conclusion that knowledge of the injury causing event
is not a precondition to the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures evidence negates the policy argument that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures would deter individuals from
32. Id. at 428.
33. Id. at 427; see Henderson v. Newport County Regional Young Men’s
Christian Ass’n, 966 A.2d 1242, 1246 (R.I. 2009) (“[M]aterials obtained or
prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation are not . . . discoverable
unless production of those materials [is] necessary for the preparation of
one’s own case.”).
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 422.
36. Id. at 429.
37. Id. at 423.
38. Id. at 422.
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rectifying injury causing events to avoid prejudicial evidence.39
This decision was a conduit for the Court to communicate its
professional standards to members of the bar. The
Court
indirectly urges attorneys to cautiously draft agreements that will
protect clients’ interests because the lessons an attorney learns
from misrepresenting a client may be used in a legal malpractice
action against her. Attorneys, now more than ever, are more
likely to closely evaluate stock language before incorporating such
language into an agreement.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a Superior Court
justice in a legal malpractice action properly granted the
Plaintiff’s motion to compel production of marital agreements that
his attorney drafted for other clients to show evidence of
subsequent remedial measures. The Court was guided by its
policy in support of broad discovery, and narrowly interpreted the
attorney-client privilege, marital privilege, and work product
doctrine to permit disclosure.
Krystal L. Medeiros

39.

See id.

Property Law. Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 158 A.3d 735 (R.I. 2017).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that merely labeling an
area “Beach” on a Plat and Indenture is insufficient to constitute a
public dedication. The requisite manifest intent necessary to rule
an action a public dedication is not met solely by labeling an area
on a Plat and Indenture. Rather, a landowner’s intent to dedicate
must be expressed to the public, and the public must accept the
dedication.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In July of 1909, owners of beachfront property in
Misquamicut filed a plat map (the 1909 Plat) that divided the
property amongst the owners.1 The 1909 Plat showed the lots
separated easterly and westerly by dashed lines and bounded by
Atlantic Avenue to the north.2 These boundaries were all
undisputed by the parties in this case; however, the disputed
southern border of the lots led to this litigation. The 1909 Plat
shows an undulating line south of the lots labeled as the “line of
foot of bank.”3 Beyond the line of foot of bank is an area labeled
“Beach,”4 which was at the heart of this case.
The State alleged that the landowners, by the 1909 Plat,
dedicated the area labeled “Beach” to the public because the
dashed lines marking the easterly and westerly boundaries of the
lots did not extend through the line of foot of bank and therefore
did not extend to the Beach area.5 The 1909 Plat also contained
nine rights of way that extended from Atlantic Avenue down to
the Beach area.6 In addition to the 1909 Plat, the Plattors also
recorded an Indenture, which described the lots as being located
between “Atlantic Avenue on the North and the ocean on the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 158 A.3d 735, 737 (R.I. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737–38.
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South.”7 The Indenture also described each of the nine rights of
way as “a public walk or right of way,” that was to be “dedicated
as a public walk and right of way from said highway to the
Beach.”8
In October of 2012, the Attorney General brought suit
alleging that the 1909 landowners dedicated the beach to the
public through the 1909 Plat and sought to enjoin the current
landowners from preventing public access to the beach.9 The
Defendants moved pursuant to Rule 19 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for “failure to
join persons needed for a just adjudication” or, in the alternative,
to require joinder of said persons.10 In response, the trial justice
required the State to notify all landowners in the area at issue,
and then allowed those landowners to intervene.11
The Defendants answered the State’s complaint, claiming
that they were the true owners of the Beach area at issue, brought
a counterclaim against the State for slander of title, and further,
claimed that the State’s conduct constituted a temporary taking of
their property.12 The State, the Defendants, and the Intervenors
all filed motions for summary judgment and the trial justice
denied all of the motions, determining that there was “a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to whether the Plattors’
intended a public dedication.”13
The two issues at trial were: whether the Plattors intended a
public dedication of the Beach, and, if they did, whether the public
accepted the offer of dedication.14 The State called
seven
witnesses at trial, ranging from professional land surveyors, to
attorneys who primarily practiced real estate conveyances, to
history professors.15 Their collective testimony ultimately
interpreted the 1909 Plat to show the manifest intent necessary
7. Id. at 738.
8. Id.
9. Id. The Attorney General’s complaint alleged “public nuisance,
purpresture, private nuisance, trespass, and unreasonable use of easement.”
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 739.
15. Id. at 739–40.
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for a public dedication.16 The expert witnesses focused on the fact
that the easterly and westerly dashed line borders ended at the
line of foot of bank and did not extend to the beach, and argued
that was evidence of the line of foot of bank existing as the
southerly border.17 They also pointed to the fact that the
Indenture described the rights of way as running “to the Beach”
and argued that language created “public rights in the rights of
way and on the beach.”18
The Defense called three witnesses: an attorney and two
professional land surveyors. Their collective testimony was that
the line of foot of bank was not intended as a boundary line
because of its “‘fairly significant’ break[s]” and that if it were
intended as a boundary line, it would have been drawn as one
continuous line.19 One witness also testified that the “great
majority” of the conveyances of the lots shown on the 1909 Plat
described the lots as being bordered southerly by the ocean.20
Another witness testified to the rights of way granted to the public
and opined that they granted the public “the right to pass to the
beach and to walk back and forth across it.”21 However, this
referred to the historic meaning of the word “beach” as the “land
below the mean high tide line and above the mean low water [line]
where you can walk” and not the dry sand portion of the beach at
issue here.22
The trial court justice held that the Plattors did not have the
power to dedicate the Beach to the public because they each
owned a part of the aggregate whole, and not all of the owners
signed the 1909 Plat and Indenture.23 The trial court justice then
ruled on the issue of whether the 1909 Plat and Indenture
demonstrated the Plattors’ “manifest intent for a public dedication
of the Beach area.”24 The trial court justice held that the 1909
Plat and Indenture did not reveal the requisite manifest intent to

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 739–42.
Id. at 740, 742.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 742.
Id.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 744.
Id.
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dedicate the Beach to the public.25 Comparing the boundary lines
of Atlantic Avenue to the undulating line marked the line of foot of
bank, the trial court justice concluded that the 1909 Plat did not
clearly and unambiguously manifest intent to dedicate the Beach
to the public.26 Furthermore, the trial court justice deemed
inapplicable the common law principle of “presumption of intent to
dedicate” when a road is shown on a Plat because the Plattors did
not consider the Beach a road.27 Lastly, the trial court justice
found the 1909 Plat and Indenture unambiguous and therefore
concluded that extrinsic evidence could not be used to determine
the question of dedicatory intent.28 However, the trial court
justice offered his alternative analysis on the extrinsic evidence
and concluded that it did not demonstrate the requisite manifest
intent either.29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, the State argued that the trial court justice erred
because the 1909 Plat and Indenture clearly and unambiguously
demonstrated the Plattors’ intent to dedicate the Beach to the
public, and even if the 1909 Plat was ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence revealed the Plattors’ intent.30 The Court noted that a
trial justice sitting without a jury will not be overturned on factual
findings unless the “findings clearly are wrong or the trial justice
overlooked or misconceived material evidence.”31 The Court also
noted that the State had the burden to prove on appeal that the
Plattors’ had a “manifest intent” to dedicate the beach area to the
public.32
The State argued that the 1909 Plat and Indenture clearly
and unambiguously demonstrated the Plattors’ intent to dedicate
the Beach to the public and the trial justice made three legal
errors when interpreting the 1909 Plat and Indenture: first, he
“misread the lines and markings on the [1909] Plat”; second, he
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 746.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 746–47.
Id. at 747.
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“erroneously concluded that the rights of way did not grant any
rights in the Beach area”; and third, he “improperly narrowed the
doctrine of incipient dedication to roadways.”33
The Court reviewed the trial justice’s analysis of the lines and
markings on the 1909 Plat and Indenture and found that he
compared the lines used for the Atlantic Avenue northern
boundaries, which were “thick, straight, uninterrupted lines,”
with the line of foot of bank, which was an “undulating line that
breaks in six places.”34 The Court reasoned that the Indenture
supported the trial court justice’s finding that the Plattors did not
intend a public dedication.35 The Plattors knew how to
successfully dedicate property to the public as evidenced by the
nine rights of way that they did dedicate to the public.36
Therefore, if the Plattors intended to dedicate the Beach to the
public, they would have done so in a proper manner.37
The State also argued that the trial court justice “ignored key
parts” of the 1909 Plat and Indenture in coming to his decision.38
The State pointed specifically to the fact that the trial court justice
“disregarded the dimensions that show that the lots end before the
mean high tide line.”39 The Court rejected the State’s argument
by finding that the trial court justice did carefully analyze the
1909 Plat’s lines and markings and added that trial court justices
do not need to categorically consider and “accept or reject” each
piece of evidence that is offered at trial.40
The State further alleged that the trial court justice
committed an error of law by deciding that the line of foot of bank
was not the southerly border of the lots.41 The Court noted that
the trial justice did not in fact make any determination as to the
southerly border of the lots, nor was he tasked with doing so.42
The Court continued on to say that any findings the trial court
justice made related to the line of foot of bank were made with the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sole purpose of assisting him in determining the Plattors’ intent.43
The State also argued that the trial justice erred by not finding
that the Indenture’s language “to the Beach” granted the public
implied easement rights to use the Beach.44 The State relied on
case law from surrounding jurisdictions such as Massachusetts
and Connecticut, but the Court rejected the State’s arguments
and noted that “the determination of manifest intent is a factintensive inquiry” and concluded that the intent was
lacking in this case.45
The Court also rejected the State’s argument that the trial
justice “restricted the doctrine of incipient dedication to
roadways.”46 The Court clarified that the trial court justice did
not rule that the doctrine of incipient dedication only applies to
roadways.47 Rather, the trial justice found that the Plattors’
intent could “not be easily presumed from their recordation of the
1909 Plat” with the word “Beach” on it.48 The Plattors needed to
do more than simply label the area beach.49 This contrasts with
the “presumption of incipient dedication of roadways”; however, it
does not narrow the doctrine to only roadways.50
The Court continued further and addressed the State’s
arguments regarding extrinsic evidence, even though its
determination that the trial justice did not err in deciding that the
1909 Plat and Indenture did not demonstrate manifest intent to
dedicate the Beach to the public effectively ended the inquiry on
appeal. The trial justice determined that the most important
extrinsic evidence were the deeds out of the 1909 Plat, the
documents created leading up to the 1909 Plat’s recording, and the
expert testimony regarding the 1909 Plat’s lines and markings.51
The trial justice concluded that any ambiguity in the 1909 Plat
and Indenture only supported the finding that they did not
“intend to dedicate an easement to the public over the Beach
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 749–50.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
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area.”52 The State faulted the trial justice for placing too much
weight on specific exhibits of extrinsic evidence that post-date the
1909 Plat and Indenture and list the ocean as the southerly border
of the plats.53 The Court rejected the State’s argument and noted
that “the majority of the deeds” after the 1909 Plat listed the
ocean as the southerly border of the lots.54 Furthermore, the
Court noted that trial justices need to draw inferences at times
and that a trial justice’s findings will stand “even though another
equally reasonable set of inferences might be drawn from the
evidence.”55
COMMENTARY

Although it did not prove to be a dispositive issue at trial or
on appeal, the State had a strong argument that the 1909 Plat
and Indenture were ambiguous. The State argued that the
southerly border of the lots on the 1909 Plat should be read to be
where the dashed lines demarcating the easterly and westerly
boundaries of the plots end (which was before the beach area).56
The reasonable inference to be drawn from the dashed lines is
that the lots only extend as far south as their easterly and
westerly boundary lines. Although this inference would not be
strong enough evidence of the requisite manifest intent to dedicate
the beach to the public, it certainly was strong enough evidence to
convince the trial justice that the 1909 Plat and Indenture was
ambiguous.
Ultimately, the trial justice considered the extrinsic evidence
and offered his “alternative analysis” regarding the extrinsic
evidence as he would have had he found the 1909 Plat and
Indenture ambiguous in the first place.57 The Supreme Court
reviewed his analysis of the extrinsic evidence and found no error.
This case, and in particular the 1909 Plat and Indenture, had
the potential to force current landowners in the Misquamicut area
of Westerly, Rhode Island to allow the public onto what they
formerly believed to be the land they owned for many years. The
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 752 (citations omitted).
Id. at 748.
Id. at 745.
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implications on not only the persons involved in this case, but also
on future litigants, would have been truly significant. Rhode
Island is a state situated along the coastline with many beaches.
If the Court held that the manifest intent necessary for a public
dedication was met here, then many other similar claims could
arise dealing with private property along other parts of Rhode
Island’s coastline.
The Supreme Court correctly held that the landowners did
not meet the requisite level of intent for a public dedication. The
trial justice noted that “dedication can be presumed in most
roadway dedications” but in the case of a beach, dedication cannot
be presumed.58 There is a clear difference between landowners
dedicating a roadway to the public and dedicating beachfront
property to the public. Beachfront property is not nearly as
common as public roadways, and it is less likely that owners of
beachfront property would be willing to dedicate that property to
the public without expressly conveying their intention through
more than a mere label on a Plat.
Furthermore, the Court was correct in ruling that the
presumption did not apply to the Beach in this case because the
landowners showed proof that they understood how to dedicate
property to the public through the dedication of the rights of way
that contained the express language stating, “the spaces indicated
on said plan . . . are dedicated as a public walk and right of
way.”59 In light of these facts, it becomes clear that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decided this case correctly, and in doing so,
likely allowed many beachfront property owners in Rhode Island
to relax their fears of future litigation involving potential “public
dedications” from century-old documents.

58.
59.

Id. at 749.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the 1909 Plat and
Indenture did not exhibit the requisite manifest intent to dedicate
the beach area to the public. The Court reasoned that a public
dedication of beach area requires more than simply labeling an
area on the 1909 Plat “Beach” and that the extrinsic evidence here
further supported the Defendants’ contention that intent was
lacking.
Alexander L. Ried

Tort Law. Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 152 A.3d 1137
(R.I. 2017). A trial justice’s decision to deny a motion for a new
trial in a slip and fall case will not be disturbed if nothing
indicates that “the trial justice overlooked or misconceived
material and relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong” in
denying the motion. When a party does not properly request a
jury instruction or fails to object to the absence of such an
instruction at the trial level, the party will be precluded from
raising that issue on appeal under the Court’s long-standing raiseor-waive rule.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In March 2009, Deborah Bates-Bridgmon (Deborah) went to
Roch’s Market, a grocery store, and slipped on what she described
as “cucumber and oil debris” from a nearby salad bar.1 On
January 9, 2012, Deborah and her husband, Jackie Bridgmon
(Jackie) (collectively, Plaintiffs), filed a complaint against Roch’s
for injuries sustained from her fall.2 The complaint alleged that
Roch’s Market negligently maintained the market’s premises,
breached its contractual duty to Deborah, a business invitee, by
failing to maintain the premises in a safe and reasonable manner,
and, as a result, Jackie suffered loss of consortium and Deborah
suffered damages.3 Plaintiffs subsequently amended their
complaint to include an additional count based on the “mode of
operation” theory.4 Essentially, this theory provides that when an
1. Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 152 A.3d 1137, 1139 (R.I.
2017).
2. Id. at 1138. Plaintiffs will be referenced by their first names, as the
Rhode Island Supreme Court did in its Opinion, in order to avoid confusion.
3. Id.
4. Id. Plaintiffs described the theory of mode of operation to the court
as allowing for the burden of proof to shift onto the party who was in the best
position to identify the cause of an injury sustained by an invitee. Here,
Defendant/owner of Roch’s Market was in the best position to identify the
debris near the salad bar. Id. at n.2. Plaintiffs cited to a Massachusetts case,
Sheehan v. Roche Brothers Supermarkets, Inc., where “the court explained
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owner’s chosen mode of operation, particularly in the context of
self-service retail establishments, makes dangerous conditions
reasonably foreseeable, the owner assumes responsibility for such
negligence and foreseeable conditions on the premises.5 A trial
occurred from February 24, 2015 through February 26, 2015.6
Deborah testified first and explained the circumstances
surrounding her fall.7 She testified that there were no warning
signs near the salad bar or available employees in the area to
assist her once she had fallen.8 She subsequently found a nearby
railing, lifted herself up, and an employee eventually offered
assistance and wiped the floor.9 Deborah further testified that
after she got up from the fall, a manager told her no one was
available at that time to complete an incident report.10 Although
Deborah experienced pain “immediately after the fall,” she did not
go to the emergency room until the next morning, when she
received x-rays and an MRI that revealed a bulging and
degenerative disk along with multiple tears in her meniscus.11
Deborah distinguished the pain she felt from the fall from
preexisting injuries for which she was collecting disability benefits
from the State.12
The remainder of the trial included testimony from Jackie,
the owner of Roch’s Market, and the general manager.13 Jackie
testified that he often required his wife’s assistance due to his own
health issues, and that the fall had negatively impacted their dayto-day life.14 He also recounted calling Roch’s Market after the
the theory as follows: ‘a store owner could be held liable for injuries to an
invitee if the plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable
precautions necessary to protect invitees from these foreseeable dangerous
conditions.’” Id. (quoting 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Mass. 2007)).
5. Id. at 1139.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1139–40.
10. Id. at 1140.
11. Id.
12. Id. Deborah collected benefits for fibromyalgia, anxiety, depression,
and circulatory issues. Id. She described the pain from her fall as “a
constant pain . . . like an ache or throb[,]” as opposed to “that sharp twitchy
electrical current pain” she felt from the fibromyalgia. Id.
13. Id. at 1140–41.
14.
Id. at 1140. Regarding the loss of consortium claim, Jackie stated
that Deborah’s new injuries had impacted their life to such a point that
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fall, and a manager told him to call an attorney.15 Next, the
owner of Roch’s Market testified.16 She explained that the
general manager had informed her of the fall, but he did not have
Deborah’s information or an incident report.17 Moreover, she was
questioned on whether changing the salad bar into a station for
wrapped sandwiches in 2011 was influenced by Deborah’s fall, but
stated that change was purely because the salad bar was not
generating enough business.18 Finally, the general manager
testified.19 He stated that he was aware of the fall, the existence
of injuries, and confirmed that something was, indeed, on the
floor.20 He also explained that no particular employee was
assigned to monitor the salad bar, and no protective mats or
warning signs were around the premises.21
Both parties rested and moved for judgment as a matter of
22
law. After hearing each party on their respective motions, the
trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion and reserved deciding
Defendant’s motion.23
“[their] life’s just done. [They] do nothing.” Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. The owner was not in the store on the day in question. Id. The
general manager told her of the fall, but she was not informed about an
injury or the husband’s subsequent phone call. Id. The owner was also
doubtful that an employee told Jackie to call an attorney. Id. It is company
policy to complete an injury report so that they have the customer’s name,
information, and a description of what happened on file. Id.
18. Id. at 1140–41.
19. Id. at 1141. The general manager was working on the day in
question, but was unable to testify that day. Id. at n.2. Plaintiffs’ attorney
read the transcript into the record. Id.
20. Id. at 1141.
21.
Id. The manager stated that the deli employees could view the salad
station and would periodically check to ensure it was stocked. Id.
22.
Id.; see R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 50. On its motion for judgment as a
matter of law, Defendant argued that, although it is undisputed that Deborah
fell on oil and cucumber, there was no evidence of actual notice concerning
the substance of the floor. Bates-Bridgmon, 152 A.3d at 1141. Further,
Defendant asserted that there was no evidence of constructive notice to give
Defendant a reasonable opportunity to clean the spill before Deborah fell. Id.
On the issue of notice, Plaintiffs argued that the salad bar is a “constant
danger” and Roch’s Market lacked policies to maintain safety. Id. Plaintiffs
asserted, even without mode of operation or breach of contract theories,
Defendant still breached its due care obligation under the concept of
negligence. Id.
23. Id. at 1141.

732 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:729
The trial justice instructed the jury in accordance with the
issue of duty.24 In a subsequent sidebar, Plaintiffs’ attorney
requested instructions on the collateral-source rule and
subsequent remedial measures pursuant to Rule 407 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence, both of which the trial justice denied.25
Plaintiffs also requested the jury be instructed on aggravation of
preexisting injuries, which the trial justice granted.26 While still
in sidebar, the trial justice stated that these issues were not
raised in Plaintiffs’ papers, and that Plaintiffs’ counsel did not
provide him with written jury instructions.27 Plaintiffs’ attorney
maintained that he did provide those instructions, and that they
contained a request for jury instructions on the mode of operation
count and breach of contract claims; yet, the aforementioned
documents did not appear within the record.28
The jury deliberated, and on February 26, 2015, it found that
Plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant was negligent or that the alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of any injury sustained.29
Within the next week, Plaintiffs moved for a new trial and
additur, and a hearing was held on that motion in April 2015.30
Defendant objected to this motion.31 The trial justice summarized
24.
Id. at 1142. The instructions provided that Defendant owed a duty
to Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the premises in a
reasonably safe condition for grocery shopping, keeping in mind the nature of
the operations being conducted on the premises at the time. Id.
25.
Id. The trial justice determined that, since there was no mention of
insurance, there was no need for an instruction on the collateral-source rule.
Id. Additionally, the trial justice held that the evidence did not warrant an
instruction on subsequent remedial measures. Id.
26.
Id. This instruction provided that the defendant in a personal injury
case takes his plaintiff as he finds the plaintiff and cannot defend the
accident based on merely aggravating preexisting conditions. Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. On appeal, Plaintiffs provided the Supreme Court with a
document entitled “Jury Instructions,” but there was no indication that the
Superior Court received this document because it was not time-stamped as
received by the court or signed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. at n.6.
29. Id. at 1142.
30.
Id.; see R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 59. Plaintiffs argued that, because
the salad bar had the potential to spill onto the floor, Deborah’s fall was
foreseeable, that Roch’s Market removing the salad bar was a subsequent
remedial measure, and that the owner was on notice after the incident. BatesBridgmon, 152 A.3d at 1142–43.
31.
Id. at 1143. Defendants asserted that the verdict was consistent
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the evidence adduced at trial and agreed with the jury’s
conclusion; he was not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ presentation on the
issue of negligence and proximate cause.32 Accordingly, he denied
Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.33
On April 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an appeal that contended
the trial justice improperly denied their motion for a new trial and
erred by failing to charge the jury on the mode of operation
theory.34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the Superior Court judgment, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court sought to determine whether the trial
justice erred by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and
failing to charge the jury on the “mode of operation” theory.35
Additionally, Plaintiffs requested the Court adopt the
aforementioned theory as a standard by which Rhode Island
analyzes slip and fall cases.36
The Court first reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.37
Plaintiffs disputed various findings that the trial justice made in
deciding the motion.38 The Court concluded that it was satisfied
with Rhode Island law, and that the theory of mode of operation is
inapplicable in this state. Id.
32.
Id. The trial justice reasoned that the issue of whether Defendant
was aware of Deborah’s fall after it occurred was a “red herring” because the
relevant inquiry was whether Defendant was on notice of the condition that
caused the fall. Id. He also noted that he had difficulty distinguishing the
numerous preexisting health issues that Deborah suffered from the newly
incurred injuries. Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 1143. Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal before judgment
was entered, but the Court routinely treats such an appeal as timely filed. Id.
at n.7.
35. Id. at 1143.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1144. With regard to a motion for a new trial, the standard of
review is deferential to the trial justice’s decision. Id. at 1143. The trial
justice must uphold the jury verdict if he or she determines the evidence is
evenly balanced or that reasonable people could come to different conclusions
in considering the same evidence. Id. The Court will not find that the trial
justice erred in his ruling on a motion for a new trial unless the moving party
demonstrates that “the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material and
relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Id. at 1144 (quoting Yi
Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 38 A.3d 1093, 1099 (R.I. 2012)).
38. Id. at 1144. Plaintiffs argued the trial justice ignored the fact that
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with the trial justice’s new-trial analysis because he summarized
the evidence adduced at trial and determined he would not have
reached a different result from that of the jury.39 With respect to
the issue of Deborah’s fall, the trial justice found the evidence was
lacking details pertaining to the specifics of how the fall
occurred.40 Regarding the issue of notice, the trial justice noted
there was no evidence about how long the spill was on the ground.
Further, despite Plaintiffs’ recurring argument that Defendant
knew of the fall after-the-fact, the relevant inquiry was what
notice Defendant had of the condition prior to the fall.41 Finally,
on the causation issue, the trial justice found the evidence
distinguishing between the preexisting health problems and those
sustained by the fall was “murky at best.”42 The Court concluded
there was nothing in the record to “indicate that ‘the trial justice
overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence or was
otherwise clearly wrong.’”43 Thus, the decision was affirmed.44
Conducting a de novo review of the jury instructions, the
Court considered whether the trial justice erred in declining to
instruct the jury on the theory of mode of operation.45 Pursuant
to Rule 51(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,
unless a party objects with some specificity to the giving or failure
to give an instruction before the jury retires to determine the
verdict, the instructions will not be in error.46 Moreover, under
Defendant was aware of the fall, the trial justice contradicted himself
regarding the sufficiency of Deborah’s testimony about the fall, and the trial
justice attempted to “make light of” Plaintiffs’ damages by implying her
testimony did not reflect injuries related to the incident. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (internal citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. The standard of review for jury instructions is as follows:
[The Court] examine[s] “jury instructions ‘in their entirety to
ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinarily intelligent lay
people would have understood them . . . . Even if an instruction is
erroneous, reversal is warranted only if it can be shown that the jury
could have been misled to the resultant prejudice if the complaining
party.
Id. (internal citations omitted)
46. Id. at 1145. When a party objects to jury instructions, it must state
distinctly the matter to which they object and the grounds of the objection.
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Rhode Island’s well-established “raise-or-waive” rule, the Court is
precluded from reviewing issues at the appellate level that were
not properly raised at trial.47 Here, Plaintiffs’ attorney did not
properly request a jury instruction on mode of operation, nor did
he object when the trial justice instructed the jury.48 Although
Plaintiffs’ counsel loosely touched upon the topic during a sidebar,
there was no formal request for that specific instruction, and when
given the opportunity to raise concerns with respect to the jury
instructions, counsel answered in the negative.49 Thus, the Court
concluded that Plaintiffs waived their right to review on this
issue.50
Finally, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ alternative request for
Rhode Island’s adoption of the “mode of operation” theory for slip
and fall cases.51 Recognizing that this request was affiliated with
Plaintiffs’ request for review of the lower court’s jury instruction,
the Supreme Court reiterated counsel’s failure to request a jury
instruction on the mode of operation or object to the absence of the
instruction.52 Without the benefit of the lower court’s analysis
and decision making on the matter, the Court refused to consider
the merits of adopting a new rule that may affect a large number
of cases.53
COMMENTARY

In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly
affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling with regard to the jury
instructions and “mode of operation” theory. As most Rhode
Island practitioners know, Rhode Island state courts strictly
adhere to the long-standing “raise-or-waive” rule.54 This rule
precludes the Court from hearing or considering issues at the
appellate level that were not properly presented at the lower court
See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 51(b). The objection must be specific enough to
alert the trial justice as to the nature of his or her error. Bates-Bridgmon,
152 A.3d at 1145 (internal citation omitted).
47. Id. (quoting Botelho v. Caster’s, Inc., 970 A.2d 541, 547 (R.I. 2009)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1145.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
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level.55 While Plaintiffs maintained that the record included an
“extensive memorandum prior to the trial on the mode of
operation,” at no point during the trial did counsel formally
request an instruction on the mode of operation theory.56
Additionally, when the trial justice gave the opportunity to raise
any requests concerning the jury instructions, Plaintiffs’ attorney
expressly stated, “No, your Honor.”57
As Justice Indeglia noted, the Court is especially rigorous in
applying the raise-or-waive rule when reviewing jury
instructions.58 In order to protect the integrity of the trial process
and the jury’s deliberated findings, the Court applied basic rules
of jurisprudence and appropriately precluded review of the issue.
Furthermore, the Court’s unwillingness to consider the
adoption of the mode of operation theory is understandable,
particularly in light of its interrelatedness with the previously
challenged jury instructions.59 When creating a new rule that
would affect a large number of cases, the Court is reluctant to
adopt the rule without input from other intelligible sources.60 The
Court cited to a Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision
holding “where an owner’s chosen mode of operation makes it
reasonably foreseeable that a dangerous condition will occur, a
store owner could be held liable for injuries to an invitee if the
plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable
precautions necessary.”61 Thus, the adoption of mode of operation
in slip-and-fall cases would result in a presumption of negligence
that certain store owners can rebut if they demonstrate that they
exercised reasonable care.62
Because Plaintiffs did not properly raise the issue of “mode of
operation” at trial, the trial justice never addressed the issue, and
the Court was “without the benefit of the lower court’s analysis
and decision-making on the matter.”63 Notably, the Court did not
55. See id. (citing Botelho v. Caster’s, Inc., 970 A.2d 541, 547 (R.I. 2009)).
56. Id. at 1145.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Botelho, 970 A.2d at 548).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1139 & n.2 (quoting Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets,
Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Mass. 2007)).
62. See Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1283.
63. Bates-Bridgmon, 152 A.3d at 1145.
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provide much commentary regarding this theory and, thereby,
inferred it may be willing to grapple with the idea under proper
circumstances.64
With regard to the motion for a new trial, Plaintiffs in this
case repeatedly and “vigorously” drew the trial justice’s attention
to Defendant’s knowledge and notice of the fall after it occurred.65
To introduce evidence of this nature was in no way beneficial to
Plaintiffs’ case.66 The trial justice categorized this point as a “red
herring,” and concluded that the proper inquiry was what notice
Defendant had of the defect or condition that caused the fall.67
This conclusion, in addition to Deborah’s unpersuasive and vague
explanation of how she fell and how injuries sustained from that
fall differed from her preexisting injuries, was a reasonable basis
for a jury to find that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof
for negligence and causation.68 Saying that such a “red herring”
issue and “murky” testimony would be sufficient grounds to
warrant the granting of a new trial would be a great stretch.
Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly followed
precedent by giving great deference to the trial justice’s discretion
because nothing suggested that the trial justice overlooked or
misconceived material and relevant evidence or was otherwise
clearly wrong.69
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s conclusion on the issues
raised by Plaintiffs was sound and in accordance with wellestablished Rhode Island law.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs failed to
preserve for appellate review their claim that the trial court
should have instructed the jury on the “mode of operation” theory
in a slip-and-fall action because Plaintiffs’ attorney neither
requested an instruction on mode of operation nor objected when
the trial justice did not instruct the jury on it. Pursuant to Rhode
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1143.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1144.
69. Id. (quoting Yi Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 38 A.3d 1093, 1099
(R.I. 2012)).
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Island’s well-established “raise-or-wave rule,” the Court is
precluded from considering issues at the appellate level that were
not properly presented before the trial court.
Camille Caron Capraro

Tort Law. O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422 (R.I. 2017). The
Wrongful Death Act’s minimum-damage provision is subject to
joint and severable liability, meaning that the minimum-damage
provision of $250,000 applies on a per-claim rather than perdefendant basis.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On March 9, 2003, Jason Goffe (Goffe) and Michael Petrarca
(Petrarca) participated in a high-speed race on the New London
Turnpike heading in a westerly direction.1 Brendan O’Connell
Roberti (Roberti) was a passenger in Goffe’s car.2 William
Walmsley (Walmsley or Defendant), was driving in an eastbound
lane.3 Goffe lost control of his vehicle, swerved into the eastbound
lane, and was struck by Walmsley.4 Goffe and Roberti died as a
result of this incident.5
Roberti’s parents, as co-administrators of Roberti’s estate,
brought suit against Walmsley and other Defendants.6 All of the
other Defendants, including those joined by Walmsley in a thirdparty complaint for indemnification and contributory negligence,7
settled with the Plaintiffs who released them from any future
claims arising out of the incident.8 These releases resulted in a
1. O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 424 (R.I. 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. “The [P]laintiffs also sued Donald Goffe, Goffe’s father, who
owned the vehicle [Goffe] drove, and Geico General Insurance Company
(GEICO), which insured the same vehicle.” Id.
7. Id. Walmsley brought a third-party complaint against Petrarca and
Tapco. Inc., which owned the truck driven by Petrarca, for indemnification
and contributory negligence in regard to Roberti’s death. Id.
8. Id. Prior to trial, the Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement
with Goffe and Geico for $145,000 (Goffe Release) and a separate settlement
agreement with Petrarca and Tapco, Inc. for $250,000 (Petrarca Release).
Both settlements released the parties from future claims arising out of the
incident. Id. The Goffe Release stated, “that all potentially recoverable
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total of $395,000 in recovery for the Plaintiffs.9 Thus, Walmsley
was the only Defendant who advanced to trial.10 Walmsley moved
for judgment as a matter of law, but prior to ruling, the trial
justice permitted the case go before a jury and Walmsley was
found negligent and liable for $10,000.11
Walmsley’s renewed motion for summary judgment was
granted and the Plaintiffs then moved for a new trial and an
additur, arguing that the statutory minimum for a wrongful death
suit in which the defendant is found liable is $250,000.12 On
September 22, 2010, judgment was entered for Walmsley and the
Plaintiffs appealed, with the sole issue being the trial justice’s
grant of Walmsley’s motion for judgement as a matter of law.13
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated that judgment and
remanded the case for additional proceedings.14
The case was then brought before a hearing justice where the
Plaintiff sought $250,000 against Walmsley in accordance with
the additur.15 Walmsley moved for summary judgment, arguing
that he was not required to pay the full sum to the Plaintiffs.16
Walmsley argued that based on the contractual language of the
Goffe and Petrarca Releases, his payment obligation was reduced
claims were ‘hereby reduced by the statutory pro rata share of negligence of
Goffe under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act of the
State of Rhode Island, or the sum of $145,000 whichever is the greater
reduction.’” Id. “In the Petrarca Release, [P]laintiffs also promised to reduce
any damage recoverable by [P]laintiffs against all other persons jointly or
severally liable to [P]laintiffs by the pro rata share of liability of [Petrarca
and Tapco, Inc.] or in the amount of the consideration paid under the
agreement, whichever amount is greater.” Id. (internal quotations to the
Petrarca Release omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The jury “deemed his negligence a proximate cause of Roberti’s
death.” Id.
12. Id. at 424–25 (citing in relevant part 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2
(1956) concerning minimum recovery in wrongful death actions). “The trial
justice ruled conditionally that, if defendant’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law was overturned on appeal, he would grant [the] [P]laintiffs’
motion for an additur. Alternatively, the trial justice ruled that, if [the]
[P]laintiffs did not accept the additur, he would grant their motion for a new
trial with respect to both damages and liability.” Id. at 425.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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as “an ‘other tortfeasor,’”17 and further, that the Plaintiff had
already received over $250,000 regarding the wrongful death
action and thus, his reduced liability was proper.18 In essence,
Walmsley argued that joint tortfeasors were severally liable for
the $250,000.19 In contrast, the Plaintiffs asserted that the
statute required a minimum of $250,000 from each Defendant
found liable, regardless of their percentage of fault or what the
Plaintiffs have recovered in the aggregate from all tortfeasors.20
On May 6, 2015, the hearing justice found in favor of
Walmsley because the Goffe and Petrarca Releases fully satisfied
the judgment against him.21 The hearing justice explained that
the legislative intent of the minimum-damage requirement was to
compensate wrongful-death plaintiffs, and thus, the Plaintiffs
were satisfied because they had already received more than the
statutory minimum under the releases.22 The hearing justice
further reasoned that if reading a statute literally produces an
absurd result, as it would here by requiring a minimum of
$250,000 from each Defendant, the statite should not be read in
that way.23 He stated that “joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severally liable for the $250,000 minimum reflected in [Rhode
Island General Laws section] 10–7–2”24 and further, that “state
law clearly provided that release of one joint tortfeasor reduces
the claim against other joint tortfeasors.”25 For those reasons, the
hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendant and the Plaintiffs appealed.26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to
17. Id. (alteration omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Petro v. Town of W. Warwick ex. rel. Moore, 889
F.Supp.2d 292 (D.R.I. 2012) (discussing the statutory interpretation of 10 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1956))).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 426.
25. Id. The hearing justice noted that based on 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 10-7-2 and the two releases, the Plaintiffs’ recovery against Walmsley must
be reduced by $395,000, which was the joint sum of the settlements. Id.
26. Id.
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determine whether the hearing justice was correct in granting a
motion for summary judgment.27 The issues presented were (1)
whether the Wrongful Death Act’s minimum-damages provision28
should be a “rigid and technical plain-reading,” as the Plaintiffs
asserted29 and; (2) whether the minimum-damage provision could
be reconciled under joint and several liability.30 The primary
intent of the Wrongful Death Act was to provide compensatory
damages to remedy the loss of the estate.31 The Court explained
that the Wrongful Death Act is contrary to common law and thus
requires the Court to “strictly construe its language,”32 unless a
strict reading of the statute results in “absurdities or would defeat
the underlying purpose of the enactment.”33
The relevant language of section 10-7-2 of the Rhode Island
General Laws states that “[w]henever any person or corporation is
found liable under §§ 10-7-1–10-7-4 he or she or it shall be liable
in damages in the sum of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
dollars ($250,000).”34 The Court found that a strict reading of the
statute here might require each tortfeasor to pay a minimum of
$250,000, which they determine is an absurd result and one not
intended by the General Assembly.35 In viewing the full statutory
scheme, the Court reasoned that the legislative intent was for the
minimum-damages requirement to apply on a per-claim basis
rather than a per-defendant basis.36 The statute focuses on the
act which caused the death, and the compensation of the family,
not on the number of actors involved.37 Thus, the number of
tortfeasors involved in the wrongful death is irrelevant to the
27. Id. “We will affirm a [trial] court’s decision only if, after reviewing
the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Boucher v. Sweet, 147 A.3d
71, 73 (R.I. 2016).
28. 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1956).
29. Walmsley, 156 A.3d at 426–27.
30. Id. at 427.
31. Id. (citing Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 446–47 (R.I. 2000)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 428 (citing Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727
A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1999)).
34. 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1956).
35. Walmsley, 156 A.3d at 428.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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amount of loss endured by the estate.38 Whether it was one actor
or ten, the minimum recovery, as a whole, is $250,000.39
Thus, the Court found that the hearing justice was correct in
declining to hold Walmsley individually liable for $250,000
because the Goffe and Petrarca Releases reduced the claim
against him as a joint tortfeasor.40 The Court concluded that
statutory minimum of the Wrongful Death Act is subject to joint
and several liability principles.41
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly articulated the
relationship between release of joint tortfeasors and the Wrongful
Death Act regarding minimum damages.42 The Court explained
that it “must ‘consider the entire statute as a whole; individual
sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory
scheme, not as if each section were independent of all the other
sections.’”43 Within this framework, the Court concluded that
section 10-7-2, the minimum-damage provision of the Wrongful
Death Act, could be reconciled with section 10-6-7, the release of
joint tortfeasors, because not doing so would produce an absurd
result.44
As such, the Rhode Island Supreme Court clarifies the
statutory scheme of the Wrongful Death Act in accordance with
multiple tortfeasors when some of those tortfeasors are released
prior to trial. On its face, the language of the Wrongful Death
Act’s minimum recovery is not clear in identifying that joint and
several liability applies; however, the Court’s interpretation now
gives light to the fact that the statute should be read that all of
the tortfeasors together owe a minimum of $250,000 to the
plaintiff. It seems to be that this reasoning would apply whether
the joint tortfeasors were released or not, meaning that if multiple
parties continued on to trial, in the aggregate, the result would be
the same. By reading the statute in this light, the Court clarifies
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426 (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)).
Id. at 428.
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the rule that when there are multiple tortfeasors in a wrongful
death action, their recovery is an overall minimum of $250,000
whether there are ten defendants or two.
The holding and reasoning of the Court in this case is sound
because “individual sections must be considered in the context of
the entire statutory scheme.”45 Therefore, the minimum damage
provision of the Wrongful Death Act should be read in conjunction
with the section on release of joint tortfeasors when the facts lend
themselves to this analysis. Reading the minimum damage
provision as applying to each tortfeasor separately would produce
an absurd result. The purpose of this provision is to make a
plaintiff whole again and to set a minimum in remedying them for
their loss. It would be unfair if each plaintiff had a different
statutory minimum depending on the number of defendants
involved. Reading the Wrongful Death Act’s minimum recovery as
a per-claim basis garners a just and fair result for all plaintiffs to
whom it applies.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that under the
Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff’s minimum recovery is subject to
joint and severable liability. The Court determined that allowing
a plaintiff to separately recover a minimum of $250,000 from each
defendant would yield absurd results and thus was contrary to the
intent of the legislature.
Jillian Nobis

45.

State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013).

Tort Law. Roach v. State, 157 A.3d 1042 (R.I. 2017). The
general statutory tort cap applicable in tort cases asserted against
the State does not apply when the State engages in a “proprietary
function in commission of the tort.” An entity may be capable of
fulfilling both governmental and proprietary functions. However,
the only relevant functions in the tort cap analysis are those that
give rise to the tort claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On November 10, 2008, the Plaintiff, Ms. Victoria Roach (the
Plaintiff), slipped and fell on a moist area of a bathroom floor
during her shift as a nurse at the Rhode Island Veterans Home
(Veterans Home).1 The Veterans Home is a nursing home for
Rhode Island veterans, housing veterans predominately between
seventy and eighty years old with varying degrees of selfsufficiency.2 The veterans reside in rooms and are assigned
particular units. Each unit includes two wings and the wings
contain thirty or forty residents on each side.3
The Plaintiff’s accident occurred in a bedroom within Unit N7, which was comprised of residents that “required heightened
care” and “palliative (end of life) residents.”4 In order to
accommodate the needs of these residents, the Veterans Home
customarily staffed a charge nurse, a staff nurse, and several
Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) for each
shift.5 On
November 10, 2008, the Plaintiff reported to work for her 4 p.m. to
1. Roach v. State, 157 A.3d 1042, 1044 (R.I. 2017).
2. Id. The Veterans Home is “statutorily organized and governed under
Rhode Island’s Department of Human Services.” Id. In order to reside at the
home, the individual must be a Rhode Island resident veteran who served
during a time of war. Id. Residents range from “totally independent to
bedridden.” Id. at 1045.
3. Id. at 1045. The two wings are referred to as “sides A and B.” Id.
4. Id. Many of these residents “needed help getting out of bed and
ambulating, using the bathroom, eating and bathing.” Id.
5. Id.
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12 a.m. shift at the Veterans Home.6 In order to obtain
information about the Veterans Home’s procedures and orient
herself with her new work environment, the Plaintiff arrived to
work early and met with the Unit’s charge nurse, Ms. Cheryl
Kelley (Kelley).7
After Kelley’s introduction, the Plaintiff began her first task
of administering medication to the Unit N-7 residents.8 After
visiting a few rooms, she arrived at Room B-7, which was the
home of two resident-patients.9 The Plaintiff administered one of
the resident-patient’s medications in pill form, which she served in
a Dixie cup.10 The resident received his pill with a 90-cubiccentimeter Dixie cup filled about halfway with water.11 After the
resident-patient ingested the pill, the Plaintiff discarded the
medication cup into the trash and approached the bathroom in
order to dispose of the remaining water in the Dixie cup.12
However, upon her entrance into the bathroom, she slipped and
fell on the bathroom floor.13 The Plaintiff stated that the smell of
the liquid on the floor indicated to her that it was “cleaning
solution or soapy water[,]” which is typically used to bathe the
residents.14 The liquid dampened her back and the side of her
pants, and as a result of her fall, she suffered a torn anterior
cruciate ligament (ACL) and a torn meniscus.15
The Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the State of Rhode
Island and Gary Alexander in his official capacity as Director of
the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (collectively, the
Defendants), and a trial by jury commenced on March 12, 2014.16
6. Id. The plaintiff was a contract nurse and worked on a per diem
basis for MAS Medical Staffing. Id.
7. Id. Kelley showed her “the treatment cart, medical cart, bathroom
and kitchen.” Id. The plaintiff also reviewed the list of unit residents’
medications, which she would be administering during her shift. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Resident 1 was a double amputee, who often remained in a wheel
chair and needed assistance accessing the toilet, which required the use of a
lift. Id. Resident 2 suffered from end-stage Parkinson’s disease and also
needed assistance moving from his bed to his wheelchair. Id. at 1046.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15. Id. at 1046, 1048.
16. Id. at 1044.
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Upon the close of the Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the Defendants
moved for judgment as a matter of law as permitted by Rule 50 of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.17 Ultimately, on
March 19, 2017, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000.18
Shortly thereafter, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants filed a motion for a
new trial and a motion to amend judgment and sought a
remittitur.19 On April 17, 2014, the trial justice issued a bench
decision denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter
of law and motion for a new trial, but granting the remittitur,
which reduced the Plaintiff’s award to $382,000.20 However,
prejudgment interest increased the judgment to $631,373.66.21
On April 30, 2014, the Defendants appealed the judgment and
presented the following arguments: “(1) the public-duty doctrine
shields the state from liability; (2) the statutory cap in Rhode
Island General Laws section 9-31-2 limits damages to $100,000;
(3) the prejudgment interest award was improper; (4) the trial
justice erred in denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a
matter of law; and (5) the trial justice erred in failing to instruct
the jury on comparative negligence.”22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial justice’s bench decision, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court addressed the Defendants’ appellate
arguments in turn, starting with a de novo review of the
applicability of the public-duty doctrine.23 The public-duty
doctrine serves to “shield the state from liability in limited
circumstances.”24 The Court sought to determine whether the
function that gave rise to the Plaintiff’s injuries was a
17.
Id. The Defendants later renewed their motion for judgment as a
matter of law at the close of evidence. Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20. Id. at 1048.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1049.
24. Id. at 1050. “[T]he public duty doctrine immunizes the state from
‘tort liability arising out of discretionary governmental actions that by their
nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons.’” Id. (quoting
Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 730 (R.I. 2006)).
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discretionary governmental activity protected under the publicduty doctrine or an act capable of performance by private
citizens.25 The Defendants’ argument on this issue was quickly
disposed of by the Court. The Defendants attempted to frame the
activity at issue as “the Veteran Home’s maintenance[,]” which it
argued cannot be replicated by a private person because the
Veterans Home is statutorily created with its management vested
in the Director of Human Services.26
The Court agreed with the trial justice when it rejected this
argument because the public-duty doctrine test narrowly
examines the underlying activity that gave rise to the tort.27
Here, the function the Court examined was “care for nursing home
resident-patients.”28 With the function properly framed in this
manner, it was clear to the Court that the Veterans Home
performs similar tasks as private nursing homes. Particularly,
the Court noted that both entities “house[] and care for patients,
which includes care from agency-employed nurses.”29 Moreover,
the trial justice noted, and the Court reinforced, that “daily
nursing care and nursing care facilities are not unique to state
entities.”30 Thus, because the Defendants engaged in a function
capable of being performed by a private citizen or entity, the
public-duty doctrine did not apply.
The Court’s next issue to review was whether or not the
statutory damage limitation applied to the case at bar. The Court
acknowledged that “Rhode Island operates under a general
statutory-damage limitation applicable in tort cases asserted
against the state.”31 While the Court acknowledged the existence
25. Id. at 1051.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 1052. “[T]he administration, operation, or maintenance (in
a broad sense) of the Veterans Home is not at issue. Rather the pertinent
government function is resident-patient care.” Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1051. The Plaintiff was in fact an agency employed nurse. Id.
at 1045.
30. Id. at 1051.
31. Id. at 1052. The Court referred to the following provision:
In any tort action against the State of Rhode Island or any political
subdivision thereof, any damages recovered therein shall not exceed
the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); provided,
however, that in all instances in which the state was engaged in a
proprietary function in the commission of the tort, or in any
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of the cap, it quickly shifted to the proprietary function exception
stated within section 9-31-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws.32
In determining whether or not the activity within this case is a
proprietary function, the Court provided the following two
definitions of the term: (1) “actions normally performed by private
individuals,” and (2) “one which is not ‘so intertwined with
governing that the government is obligated to perform it only by
its own agents or employees.’”33 In reconciling these definitions,
the Court articulated the similarities between them: specifically,
the fact that both definitions “pinpoint the function at issue” and
“examine whether it is so significantly tied to governing that
private persons or entities could not justifiably fulfill it.”34
The Defendants argued that the damages cap applies because
“Veterans Home maintenance is a governmental function.”35
Moreover, it asserted that the trial justice applied the improper
test in analyzing the cap.36 According to its analysis, the proper
question was whether the Defendants “engaged in a proprietary
function in the commission of the tort.”37 In response, the Court
stated that although the public-duty doctrine and statutory tort
cap standards tend to be very similar, the trial justice “properly
framed the issue before her.”38 The Defendants’ argument was
unpersuasive principally because the inquiry into whether private
individuals regularly engage in a function is tantamount to
“asking whether the Veterans Home, in commission of the tort,
acted in a proprietary manner.”39
situation whereby the state has agreed to indemnify the federal
government or agency thereof for any tort liability, the limitation on
damages set forth in this section shall not apply.
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (1984). Id.
32. See id. “[The] Court recognizes that damages above $100,000 are
permitted when the tort action stems from the state’s ‘proprietary function.’”
Id.
33. Id. at 1052 (quoting Lepore v. Rhode Island Public
Transit
Authority, 524 A.2d 574, 575 (R.I. 1987)). The Court “recognizes the
somewhat murky nature of deciphering when the state executes a proprietary
versus a governmental function.” Id. at 1053.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Defendants argue the trial justice “improperly applied the
public-duty doctrine standard.” Id. at 1053.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1054.
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Similarly, the Court was unmoved by the Defendants’
argument that the Veterans Home “is a creature of statute and
therefore is protected by the tort cap.”40 The Court stated that
whether an entity is statutorily created is not relevant to this
particular issue. Instead, the proper analysis considers the
function that gave rise to the tort. In fact, the Court concluded
that if it accepted the Defendants’ argument, then it would be
difficult to envision the Veterans Home, or any other statutorily
organized state entity, ever being fully liable in tort.41
Finally, on the issue of statutory tort cap damages, the Court
made a concerted effort to indicate its awareness that entities are
capable of performing both governmental functions and
proprietary functions.42 Insofar as the Veterans Home is capable
of fulfilling both functions, the Court made clear that the activity
giving rise to the State’s liability in this case involved purely
proprietary functions.43 However, the Court stated that Veterans
Home certainly would also be capable of performing a
governmental function.44 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
the test is “fact-intensive,” which requires an examination of the
“underlying activity or function at issue rather than the entity
itself.”45 Accordingly, the proper conclusion in this case warranted
the trial justice’s rejection of the tort cap’s application.
In reviewing its third issue, the Court shifted its inquiry to
prejudgment interest.46 The Defendants argued that the Court
erred in awarding prejudgment interest.47 Furthermore, the
Defendants argued that the Plaintiff’s failure to request
prejudgment interest precluded recovery.48 The Court analyzed
40. Id. at 1053.
41.
Id. at 1054. “To accept the [Defendants’] assertions would morph
current jurisprudence into a cursory analysis whereby statutory organization
alone is sufficient to limit the state’s liability.” Id. at 1054.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. These activities include functions related to resident-care
functions of CNAs and contracted housekeepers. Id.
44.
Id. at 1054–55. The Court uses the example of a scenario where the
management and operation of the Veterans Home might involve
“discretionary government decision making, such as negligence flowing from
the director’s decision to admit or not admit a resident-patient.” Id. at 1055.
45.
Id.
46.
See id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
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these arguments one at a time beginning with the Defendants’
argument that prejudgment interest was improper.49 In doing so,
the Court highlighted an exception to the general rule that
prejudgment interest is not awarded against the State.50 As is
the common theme throughout this case, the exception “turn[ed]
on the proprietary versus governmental function distinction.”51
Thus, because the Defendants “acted in a proprietary, rather than
governmental, manner,” the Defendants were subject to
prejudgment interest.52
Additionally, in addressing the Defendants’ second argument
that the Plaintiff’s failure to request prejudgment interest
precluded recovery, the Court disagreed for two reasons. First,
the statute itself makes no indication that the Plaintiff was
required to request prejudgment interest.53
Second, the Court relied on precedent indicating that the
Plaintiff did not have to request prejudgment interest in order to
receive it.54 As a result, the Plaintiff’s award of prejudgment
interest was not improper.
In reconciling the Defendants’ argument that the trial justice
erred in denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter
of law, the Court highlighted the significant amount of findings
that the trial justice articulated. The Defendants argued that “the
[P]laintiff’s case relie[d] on impermissible inference building in
that [the] [P]laintiff did not eliminate other possible causes of the

49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 1056. The relevant interest statute stated the following:
In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made
for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of court to
the amount of damages interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum thereon from the date the cause of action accrued, which
shall be included in the judgment entered therein.
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-10.
54. Id. at 1056; see Cardi Corp. v. State, 561 A.2d 384, 387 (R.I. 1989)
(“Whether [the plaintiff] specifically requested the interest by motion [is] not
relevant to the awarding of prejudgment interest pursuant to 9 R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 21-10 (West 2017). This Court has long held that the awarding
of such interest is a ministerial act for the clerk of the court, not an issue to
be decided by the court.”).
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spill.”55 In response, the Court concluded that the evidence
provided was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to reach a
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.56
Finally, the Court addressed the State’s argument that the
trial justice erroneously refused to instruct the jury on
comparative negligence. The Court agreed with the trial justice’s
finding that the Defendants had not presented a
clear
comparative negligence theory.57 In addition, the Court refused to
review a new comparative negligence theory for the first time on
appeal and considered it waived under the “raise-or-waive rule.”58
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court further established that the
statutory cap in tort actions against the State is subject to an
impactful and divisive “proprietary function” exception.59
Acknowledging “the somewhat murky nature of deciphering when
the state executes a proprietary versus a governmental function,”
the Court elected to follow a line of cases that focused on the
nature of the activity at issue in order to determine whether the
Defendants’ actions constituted a proprietary function.60 This
analysis included identifying the function giving rise to liability
and examining “whether it [was] so significantly tied to governing
that private persons or entities could not possibly fulfill it.”61
Thus, according to the majority, a proprietary function is
undoubtedly a function or activity that is capable of being
55.
Id. The Defendants further contend that “because a third party
with Room B-7 access may have caused the spill, a reasonable jury should not
have been allowed to find that a CNA or housekeeper caused it, or that the
liquid was present long enough to alert a CAN to its existence.” Id.
56. Id.
57.
Id. The Defendants argued a comparative negligence instruction
was appropriate because the “[P]laintiff (1) failed to supervise CNAs and (2)
failed to notify the CNAs; and alternatively (3) did not properly enter Room
B-7 to administer medications. Id. at 1057.
58.
“It is well settled [under our raise-or-waive rule] that a litigant
cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not
raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828–
29 (R.I. 2008)).
59.
Id. at 1053. The statutory cap does not apply when “the state was
engaged in a proprietary function in the commission of the tort.” Id.
60. Id. at 1052.
61. Id. at 1053.

2018]

SURVEY SECTION

753

routinely performed by a private person or entity.62
While the majority was comfortable with its method for
determining a proprietary function, Justice Robinson proceeded
down a different analytical path in his dissenting opinion. Based
on his analysis, Justice Robinson reached the conclusion that the
statutory cap should apply in this case.63 The difference rests in
the manner by which he defined proprietary function. Justice
Robinson treated the issue of defining “proprietary function” as
one of statutory interpretation and therefore sought to glean the
Legislature’s intent in drafting the statute.64 He believed that the
intent was “to limit the amount of damage awards in the
governmental tort context save only for the genuinely exceptional
case where government engages in a ‘proprietary function.’”65
Thus, in adhering to the purpose of the statutory tort cap,66
Justice Robinson followed a different line of cases in defining
proprietary function.67
Justice Robinson devoted his attention to cases that focus on
“whether or not the alleged tort was somehow related to the
maintenance of a public building” rather than those that focus on
the nature of the activity at issue.68 Utilizing this test, which
guarantees that fewer functions will be deemed proprietary, he
concluded that because the Plaintiff “was injured as a result of
activities that related to the maintenance of the Veterans Home
(incontestably a government building),” her case should not be
exempted from the statutory tort cap.69
There are stark implications for how “proprietary function” is
defined within the text of the statutory cap statute. The approach
adopted by Justice Robinson certainly has the effect of shrinking
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1058.
64. Id. at 1059.
65. Id. at 1058.
66. See Barrat v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1225 (R.I. 1985) (noting
that the purpose of the statutory tort cap is to “protect the state’s treasury
against excessive claims”).
67. Roach, 157 A.3d at 1058.
68. Id. at 1058. In abandoning the majority’s approach to defining
proprietary function, Justice Robinson remarked that “such a focus is not
rooted in the statutory language and constitutes an ‘Open Sesame’ for
enormous damage awards . . . .” Id. at 1061.
69. Id. at 1062.
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the number of plaintiffs that would enjoy exemption from the
statutory cap in tort actions against the State, which he believes
properly aligns with the purpose of the statute.70 However,
without clarification by the General Assembly as to the scope of
the “proprietary function” exception to the statutory cap, the true
intent of the General Assembly on this issue will remain unclear.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that statutory cap
under Rhode Island General Laws section 9-31-2 did not apply to
the case at bar because the Veterans Home’s resident care
activities of CNAs and contracted housekeepers constituted
proprietary functions. The Court reached this conclusion by
determining that these underlying functions were routinely
performed by private individuals.
Koye Idowu

70. See id. at 1063. “The obvious goal of the General Assembly in
enacting the Tort Claims Act was to allow some measure of relief to plaintiffs
seeking relief for alleged governmental torts while also protecting taxpayers
from having to be responsible for very large awards of damages.” Id.

Workers’ Compensation. Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.,
154 A.3d 913 (R.I. 2017). The Rhode Island Workers’
Compensation Act does not require coverage from a single policy
or insurer; an employer can satisfy the Act’s requirements with
multiple policies or multiple insurers. Where there is overlapping
coverage, liability is not determined by the forum in which the
injured employee decides to file a claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On October 26, 2004, Mark Furia, an iron worker for Ajax
Construction Company (Ajax), was injured on a job site in Milton,
Massachusetts.1 Furia filed a claim against Ajax in Rhode Island
Workers’ Compensation Court, and shortly thereafter, Ajax
petitioned the same court to determine which of its insurers would
be responsible for making payments to Furia.2 Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company (Liberty) was Ajax’s workers’ compensation
insurer in Massachusetts; Beacon Mutual Insurance Company
(Beacon) insured Ajax in Rhode Island.3
Ajax is based in Harrisville, Rhode Island, but does work in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Rhode Island.4 It carries workers’ compensation insurance in
every state where it does business.5 Premiums were calculated by
the wages earned by employees in each state—the premium on the
Liberty policy (Massachusetts) was $282,707, while the premium
on the Beacon policy (Rhode Island) was just $69,000.6 Furia, like
other iron workers, did not have one single place of employment,
but rather moved around to different job sites.7 He stated in his
deposition that he was hired at Ajax’s headquarters in Rhode
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ajax Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 154 A.3d 913, 916 (R.I. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 917.
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Island and had worked in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island during his twelve to fifteen years with the company.8 He
estimated he spent about seventy percent of his time working in
Massachusetts and thirty percent of his time working in Rhode
Island.9 Ajax’s president, Donald Morel, testified that
the
company could not predict where it would do most of its work in
any given year, but that historically, eighty percent of its work
had been done in Massachusetts.10 He stated that during the
year of Furia’s injury, 2004, Ajax did more work in Massachusetts
than in Rhode Island and it withheld Massachusetts income taxes
and paid Massachusetts employment taxes for its employees who
did work in that state.11
The Workers’ Compensation Court trial judge entered a
pretrial order on December 22, 2004 that held that Furia had
sustained a work-related injury; later that day, the trial judge
entered an interlocutory order requiring Beacon to pay benefits to
Furia.12 If, after trial, Beacon was found liable, it would receive a
credit for the payments it had already made to Furia; if Liberty
was found liable, it would be required to reimburse Beacon for all
the payments it had already made to Furia.13
The trial judge issued a bench decision on May 11, 2006,
finding Ajax liable to Furia under the Rhode Island Workers’
Compensation Act (the Act) because it had hired him in Rhode
Island.14 Beacon, in turn, was liable because Furia brought his
claim in Rhode Island and because Beacon had issued Ajax’s
policy pursuant to the Act.15 The trial judge found that Furia had
a right to payments from a single entity and designated Beacon to
make the payments; however, he also found that Ajax had
overlapping coverage in this case and that Liberty needed to
contribute to Furia’s benefits.16 Although the trial judge found
that the Act did not provide a particular remedy for this situation,
he believed that ordering the two insurers to each cover fifty
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916.
Id.
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id.
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percent of Furia’s benefits would be equitable and in line with the
equitable nature of workers’ compensation law.17 Beacon would
still pay Furia directly, but would receive a credit for the benefits
it had already paid; Liberty would indemnify Beacon for fifty
percent of the benefits paid to Furia.18
All three parties—Ajax, Beacon, and Liberty—appealed to the
Workers’ Compensation Appellate Division.19 Ajax argued that
Liberty should be responsible for 100 percent of Furia’s benefits
because Ajax was paying a premium of more than $280,000 per
year to cover its employees who worked in and were injured in
Massachusetts.20 Beacon made the argument, among others, that
the Liberty policy covered Furia and that the Act, specifically
Rhode Island General Laws section 28-36-5, did not provide for
Liberty to avoid paying benefits to Furia directly.21 Liberty
argued that the same section of the statute required Beacon to
cover Ajax’s entire liability, and that the Liberty policy only
covered Massachusetts employees, while Furia was a Rhode
Island employee.22
On November 7, 2013, Beacon moved for a decision from the
Appellate Division; there was no explanation for the seven-year
delay, which the Rhode
Island
Supreme
Court
found
troubling.23 The Appellate Division vacated the trial judge’s order
and held Beacon fully liable.24 It found that Furia was covered
under the Act, which states that policies apply to “any and all
employees . . . who are injured or hired in the state of Rhode
Island”25 and that “every policy shall cover the entire liability of
the employer . . . .”26 Beacon issued a policy to Ajax under the
Act; Furia brought his claim in Rhode Island, pursuant to the Act;
and the court awarded him benefits pursuant to the Act.27 The
Appellate Division found irrelevant the issue of which insurer had
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919.
Id. & n.4.
Id. at 919.
Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–29–1.3).
Id. (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–36–5).
Id.
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included the worker’s wages in determining the premium.28 It
also agreed with the trial judge that there was concurrent
jurisdiction because the Rhode Island Act covers employees hired
in Rhode Island, and the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation
Act covers employees injured in Massachusetts; therefore, if Furia
had filed his claim in Massachusetts, Liberty would have been
fully responsible.29
The Appellate Division examined the section in Liberty’s
policy regarding payment of benefits awarded in another state,
which stated that Liberty would pay “only if the claim for such
benefits involves work performed by a Massachusetts
employee . . . .”30 Given that the term “Massachusetts employee”
was not defined, the court turned to a bulletin issued by the
Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Rating and Inspection
Bureau (WCRIB).31 It defined “Massachusetts employee” as an
individual hired in Massachusetts to work primarily in
Massachusetts.32 Based on that definition, the Appellate Division
found that Furia was not a Massachusetts employee and therefore
Liberty was not responsible for paying benefits awarded to him in
Rhode Island.33
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the Ajax and
Beacon petitions for certiorari.34 Ajax argued the Appellate
Division erred in finding Beacon liable in full and in concluding
that Liberty’s policy did not cover the benefits awarded to Furia in
Rhode Island.35 Beacon made the argument, among others, that
the Appellate Division erred by allowing the forum in which Furia
filed his claim to dictate Liberty’s liability and by not interpreting
Liberty’s policy in the light most favorable to the insured—
Ajax.36
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court focused on two issues in its
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 920–21.
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review: whether the Appellate Division’s interpretation of
“Massachusetts employee” was correct, and whether its
interpretation of section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island General
Laws was correct, specifically the phrase “entire liability of the
employer.”37 The Court reviewed both the contract interpretation
issue and the statutory construction issue de novo.
Ajax argued that the term “Massachusetts employee” in the
Liberty policy was unambiguous and that the only reasonable
interpretation of that term was “an employee who works primarily
in Massachusetts.”38 It further argued that the Appellate
Division’s finding that Furia was not a Massachusetts employee
was “unreasonable and contrary to the plain and ordinary
meaning of the term” because Furia worked primarily in
Massachusetts.39 Ajax also argued in the alternative that by
turning to the WCRIB bulletin for a definition of “Massachusetts
employee,” the Appellate Division determined it was an
ambiguous term; therefore, the term should have been construed
against Liberty.40 Beacon argued, similarly, that the Appellate
Division should not have turned to the WCRIB bulletin because it
was not included with the Liberty policy or otherwise presented to
Ajax.41
Following “the rules of construction that govern contracts,”
the Court looked to give the term “Massachusetts employee” its
“plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.”42 The Court held that the
term was not ambiguous; in fact, any ordinary reader or purchaser
of the policy would have interpreted it the way Ajax did: a
Massachusetts employee is an individual who works primarily in
Massachusetts.43 The Court further held that the Appellate
Division should not have looked to the WCRIB bulletin because
the term was not ambiguous, and ambiguity was required for the
Appellate Division to turn to extrinsic evidence.44 Furthermore,
the Appellate Division never expressly found the term to be
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 921–22.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id. at 921–22.
Id. at 922.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 922–23.
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ambiguous, and, if it had, it would have been obligated to construe
the policy in favor of Ajax, the insured, and against Liberty, the
insurer.45 Given that Furia fit the definition of a Massachusetts
employee, the Court found Liberty liable for his workers’
compensation benefits, but had to determine whether Beacon was
also liable.46
Regarding the language in section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island
General Laws—“entire liability of the employer”—Ajax argued the
Appellate Division “erroneously broadened the scope” of the
statute and “failed to further” the legislative intent behind it.47
Ajax argued that nothing in the statute indicated that coverage
had to come from one policy and that the Appellate Division’s
interpretation would lead to “absurd, unintended and
unreasonable results.”48 Beacon argued that the phrase “entire
liability of the employer” was ambiguous and that the Appellate
Division’s interpretation would require employers to obtain
coverage from the same insurer in every jurisdiction.49 Beacon
argued that the phrase should be interpreted to mean that a
policy cannot exclude benefits required by the statute, but that the
benefits do not need to come from one policy.50
The Court agreed that the phrase was ambiguous and,
looking to the legislative intent, concluded the statute was
intended to ensure that employers obtained coverage for all their
employees, regardless of how many policies or insurers were used
to accomplish that.51 The Court found that the Appellate
Division’s interpretation held Beacon liable for coverage that was
not accounted for in its premiums while letting Liberty off the
hook for coverage that was accounted for in its much higher
premiums.52
The Court looked to a Connecticut Supreme Court case for
guidance, which held that “[f]ull coverage of the entire liability of
an employer at a given place or places, on specified work, fully
meets the intent of the statute in this respect,” otherwise, “it
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 923.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 923–24.
Id. at 924.
Id.
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would be necessary for an employer in all cases to obtain a single
policy covering all his liability in every place, and would prevent
his taking out several policies in different companies . . . .”53
Accordingly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that
employers should not be required to take out all of their policies
from the same insurer, especially if they can find savings through
different insurers.54 The Court also found the forum in which the
claim is filed to be irrelevant to liability in cases of overlapping
coverage, citing case law from other jurisdictions for support.55
Rejecting the Appellate Division’s findings on both issues—
the contract interpretation of “Massachusetts employee” and the
statutory construction of “entire liability of the employer”—the
Court found Liberty liable in full, and required Liberty to
reimburse Beacon for all payments made to Furia.56
COMMENTARY

The Court rightly found Liberty liable in this case. It would
be illogical for Beacon to be entirely liable for Furia’s benefits
simply because he chose to file his claim in Rhode Island. Injured
employees likely do not consider which of their employer’s
insurance companies will be liable when filing their workers’
compensation claims. Furthermore, Beacon makes a persuasive
argument that the term “Massachusetts employee” in the Liberty
policy is ambiguous and therefore should be construed in favor of
the insured, Ajax. Despite taking a different approach to this
issue, the Court arrived at the same result by finding the term
unambiguous and adopting Ajax’s interpretation. Lastly, the
Court’s interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language—
“entire liability of the employer”—appears to accomplish the
legislative intent. While it does not seem necessary in all
situations for only one insurer to be liable when there is
overlapping coverage, in this case, the circumstances pointed to
Liberty to pay in full. Ajax was paying premiums to Liberty to
cover exactly this sort of situation—an injury that took place in
53. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 155 A.
709, 713 (1931)).
54. Ajax, 154 A.3d at 924–25.
55. Id. at 925.
56. Id.
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Massachusetts to a worker who spent a majority of his time
working in Massachusetts—and therefore Liberty should be
responsible for paying the benefits in full. The Court’s analysis
produced a commonsense and equitable result.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the idea that the
forum in which an injured employee files a workers’ compensation
claim should dictate which of an employer’s insurers should be
liable. The Court also clarified the meaning of the ambiguous
phrase in section 28-36-5 of the Rhode Island Workers’
Compensation Act—“entire liability of the employer.”
An
employer can meet the statutory requirements through multiple
policies and multiple insurers; in fact, it would lead to absurd
results if employers were required to have only one policy or
insurer. The Court came to this conclusion by analyzing the
legislative intent of the statute and by looking to other
jurisdictions for guidance.
Jessie M. Reniere

Zoning. Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Ass’n v. Pres. Soc’y
of Newport Cty., 151 A.3d 1223 (R.I. 2017). Under the Zoning
Enabling Act, a local zoning board has the authority to interpret
zoning ordinances in determining whether to grant special use
permits and in considering challenges to the issuance of such
permits. Interpreting zoning ordinances does not require a zoning
board to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the pre-existing
use of property.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Preservation Society of Newport County (Society) has
operated the Breakers, a prominent mansion in Newport, Rhode
Island, as a museum since 1948.1 Until 1977, the Society
operated the Breakers as a museum “by right pursuant to the
zoning ordinance.”2 In that year, Newport amended the ordinance
to allow for museums in the zone where the Breakers is located,
but only by issuance of a “special use permit” by the City of
Newport Zoning Board of Review (Zoning Board or Board).3 In
1997, the Society applied for a special use permit to build a shed
to house a vending machine for visitors waiting to enter the
Breakers, and the Zoning Board granted the permit.4
In May 2013, the Society applied to the Newport Historic
District Commission (HDC) for a certificate of appropriateness for
a Welcome Center near the entrance to the Breakers.5 As
proposed, the Welcome Center would be approximately 3,650
square feet and would serve as a location for ticket sales,
1. Bellevue-Ochre Neighborhood Ass’n v. Pres. Soc’y of Newport Cty.,
151 A.3d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 2017). The Breakers was originally a summer
residence for the Vanderbilt family. Gladys Vanderbilt first opened it to the
public in 1948, and her heirs sold it to the Society in 1972. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1225–26, 1225 n.2 (explaining the process for applying to the
HDC).
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concessions, and restrooms.6 The HDC denied the application,
and the Society appealed to the Zoning Board.7 The Zoning Board
granted the Society’s application on March 1, 2014, reversing the
HDC’s ruling.8
On March 7, 2014, the Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood
Association (BOPNA), a corporation of property owners in the
neighborhood surrounding the Breakers, filed an action for
declaratory judgment in Rhode Island Superior Court.9 The
Society moved to dismiss the action, arguing in part that BOPNA
had improperly bypassed the Zoning Board and that “judicial
intervention in zoning matters should be reserved until the local
zoning process is finished.”10 The hearing justice granted the
Society’s motion to dismiss on July 18, 2014, determining that the
Zoning Board had the authority to address BOPNA’s claims.11
BOPNA appealed this ruling on September 9, 2014.12
After BOPNA filed its appeal, the Society applied for a
modification of the special use permit it had received in 1997.13
In a written decision, the Zoning Board granted the application
and “also addressed—and rejected—many of the arguments raised
in BOPNA’s complaint.”14 The Zoning Board asserted that,
contrary to BOPNA’s contention, the Breakers was not a
nonconforming use because it had received a special use permit in
1997.15 It also rejected BOPNA’s contention that the zoning
ordinance prohibited restaurants in the Breakers’ district by
stating that neither the Breakers nor the proposed Welcome
6. Id. at 1225.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1226. BOPNA’s claim asked for declarations that “the
Breakers is a lawful nonconforming use, and the Welcome Center’s
construction would be a prohibited movement or change in the land’s
nonconforming use; the Welcome Center will house a restaurant, and the
zoning ordinance prohibits restaurant operation on museum property; and,
lastly, the Welcome Center is an unpermitted accessory use on the Breakers
property.” Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The hearing justice also noted that BOPNA had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies. Id.
12. Id. at 1227.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Center operated primarily to sell food.16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court first sought to determine
the proper standard of review.17 While BOPNA insisted that the
Court review the case using the standard of Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Society contended
that the Court should conduct a de novo review because the
hearing justice considered “substantial materials outside of the
complaint’s four corners,” which “converted the motion to dismiss
to a summary judgment motion.”18 The Court found that the
hearing justice had considered several items outside the
complaint, including Newport’s 1977 and 1994 zoning ordinances
and all of the materials related to the 1997 special use permit.19
After determining that the hearing justice’s use of these materials
converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment, the Court proceeded with a de novo review.20
The Court then examined BOPNA’s complaint, ascertaining
at the outset of its analysis that “the crux of the issue before the
hearing justice was whether the [Z]oning [B]oard had the
authority to decide the issues raised in BOPNA’s complaint.”21
Although BOPNA asserted that its complaint presented issues of
law that only a court had the power to decide, the Court found no
basis for this argument.22 The Court found that the cases invoked
by BOPNA had held that a zoning board did not have authority to
issue declaratory judgments “regarding the pre-existing use of
property,” a matter entirely separate from interpreting zoning
ordinances.23 Looking instead to the Newport Zoning Code, the
Court found that the Zoning Board had the authority to interpret
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1228.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1228–29. The present version of the zoning ordinance was
adopted in 1994. Id. at 1229.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1229–30. While BOPNA cited two cases in support of this
argument, the Court found that neither stood for the proposition that a
zoning board lacked the authority to interpret zoning ordinances. Id. at
1230.
23. Id.
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its zoning ordinances.24 The Court noted that the Zoning Board
would not have had to make a declaratory judgment on the
Breakers’ pre-existing use if BOPNA had undertaken the proper
administrative procedures.25 Instead, the Court explained, “the
[Z]oning [B]oard would have to (and eventually did) interpret the
zoning ordinance’s provisions, review the society’s application, and
ultimately determine whether to grant a special use permit.”26
The Court also addressed the hearing justice’s application of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.27 BOPNA
argued that its complaint fell within an exception to the doctrine
because it claimed that the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction to
address the relevant issues.28 The Court, however, agreed with
the hearing justice that the Zoning Board had the power to hear
BOPNA’s complaint, and determined that the exception did not
apply.29 It similarly rejected BOPNA’s argument that an
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile, noting that
the Zoning Board had authority to hear BOPNA’s complaint and
had yet to issue a ruling on the proposed Welcome Center at the
time of the hearing justice’s ruling.30 The Court concluded,
therefore, that “BOPNA had a mechanism, through the [Z]oning
[B]oard, to pursue the issues asserted in its complaint.”31 BOPNA
also asked the Court to interpret the zoning ordinance itself.32
The Court refused to do so, however, in light of its determination
that the Zoning Board had the authority to decide the issues
24. Id. at 1229 (quoting Newport Zoning Ordinance § 17.112.010(A): “It
is the intent of this zoning code that all matters arising in connection with the
enforcement or interpretation of this zoning code, . . . shall be first presented
to the zoning officer; and . . . shall be presented to the zoning board of review
only on appeal . . . .”); see also 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-57(1)(i) (Supp.
2016) (granting zoning boards of review the power to hear and decide appeals
regarding any action “by an administrative officer or agency in the
enforcement or interpretation of this chapter, or of any ordinance adopted
pursuant hereto”).
25. Bellevue-Ochre, 151 A.3d at 1230.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1231.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court also agreed with the hearing justice that court
consideration of BOPNA’s complaint would run counter to the exhaustion of
remedies doctrine’s four purposes. Id.
30. Id. at 1232.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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raised in the complaint.33
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly established that
local zoning boards have the authority to interpret zoning
ordinances in hearing complaints.34 The Court also confirmed
that zoning boards do not have the authority to issue declaratory
judgments, and, thus, determined that such authority is separate
and distinct from the power to interpret zoning ordinances.35 The
Newport Zoning Board issued a declaratory judgment as part of
its decision to grant the modification to the Society’s special use
permit; however, this declaration did not affect the Zoning Board’s
ability to determine the meaning of the ordinance. Rather,
BOPNA’s preemptive filing in court prompted the Zoning Board to
address BOPNA’s concerns in its decision. Had BOPNA first
presented its challenge to the Zoning Board, the Board would not
have needed to issue a declaratory judgment.36
In this case, the Court sought to make clear that courts
should only be called upon to interpret a zoning ordinance after
the local zoning board has done so. The facts of this case revealed
that BOPNA likely expected that a review of its concerns by the
Zoning Board would be unfavorable in light of the Board’s decision
overruling the HDC. Thus, the Court’s decision foreclosed the
possibility of a party challenging the interpretation of a zoning
ordinance directly in court in the hope of a favorable ruling and
eliminated a form of forum shopping in zoning cases.
The Court also pointed out that compelling plaintiffs to seek
review by a zoning board before bringing an action in court
ensures a fairer and more developed case that promotes judicial
efficiency.37 Adjudication by a zoning board allows a more
complete version of the facts to take form before the case even
reaches the court, and allowing a zoning board to develop these
facts may prevent a court from expending the time to conduct its
own factfinding process.38 Proceeding in this manner also
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id. (quoting Doe ex rel. His Parents and Natural Guardians v. East

768 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:763
presents the possibility that the case will be resolved before it
reaches a court, thus eliminating the need for any intervention by
the judiciary.39 By applying the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this situation, the Court established
local zoning boards as vehicles of judicial economy in zoning cases;
by doing so, the Court looks to ensure that fewer of these cases
require judicial involvement, and that the ones that reach the
court are sufficiently well developed for judicial review.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a local zoning
board is vested with the power to interpret local zoning ordinances
when reaching decisions on whether to grant special use permits
and when faced with challenges to grants of such permits. The
Court found that Rhode Island’s Zoning Enabling Act explicitly
confers this power upon the boards, and that a zoning board’s
exercise of this power properly serves the interests of allowing the
board to apply its expertise and facilitating judicial economy.
Patrick Burns

Greenwich Sch. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 1258, 1266 (R.I. 2006)).
39. Id. (quoting Doe, 899 A.2d at 1266).

2017 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 51, 60. An Act Relating to Criminal
Procedure—Identification and Apprehension of Criminals. This
Act requires all persons eighteen years or older who volunteer or
work for a religious organization to undergo a national criminal
background check if the religious organization requests it. The
Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) will conduct the
background check and notify the religious organization within
fourteen days of any disqualifying information. Any offenses of
§§23-17-37, 11-37-1 to 11-37-8.4, and §§11-9-1 to 11-9-5.3 is
considered disqualifying information. The applicant is responsible
for the costs of the criminal records check.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 110, 174. An Act Relating to
Criminal Procedure—Criminal Injuries Compensation. This Act
allows criminal injury compensation for a child who suffers
emotional injury as a direct result of witnessing a homicide or
instance of domestic violence. The child, their guardian, a child
advocate, or legal representative may apply on behalf of the child
for compensation.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 132, 150. An Act Relating to
Insurance—Coverage for Infertility. This Act requires any health
insurance contract, plan, or policy that includes pregnancy-related
benefits to provide coverage for fertility preservation services when
medically necessary medical treatment may cause iatrogenic
infertility to a covered person. This Act also applies to nonprofit
hospital service, nonprofit medical service, and health maintenance
organization service contracts, plans, or policies.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 133, 146. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses—Fraud and False Dealing. This Act
criminalizes a person who, with the intent to defraud, knowingly
omits a material fact or makes a written misrepresentation during
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the mortgage lending process with the intention that a mortgage
lender, borrower, or other person will rely on that
misrepresentation or omission. This Act also includes the knowing
use or facilitation of an omission or misrepresentation of a material
fact during the mortgage lending process with the intention that a
mortgage lender, borrower, or other person will rely on that
misrepresentation or omission. Solicitation or conspiracy are also
prohibited by this Act. Violators of the Act shall be subject to
imprisonment of not more than ten years, a fine not more than
$10,000, or both. Furthermore, the violator will be forced to
disgorge any profits and pay restitution to any victims. The
penalties may be increased if the offender knew the victim was
vulnerable due to age, disability, infirmity, reduced physical or
mental capacity, or national origin.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 167. An Act Relating to Motor and
Other Vehicles—Mobile Telephone Use. This Act prohibits
operators of motor vehicles from using a hand-held personal
wireless communication device to make calls while the vehicle is in
motion. The Act presumes that a hand-held personal wireless
communication device in the immediate proximity of the operator’s
ear while the vehicle is in motion to be making a call. Listening or
talking on such a device is considered “engaging in a call,” but
activating or deactivating a function of the phone is not. This Act
does not apply to communicating with an emergency response
officer, hospital, doctor’s office, fire department, ambulance
company, police department, or public utility. Further, this Act
does not apply to peace officers, firefighters, operators of an
emergency vehicle, taxi-cab drivers, tow-truck operators, or
employees or agents of a public utility. Finally, this Act does not
apply to a hands-free device. Violation of this Act will result in a
$100 fine, except for first-time offenders who purchase a hands-free
device prior to imposition of the fine.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 186, 328. An Act Relating to Health
and Safety—Department of Health. This Act prohibits any licensed
medical, mental health, or human services professional from
advertising or engaging in conversion therapy for patients under
eighteen years old. Conversion therapy means any practice that
seeks to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender
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identity. Conversion therapy does not include counseling that
provides assistance to those undergoing gender transition or
provides support for identity exploration. Conversion therapy
provided by a licensed professional shall be considered
unprofessional conduct and subject them to discipline by the
department including suspension and revocation of the
practitioner’s license.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 207, 250. An Act Relating to Food
and Drugs—Uniform Controlled Substances Act. This Act requires
any health care professional authorized to issue prescriptions, prior
to an initial prescription of an opioid drug, to discuss the risk of
developing dependence or addiction and potential overdose with the
patient. The health care professional must also discuss the adverse
risk of concurrent alcohol or other psychoactive medication use and
discuss other alternative treatments, if appropriate.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 435. An Act Relating to Motor and
Other Vehicles—Motor Vehicle Offenses. This Act creates penalties
for a second violation within a five year period with respect to
refusal of a blood test. The penalties are a fine of $600 to $1,000;
60 to 100 hours of community service; and suspension of the
offender’s driver’s license for two years. For a third violation,
penalties are a fine of $800 to $1,000; not less than 100 hours of
community service; and suspension of the offender’s driver’s license
for between 2 and 5 years. Additionally, the sentencing judicial
officer shall require alcohol and/or drug treatment for that person
and prohibit them from operating a motor vehicle not equipped with
an ignition interlock system.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 222, 334. An Act Relating to
Domestic Relations—Visitation Rights. This Act specifies a list of
factors for the family court to consider on a case-by-case basis in
determining whether grandparents get visitation rights. In
considering whether it is in the child’s best interest, courts now
consider:
(A) The nature of the relationship between the child and
the grandparent seeking visitation;
(B) The amount of time the grandparent and child spent
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together;
(C) The potential detriments and benefits to the child from
granting visitation;
(D) The potential effect of granting visitation on the
parent-child relationship;
(E) The preferences of the grandchild who is of sufficient
intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference; and
(F) The reasons that the parent(s) believe that it is not in
their child’s best interests to have visitation with the
grandparent(s).
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 229, 318. An Act Relating to
Education—Student Journalists’ Freedom of Expression Act. This
Act extends the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press
in school-sponsored media to student journalists regardless of
financial support by the school. This Act does not authorize or
protect expression that is libelous or slanderous, constitutes an
invasion of privacy, violates a federal or state law, or incites
students into creating a clear and present danger of an unlawful
act, violation of school district policy, or a material and substantial
disruption of the orderly operation of the school. A student
journalist may not be disciplined for acting in accordance with this
Act. A student media advisor may not be dismissed, suspended,
disciplined, reassigned, transferred, or retaliated against for
protecting a student journalist, or refusing to infringe on conduct
protected by this Act.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 232, 260. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses—Uniform Act on the Prevention of and
Remedies For Human Trafficking. This Act repealed and replaced
the law titled “Trafficking of Persons and Involuntary Servitude.”
Any person that knowingly recruits, transports, transfers, harbors,
receives, provides, obtains, isolates, maintains, or entices an
individual to further forced labor or sexual servitude commits
human trafficking. The Act defines “forced labor” as knowingly
using coercion to compel another to provide labor or services, except
when otherwise permissible. “Sexual servitude” occurs when one
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knowingly either: (1) maintains or makes available a minor for the
purpose of engaging the minor in commercial sexual activity; or (2)
uses coercion or deception to compel an adult to engage in
commercial sexual activity. The Act also criminalizes individuals
who knowingly patronize a victim of sexual servitude and business
entities who engage in human trafficking. In addition, the Act
includes aggravating factors for recruiting the victim from shelters
that serve victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, or foster
children and kidnapping or holding an individual against his or her
will. The identity or images of the alleged victim will be kept
confidential unless they are necessary for investigation or
prosecution, and the past sexual behavior of the victim is generally
not admissible. The Act also provides immunity for minor victims
of this crime and presumes them abused and/or neglected, while
also providing an affirmative defense to prostitution and
solicitation charges for victims. The Act creates a civil action
victims can bring against traffickers for compensatory damages,
punitive damages, injunctive relief, and any other appropriate
relief. The court will award attorneys’ fees and costs if the action is
successful. The statute of limitations for that action is ten years
after an individual was last a victim of trafficking, or turned
eighteen years old, whichever is later. The Act also creates a
council, appointed by the governor, to develop plans to provide
victims with services, author an annual report to the governor,
promote awareness of the topic, coordinate prevention services for
employees who come into recurring contact with victims, and any
other appropriate activities. Further, the Act requires any public
or quasi-public transportation service to display an awareness sign.
Certain employers, like strip-clubs or job recruitment centers, must
also display the public awareness sign. The Act requires law
enforcement to give an I-914B or I-918B form provided by the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to someone
reasonably believed to be a victim.
2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 344, 354. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses—General Provisions. This Act revises the
previous definition of “bodily injury,” and broadens felony assault
to include assaults that does not result in injury. “Bodily injury”
now includes physical injury that causes physical pain, illness, or
any impairment of physical condition.
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2017 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 386, 424. An Act Relating to Human
Services—Abused and Neglected Children. This Act requires
physicians or registered nurse practitioners or other health care
providers involved in the delivery or care of infants born with or
affected by substance abuse resulting from prenatal drug exposure
or fetal alcohol spectrum disorder to report the incident to the
Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) or a law
enforcement agency.

